

ACCULTURATION AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE SOVIET BALTIC REPUBLICS*

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My aim here is to present some considerations and evidence on a continuing problem to the Soviet regime in the Baltic republics evoked by the persisting contradictions between the processes of political socialization and acculturation of autochthonous Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian peoples. The first of these processes will be referred to here without extended definitions as sovietization, and the other one, broadly, as russification. I will present evidence on the continuing clashes between the two, and will also point out certain policies of the regime which, in the eyes of autochthonous populations, appear to be either discriminatory, or, more important, are perceived as endangering ethnic identity and existence. In this report, the validity of claims of discrimination and of perceived dangers is *not* based on the regime's proclamations or denials, but on the views held by the autochthonous Baltic peoples toward these policies (eg., the regime's persistent assurances that no russification - assimilation policies are being pursued in Latvia runs counter to the feelings of many Latvians who, according to the censuses of 1959 and 1970, are rapidly becoming a national minority in their own union republic.).

The argument and conclusions presented here are based on evidence from the 1950's and 1960's, along with some very recent examples, all of which are drawn from a close reading of the Soviet Baltic press, from interviews, and from a recent personal visit. The basic premise, which also indirectly justifies the present paper, is that the regime's efforts at sovietization, expended over the past quarter of a century, have resulted in a rather complete adoption of the soviet political and economic frames of reference in the Baltic area, and internalization of basic institutional and operational framework, but have not filled the local populations with feelings favorable, or even tolerant, of Russian national - cultural values and content. Thus, the problem of frictional relationship between the two persists. The question, then, is why has the process of socialization - acculturation developed in this particular fashion? What are the chances of a successful resolution of this dilemma?

One of the clashes between political socialization and acculturation - assimilation is caused by the aroused general apprehensions on the part of local Baltic populations. The intensity of these apprehensions tends to slow down not only the process of acculturation but tends to hamper the process of socialization also. The feeling on the part of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians that they are being treated, *in practice*, unequally with Russians elicits, overcompensating reaction that tends to overemphasize their own national peculiarities and characteristics. This reaction has resulted, at various times, in an increased idealization of their own past.¹ It shows up in the form of a nationalistic trend in the evaluations and teachings of their national literatures² and in a spontaneous revival and intensification of observances of traditional folk-customs and holidays.³ It has manifested itself in a heightened emphasis on and pursuit of national folk themes in creative music, writing, and the depicting arts.⁴ It shows up in increased attention to the study of national ethnography, intensified efforts at conservation of local archeological monuments, buildings, even of religious shrines, on the grounds of protection of national heritage.⁵ The manifestations of this heightened concern motivated by what can be defined only as cultural nationalism have been added to recurring incidents of reported public slights of Russians and things Russian. It has also resulted in demonstrations of the continued existence of national spirit and of nationalist feelings on the now forbidden national anniversaries, eg., national independence commemorations, religious holidays, and during the traditional folk-song festivals.⁶

The process of acculturation - assimilation is likely to be further slowed down by its inherent clash with the processes of political socialization, the latter being the officially proclaimed and constantly reiterated policy in an attempt to induce among the autochthonous populations feelings of Soviet patriotism, and loyalty to the Soviet Union, while at the same time claiming to maintain and to support local ethnic cultures. The open proclamation and constant reiteration of these two

aspects of the policy of socialization, proclaiming, as it were, "unity in diversity," tends to contradict existing covert and informal pressures to move the ethnic groups towards acculturation - assimilation. Indeed, these two parts of the socialization policy have been most insistently repeated and emphasized in the Baltic republics as in other national regions of the USSR through the indoctrination - socialization apparatus. They force acculturation or subordination of one culture to another in the most unobtrusive fashion.

The potential clash between policies of political socialization and acculturation, like the clash between socialization and discrimination, was recognized early by Party leadership. There is evidence indicating that both Lenin and Stalin realized that permissiveness on the part of the All - Union Communist Party leadership towards manifestations of Great Russian chauvinism would turn the task of creating loyalty to the Soviet system among the national minorities into a very complex and delicate one.⁷ It was further recognized that a russification policy by itself known today euphemistically as "insufficient attention to national peculiarities"⁸ would call forth an intense anti-Russian feeling, and thus, presumably, would make the task of political socialization, that of creating loyal Soviet citizens, even more difficult.⁹

In other words, Party leadership realized at times that official pressure to assimilate, to russify, or even to sanction discrimination on any grounds would only create national minority counter pressures, and that the resulting tension, together with its eventual outcome, would not necessarily be in the long-term interests of the Party or the Soviet state.

Indeed, objectively, the Communist Party had had in the past, and continues to have today, two basic alternative courses of action in the field of nationality policy: *either* to move the autochthonous nationalities towards greater loyalty to the Soviet Union as a whole (socialization), *or* to attempt to acculturate - assimilate them (russification). These two broad aims are inherently contradictory in their mass emotional appeal, and, therefore, a persistent, *open* pursuit of both policies simultaneously was and is unlikely, while the longterm success of these policies, even if both are attempted at the same time, is extremely doubtful.

In fact, apart from very short-lived aberrations, the evidence in the Soviet Baltic republics shows that only "Soviet patriotism" and the *very distant* fusion (*Sliianie*) of all nations into a "socialist culture" has been publicized outside the USSR, while open or even covert references to the potential loss of cultural identity to the *Russians* are completely absent.¹⁰ Since 1961, emphasis has been placed on the continued close cooperation and greater unity among *all* soviet socialist nations. The programmatic statements made on the All-Union level throughout the sixties recognized, at least on paper, the continued existence of ethnic-national differences for the foreseeable future,¹¹ and indicated that the process of moving the nations and their cultures closer together will be accomplished on the basis of "voluntariness and democratism"¹² Similar interpretations of the question of national identities continue to be echoed by the local Baltic authorities in their own republics.¹³

The second part of the officially announced mode of socialization, namely, the development of ethnic cultures "national in form and socialist in content," also tends to impair to a considerable degree the efforts at local russification, while affecting negatively — although to a much lesser extent — the efforts at doctrinal-ideological integration. The regime, in pursuit of its goal to demonstrate to the Baltic peoples their national cultural sovereignty under socialism, and perhaps in order to provide at least partially acceptable substitutes for political activity, has consciously fostered mass participation in cultural, sports, and recreational functions. The increased active popular participation in such events has been consistently hailed by the local Baltic Party functionaries as the clearest manifestation of the flourishing of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian cultures, and as evidence of the great national-cultural benefits that these peoples have reaped under the Soviets.¹⁴

Indeed, there is a plethora of Soviet data indicating that there have been substantial increases in the numbers of amateur artistic, choral, and folk-dance groups.¹⁵ The number of active participants in sports competitions has also been on the rise.¹⁶ The institution and fostering of such mass activities appears to have been utilized in an effort to combat local manifestations of political and cultural nationalism and to diminish the attractiveness of local religious observances and festivities. The competition with religious rites has been stressed more recently, and, generally, a concerted effort has been made to impart more "socialist content" to the leisure activities of the populations.¹⁷ For example, the former traditional celebrations of religious and ethnic-national significance have been replaced by regional and republican mass song and folk-dance festivals, sports competitions, and other entertainments, held at the time of former commemorations, and these now have been declared to be of a "folk traditional nature."¹⁸

On the other hand, the organization of mass folk-festival in the Baltic republics, in which tens of thousands of performers in national costumes, and hundreds of thousands of spectators participate,¹⁹ is likely to *increase* over the long run, rather than diminish the difficulties the local Party encounters with local nationalism. It is true that many of the compositions performed at these festivals have been created during the Soviet period. Many songs are translations whether from Russian or other languages, or are performed in the original languages in which they were written. It is also true that all of these compositions are permeated with varying amounts of "socialist content." However, a considerable number of works performed are still of the traditional-national Baltic folk variety.²⁰ These are the well-known "classics" of longstanding, whose performance on a grand scale rings a nostalgic, nationalistic note in at least some of the listeners' hearts. As a result, the local national pride in its own culture, language, and traditions is increased, the feeling of national separateness and identity is magnified, the feeling of loss of true independence for one's own national culture is made more acute, and

thus much of the regime's intended impact of ideological indoctrination and cultural assimilation is diminished, if not altogether destroyed.²¹ It is therefore not surprising that some of the mass festivals, eg., more recently the Estonian folksong festival in Tallinn held in 1969, turn into very thinly veiled public manifestation of the spirit of local nationalism.²²

Also, such seemingly politically harmless activity as the increased participation of sportsmen from the Baltic republics—individuals or entire teams—on the All-Union, inter-republican, or even international competition level, have, on occasion, given rise to manifestations of local national feelings, and of local national pride of considerable intensity.²³ The inter-republican team—sports events in Moscow and in other cities where the meets take place, apparently cause outbursts of ethnic nationalism, which, in the context of the usual common alignment of national ethnic groups against the Great Russians, manifest more than just a passing fans' interest in the outcome of a particular event.²⁴

In addition to the contradictions noted in the regime's pursuit of socialization within the context of its formula "national in form and socialist in content," there also exists a policy or at least a strong popular suspicion of one that also tends to hamper or work at crosspurposes with the process of political socialization. This policy is a much less clearly delineated and more covert effort to acculturate local populations by cultural penetration in a more narrow assimilationist sense, in the form of russification. The policy of russification (and it is not particularly important for our purposes here whether it is truly "real" in its intent, or partially "imaginary" — a figment of feverish nationalist imagination) can be defined, in the setting of the Soviet Baltic republics, as a conscious, but not necessarily openly admitted pursuit of certain policies by the regime. The results of them consists at least in part of the effective imposition of Great Russian cultural values, language, or customs on the autochthonous Baltic nationalities, or in a dilution of their cultural-national heritage, and thus they pose a threat to the continued ethnic existence of these nationalities. This definition would then include even those policies pursued by the regime in the cultural, economic, or ideological fields, which the local Baltic peoples *merely perceive* as representing conscious russification, and as a result not only view them with great apprehension but also resist them.

The policies of russification, or those viewed as such by the local populace, are in reality so closely intertwined with the more general policies of ideological penetration — socialization that it is difficult to separate them and their impact even for the purposes of analysis. Available evidence suggests that even for a Lithuanian, Latvian, or Estonian national presently living in the USSR, the problem of assigning any one of the three possible classifications (socialization - sovietization, acculturation - russification, or both) to *any* given Kremlin policy pursued in the Baltic republics is mainly a question of subjective, emotionally heavily tainted, and largely nationalistically colored judgment.

Upon closer examination it appears that this judgment is primarily dependent on the intensity of one's feelings of local nationalism, and on one's personal acceptance or rejection of the proclaimed Soviet overall goals with respect to the nationality of which one is a member. That is, ostensibly a specific policy pursued by the Kremlin such as the requirement of intensive study of the Russian language in local schools may be regarded by some local "ultrapatriots" as an outrage to the local nationality, while others, of more moderate patriotic persuasion, may view it as a useful and reasonably justifiable measure introduced for the sake of improved intercommunication and more efficient management of the Soviet Union.²⁵

A study of materials relating to the views and suspicions of the Baltic peoples expressed towards russification during the fifties and sixties suggests that for the purposes of analysis, the Soviet regime's policies can be grouped under five headings to which the label of Baltic russification was and to some degree still is attached by a considerable number of local nationals. Since I have done a more detailed analysis of these five categories elsewhere,²⁶ I will list these five kinds of typical policies together with the typical views that they have evoked.

The first of the policies to which an "assimilationist" label could be attached was that of cultural isolation of the Baltic peoples combined with an effective severance of family ties with their own nationals in the West, many of whom especially among the Lithuanians had emigrated before World War I. This policy was consistently pursued by the regime until the late fifties, and only presently does it appear to have become less restrictive, consequently being less resented.²⁷

The second policy was that of claiming Russian cultural superiority and technical excellence of the 1946 -1948 "Zhdanovshchina" variety advanced during the forties and early fifties, which probably made very little real impact, and was generally met with derision, especially among the more culturally and economically advanced Baltic peoples.²⁸ Combined with these claims are the continuing, references glorifying the Great Russian nation and its leading role in the USSR, which appear to give continued affront and thus provide considerable justification to the local outcries of russification.²⁹

The third policy consists of extensive revision of the historiography of the Baltic peoples which, in their eyes, goes far beyond the demands of the Marxist - Leninist ideology. The revisions throughout the fifties and sixties appear to attempt to inculcate into the Baltic peoples feelings of traditional friendship to the Russians and the Tsarist state, and emphasize the progressive cultural influences which have devolved upon the Baltic nationals from their being incorporated into the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century.³⁰ The regime's decision to permit teaching of local Lithuanian, Latvian, or Estonian history only within the general framework of the history of the USSR, instead of treating it as separate subject, also gives rise to continued accusations of cultural russification, because of the shortage of class time which can be devoted to this — in the eyes of local Baltic peoples — very important aspect of their national historical heritage.³¹

The fourth category of complaints, more important and apparently more intensely felt than those already mentioned, concerns the requirement to study Russian language in all schools, starting with the second grade.³² It is true that since

1959 the meeting of the requirement has ostensibly been made voluntary.³³ Nevertheless, it appears that the study of the Russian language is urged by local Party authorities and in practice is universally enforced.³⁴ The official urgings to improve this knowledge, the creation and maintenance of a considerable number of schools in which nationalities are purposely mixed, and the stress laid on effective bilinguality among the populace, all indicate the significance of the language question. The question of the knowledge of local Baltic languages by new arrivals from other republics, as well as the mastery of local languages by state, party, and technical cadres appointed to local positions of responsibility in the Baltic republics, continues to be a significant local irritant, as events in Latvia in 1959, and in the other two Baltic republics since then have shown.³⁵

Given the Eastern European context in which nationality closely follows language, it is not surprising that language problem has increased the cultural and linguistic sensibilities of the autochthonous Baltic peoples. Increasingly, they have begun to view the preferential status of the Russian language and culture as a discriminatory attack upon themselves and their own cultural values, and, therefore, have begun to retaliate. Incidents have been reported in the Soviet Baltic press and by eyewitnesses, in which Baltic nationals have publicly refused to understand or speak Russian,³⁶ boycotted artistic performances by Russian ensembles,³⁷ refused to applaud or even booed Russian works performed at concerts,³⁸ and in other ways have continued to demonstrate "their ethnic particularities" whenever opportunity arose.³⁹ Thus, the language question, which is of the utmost importance for its role in long-range cultural assimilation, still continues to be a highly sensitive one in the Baltic area. This explains the use of the language issue as an occasion for open manifestation of feelings of local cultural nationalism that carries within itself only thinly disguised political overtones.

The fifth category of policies in the area of potential russification is that of a conscious, or possibly inadvertent, creation of a "melting pot" environment for the local Baltic nationalities. This is done through transfers of autochthonous populations out of the three republics,⁴⁰ and was a common occurrence for a variety of reasons until about 1953.⁴¹ It was also done more commonly, through the migration of a large number of Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians into the Baltic area, and has continued up to the present time. As the 1970 census data show, the cumulative impact of population transfers into the Baltic republics has been unequal. By 1970 there were already some 705,000 Great Russians in Latvia; in Estonia, 335,000; and in Lithuania, 268,000; comprising 29.8 percent, 24.7 percent, and 8.6 percent of the total populations in these three republics, respectively.⁴² The continuation of this trend in Latvia has elicited objections on the part of local Latvian Communist Party leaders as early as 1959,⁴³ and apparently even more recently,⁴⁴ but without much avail. The long term impact of such continued transfers is likely to turn local Baltic peoples into minorities within their own republics, with all the dangers such a development would entail to the continued preservation of their separate national - cultural identities. Even the Lithuanians, who are less affected by this policy, are also aware of the "melting pot" danger, as published Soviet denials of such apprehensions indicate.⁴⁵ Eyewitness accounts suggest the existence of a considerable amount of local hostile feeling toward the new arrivals, widespread and intense unwillingness of the Baltic nationals to be employed outside of their own republics for prolonged periods, and even ostracism of those who emigrate for their own personal advantage.⁴⁶

Space does not permit an extensive evaluation of the impact of all of these assimilation's policies on the Baltic peoples, since we are dealing here with the problems and clashes arising between the processes of socialization and assimilation. The available evidence suggests, however, that the regime's attempts to eliminate, or at least effectively subdue, the feelings of local cultural nationalism have not yet borne satisfactory results. The manifestations of local nationalist-colored "deviations," a list too lengthy to present here,⁴⁷ and the constant need to repeat exhortations and call for increased vigilance in "internationalist upbringing" by local Baltic Communist Party leaders⁴⁸ suggests that the 25-year effort to achieve complete political socialization in the Baltic republics continue to be hampered effectively by local nationalism. This indicates that the enormous indoctrination efforts that have been expended locally to insure political socialization — an automatic, completely internalized, conformity only with Soviet - approved values — have not yet been completely successful. Due to the contradictions between these two sets of policies, the degree of overall social-political transformation is, at the present time, still below levels that the local Baltic Party leadership and its Kremlin superiors would like to see. Thus, the problem of policy toward national groups in the Soviet Baltic republics remains in part unresolved, perhaps less so in its political-ideological aspects, but certainly more so in its cultural - social aspects.

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1 Eg., A. Sniečkus, first secretary of the CC CP of Lithuania, *Ataskaitinis Pranešimas Lietuvos Komunistų Partijos XII Suvažiavime...* (Report to the XII Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania..., (Vilnius, 1960), hereafter cited as Sniečkus, *LCP XII Congress*). Also more recently, Sniečkus in *Tiesa*, February 29, 1972.

2 Eg., A. J. Sniečkus, *Otchetnyi Doklad Tesentral'nogo Komiteta KP Litvy X S'ezdu Partii: Postanovlenie X S'ezda KP Litvy*, (Vilnius, 1958), pp. 66-67 (hereafter Sniečkus, *Doklad X S'ezdu KP Litvy*). Also, A. Venclova, *Pergalė*, (February 1959), pp. 137-144.

3 Sniečkus, *LCP XII Congress*, pp. 62 - 63.

4 Eg., Griškevičius, *Komunistas* (December, 1961), p. 33. Undusk *Kommunist Estonii* (February 1957), pp. 37-38. Sniečkus, *Pergalė*, (November 1960), pp. 6-10, also in *Tiesa*, March 4, 1971.

5 *Kultūros Barai* (August 1971), pp. 41-42. N. S. Khrushchev in his January 17, 1961 speech to the Plenum of the CC, CPSU, objected to the wasteful practices of reconstruction of "feudal estates and castles, many of which do not have any serious historical value" in Lithuania (*Tiesa*, January 22, 1961). There was also an extensive discussion on the topic of restoration of "architectural monuments" in Lithuania among which there were "included over two hundred churches, chapels and belltowers" by J. Maniušis, then secretary of the CC of the Lithuanian CP (*Tiesa*, July 27, 1961).

6 Eg., see *Soviet Affairs: Notes*, No. 205 (April 11, 1957), pp. 3, 6-8. Eyewitness accounts, *Draugas* (Chicago) May 19, 1962; *Dirva* (Cleveland) February 19, 1960; *Literatūra ir Menas*, July 12, 1969, p. 10 on the Estonian Song Festival of June 28 -29, 1969.

7 See V. I. Lenin "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomizing,'" as given for example in L. Gruliov (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies*, II, (N. Y., 1957), pp. 214-16. The publication of Lenin's views on the nationality question was given wide publicity in the All-Union and local Baltic press, eg., see *Komunistas* (July 1956), pp. 8-20 for reprint of Lenin's documents. See also J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, (Moscow, 1935), especially pp. 141-146, 155 -157, 261 - 263.

8 Eg., A. Sniečkus, „Labai svarbi naujo žmogaus auklėjimo sąlyga," ("A Very Important Condition for the Upbringing of the New Man") *Komunistas* (April 1962), p. 16.

9 See Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, pp. 155 - 61.

10 Eg., ef., J. Stradin, "Mysli o znamenii russkogo iazyka dlia latyshskoi kult'ury," *Komunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (October, 1961), pp. 43-47. M. Kammari, "Stroitel'stvo kommunizma razvitie natsionalnykh iazykov," *Kommunist Estonii* (May 1960), pp. 76-87.

11 See eg., the CPSU Program adopted on October 31, 1961 at the XXII CPSU Congress, specifically the section on "The Tasks of the Party in the Field of National Relations," as given, for example, in *Kommunist*, No. 16 (November 1961), pp. 84 - 86.

12 N. S. Khrushchev in his speech on the new Party program to the XXII Congress of CPSU (*Pravda*, October 19, 1961, p. 7).

13 Eg., Iu. Ruben, secretary of the CC of Latvian CP, "XXIII s' ezd KPSS i internatsional'noe vospitanie trudiashchikhsia," *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (December 1966), pp. 9-17; G. Zimanas, "Partijos nacionalinės politikos jėga," (The Power of Party's Nationality Policy) in Lietuvos TSR "Žinijos" Draugijos Valdyba, *Lenininės nacionalinės politikos keliu* (On the Road of Leninist Nationality Policy) (Vilnius, 1970), pp. 28-32. A good overall analysis of the process is given on the basis of Latvian experience in A. I. Kholmogorov, *Internatsional'nye cherty sovetskikh natsii* (Na materialakh konkretnosotsiologicheskikh issledovaniakh v Pribaltike) (Moscow, 1970), *passim*.

14 Eg., see the speech by K. Preikštas, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the Lithuanian SSR, on the opening of the Song Festival in Vilnius, *Tiesa*, July 24, 1960; also *Tiesa*, November 2, 1960; V. Laciš, *Sovetskaia Latviia*, July 23, 1955; I. Kebin, "Dvadsat' sovetskikh let," *Kommunist Estonii* (July 1960), pp. 6-7.

15 Eg., by 1960 in Lithuania there were 220,000 "singers, dancers, musicians, amateur group members." That is, one out of every thirteen inhabitants partook in some kind of organized amateur-artistic activity (*Tiesa*, June 30, 1960). In the republic there were more than 11,000 active choruses, drama and folk-dancing groups, orchestras, and folk-ensembles. Since 1950 the membership in all these amateur groups had tripled (V. Jakelaitis, *Komunistas* (June 1960), p. 15).

16 *Tiesa*, July 2, 1959.

17 Eyewitness account, *Dirva*, February 5, 1960. Also, Ruben, *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (December 1966), p. 13; S. Šimkus, "Ob internatsional'nom vospitanii truzhennikov sela," *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (January 1967), pp. 58-59.

18 Eg., spring festival in Vilnius (*Tiesa*, March 24, 1959); summer festival—formerly St. John's Feast—at Rambynas (*Tiesa*, June 30, 1959); The same is true in Latvia (Kholmogorov, p. 81), and in Estonia, *Kommunist Estonii* (July 1968), pp. 30 - 32. See favorable analyses of these developments from the political point of view by Ruben, *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (December 1966), p. 13 and by Sniečkus, *Tiesa*, March 2, 1960.

19 In the Song and Folk-Dance Festival which took place in July 1960 in Vilnius there were more than 30,000 performers and more than 100,000 spectators (*Tiesa*, July 2, 26, 1960). In a similar event in June 1969 in Tallinn there were 30,000 performers and about 200,000 spectators (*Literatūra ir Menas*, July 12, 1969, p. 10).

20 See, eg., (n.a.), *Dainų Šventė* (The Song Festival) (Vilnius, 19), *passim*, and Vyt. Jakelaitis, *Lietuvos dainų šventės* (The Song Festivals of Lithuania) (Vilnius, 1970), *passim*, for the listings of performances and for a heavily illustrated accounts of the proceedings. See also K. J. Strazdins (ed.), *Istorija 'Latviiskoi SSR*, 3 vols. (Riga, 1952-58), III, 695, and G. I. Naan (ed.), *Istorii Estonskoi SSR*, 2nd ed., (Tallinn, 1958), pp. 666-67 for similar events in Latvia and Estonia.

21 According to eyewitnesses, this is an important by-product of the mass festivals (eg., Mateika, *Dirva*, February 12, 1960).

22 *Literatūra ir Menas*, July 12, 1969 p. 10. *Pergalė* (August 1966), pp. 186- 187. *Vienybė* (New York), April 24, 1970, p. 6.

23 Eg., see press reports *Tiesa*, April 30, 1957; August 14, 1958; September 11, 1960; March 28, 1961. Also *Sportas* (Vilnius) of October 28, 1967 as cited in *Elta Information Service*, No. 12 December 20, 1967). Apparently when sportsmen from the Lithuanian SSR compete with teams from other Union republics, the emphasis for the sportsmen themselves, and for their compatriots is clearly on the *Lithuanian*, and indeed, the sole inscription Lietuva (Lithuania) on their official uniforms indicates as much (*Tiesa*, May 7, 1957).

24 Interview materials with W. C. B. (1962); V. A. (1970); eyewitness accounts *Draugas*, May 19, 1962; Mateika, *Dirva*, February 12, 1960.

25 Most of the Baltic émigré writers interpret any Soviet move in the direction of manipulation of local cultures, and any measure which has been instituted to serve the USSR as a whole, simply as a manifestation of the russification policy bent upon an unqualified exploitation and subjection of the Baltic nationalities for purposes of the Great Russians — see eg., V. Rastenis, "The Russification of Non-Russian Peoples in the Russian Empire," *Lituanus*, V, No. 4 (December 1959), 103-107. V. Vaitiekūnas, "Soviet Cultural Invasions," *Baltic Review*, No. 9 (December 1956), pp. 58-67. A. Kaelas, *Das Sowjetisch besetzte Estland* (Stockholm, 1958), *passim*.

The earlier American and English scholarship treating developments of Soviet nationality policy in minority areas in the immediate post-World War II period tended to interpret them primarily as manifestation of russification — eg., see Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oaford UP, 1956), *passim*. Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (London, 1952), *passim*.

The more recent American and English scholarship appears to strike a more balanced view between the requirements of a multinational totalitarian state and the policies of acculturation pursued —eg., see Hugh Seton-Watson, "Moscow's Imperialism," *Problems of Communism*, XIII, No. 1 (January - February 1964), 16-19 and other articles in the same issue; Alex Inkeles, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective," in *Russia Under Khrushchev*, ed. by Abraham Brumberg (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 300-21; Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in *Prospects for Soviet Society*, ed. by Allen Kassof (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 143-198; see also views expressed by several writers in Erich Goldhagen (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1968), *passim*.

26 Benedict Mačiuika, "The Baltic States Under Soviet Russia: A Case Study in Sovietization," Ph. D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1963, pp. 316 - 371.

27 See, "Baltic Blackout," *Baltic Review*, No. 2/3 (June 1954), pp. 6 -19; also *Pravda*, April 19, 1957 and *New York Times*, September 26, 1959, p. 1 on the opening of Riga, Vilnius, and Tallinn to tourist traffic. The relaxation of control measures in the Baltic republics which permitted re-establishment of correspondence and of personal ties with persons abroad, appears to have been a part of the general relaxation of close supervision and controls during the "thaw" period throughout the USSR.

28 Interviews with Br. B., (1957); B. B., (1957); W. C. B., (1962). See also S. Žymantas, "Okupanto auklėjimo replėse," (In the Thongs of the Occupant's Up-bringing) *Santarvė*, (London), No. 9 (November 1954), pp. 325-29.

29 "One wants to compare Russia with a wise and good mother who continuously worries about her children," wrote Justas Paleckis, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR at the time, in his pamphlet *Dumy of starshem brate* (Moscow, 1959), p. 7. See also statements by A. Sniečkus, first secretary of the CC of the Lithuanian CP to the same effect, in *Komunistas* (January 1969), pp. 10-11.

30 Eg., Strazdins (ed.), *Istorija Latviiskoi SSR*, I 231, 296, 368-70. Naan (ed.), *Istorija Estonskoi SSR*, pp. 150-51, 278. V. Maamiagi and A. Vassar, "250-letie prisoeidnenia Estonii k Rossii," *Kommunist Estonii* (September 1960), pp. 22-31. K. Korsakas (ed.), *Lietuvių Literatūros Istorija* (A History of Lithuanian Literature) (Vilnius, 1957), I, 49-53. M. Laosson, "Blagotvornoe vliianie russkoi kult'ury na razvitie estonskoi kulu'tury," *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, July 1, 1951.

31 V. Trumpa, "Lietuvos istorikų darbai ir dienos," (The Days and Labors of Historians in Lithuania) *Aidai* (New York), No. 6 (June 1960), p. 263. Gedvilas, *Tiesa*, December 27, 1960. More recent complaint on this score in *Literatūra ir Menas*, December 4, 1969, p. 4. On the general practice of history revision on the All-Union scale see C. E. Black (ed.) *Rewriting Russian History* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1956), *passim*, and Nancy W. Heer, *Politics and History in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), *passim*.

32 Analysis of the school programs is presented by J. Aistis, "Bendrojo lavinimo mokyklos okupuotoje Lietuvoje," (The General Education Schools in Occupied Lithuania), *Aidai*, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 251-256 and No. 7 (September 1958), pp. 298 - 304. The teaching plans for primary, seven-year, and

secondary schools with Lithuanian as the language of instruction for the academic year 1958/59 are presented in *Tarybinis Mokytojas*, March 6, 1958. A more recent, general treatment of nationalities and the educational process is that by Jaan Pennar, *et al.* (eds.), *Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1971).

33 The text of the law in *Tiesa*, December 26, 1958. The "Statute of Secondary Schools of General Education," promulgated on September 8, 1970 restates the same position (*Tiesa*, October 23, 1970).

34 Thus Sniečkus in his report to the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania stated: "We have to achieve that the Lithuanian working people study the Russian language even more extensively. We have to improve further the teaching of Russian language in schools (of general) and higher education. Especial attention for the teaching of Russian language has to be directed to rural localities" (*Tiesa*, September 30, 1961). Also, Kebin, *Kommunist Estonii* February 1960), p. 31, and Voss, *Cina*, June 10, 1960 as cited in *Osteuropa*, No. 3 (March 1961), pp. 232-34. Kholmogorov, *Internatsional'nye cherty sovetskikh natsii*, pp. 104 - 156 and M. N. Guboglo, "Vzaimodeistvie iazykov i mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v sovetskom obshchestve," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 6 (November - December 1970), pp. 22-41 provide recent Soviet views on the question of language inter-relationships.

35 Zimanas, *Komunistas* (August 1956), p. 33. L. Lentsman, secretary of the CC of the Estonian CP, *Partiinaia Zhizn'*, No. 13 (July 1960), p. 23. Kebin, *Kommunist Estonii* (November 1961), pp. 19 - 20. A. Pelse, then secretary of the CC of the Latvian CP, *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (September 1959), p. 15. Sniečkus, *LSR XII Congress*, pp. 32, 35. It is interesting to note that already in 1951 I. Kebin, secretary of the CC of the Estonian CP, admitted that of lack of knowledge of local language made organization work more difficult, but, in his opinion, this knowledge was "not the main factor." The most important thing, he said, was "to know the Party language well." (*Sovetskaia Estoniia*, April 18, 1951).

36 Eg., visitor's account, T. Shabad, *New York Times*, May 19, 1962, p. 4. Also, *Eltos Informacijos* No. 46 (November 18, 1961). pp. 545-46. Soviet reports, *Tiesa*, February 25, 1961; *Komunistas* (September 1963), p. 13. Interview materials V. A. (1970); B. B. (1971).

37 Eg., *Tiesa*, August 17, 1971; *Kommunist Estonii* (May 1966), p. 22. As one trained observer notes: "One meets Russians who have visited Riga, capital of Latvia, and Tallinn, capital of Estonia, and who candidly and regretfully admit that Russians are disliked in both cities." Maurice Hindus, *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma*, (Garden City, N. Y., 1967), p. 249.

38 Eyewitness account, Br. B. (1957). It is interesting to note that similar demonstrations reportedly took place during the 1962 visit of Benny Goodman's Band to Georgia, where a Russian number sung in Russian was soundly booed to the surprise of the Band members (AP Dispatch, *Hartford Courant*, June 11, 1962 p. 15).

39 Eyewitness accounts: *Dirva*, November 1, 1956; February 12, 1960; *Naujienos* (Chicago), October 15, 1957. Interview materials, W. C. B. (1962); B. B. (1971). See also, *Kommunist Estonii* (February 1957), p. 37. Kebin, *Kommunist Estonii* (February 1958), pp. 26-27. *Tiesa*, May 25, 1961. *Komunistas* (September 1963), p. 13.

40 Mačiuka, "The Baltic States Under Soviet Russia," pp. 112 -18, 351 - 358. Also, B. V. Mačiuka, "Die Russifizierung Litauens seit 1959: Versuch einer quantitative Analyse," *Acta Baltica*, (1967) VII, 289-302.

41 Consulate General of Estonia, *Situation in Soviet Occupied Estonia in 1955/56*, (New York; Consulate General of Estonia, (n. d.)) (mimeographed), pp. 6, 62. George B. Carson (ed.) *Latvia: An Area Study*, 2 vols. (New Haven: HRAF, 1956), I, 82. *Dirva*, September 11, 1958.

42 Data from 1970 Census reports in *Tiesa*, April 17, 1971. Latvians comprised 56.8 percent of the total population of Soviet Latvia in 1970; Estonians comprised 68.2 percent of the population in their republic, while the share of Lithuanians in Soviet Lithuania was 80.1 percent (ibid.)

43 A. Pelse, *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (September 1959), pp. 15 -16.

44 A. Voss, first secretary of the CC of the CP of Latvia, *Pravda*, March 20, 1971, p. 2. See also a letter of "17 Latvian Communists," in *Darbininkas* (Nre York), March 10, 1972, pp. 5 - 6, also *New York Times*, February 27, 1972., p. 11.

45 Eg., A. Venclova in *Tiesa*, November 13, 1966. Also, V. Radaitis, *Komunistas* (September 1966), pp. 17-19.

46 Interview materials N. (1968), J. B. (1970).

47 For documentation and examples see Mačiuka, "The Baltic States Under Soviet Russia," pp. 369 - 370.

48 Eg., V. Morkūnas, first secretary of the CC of the Communist Youth of Lithuania, *Komunistas*, (November 1971), pp. 7-9. Sniečkus, *Tiesa*, March 4, 1971. A. Drizul, secretary of the CC of Latvian CP, *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (August 1971), p. 8. For Soviet analysis of the continuing problem see Kholmogorov, *Internatsional'nye cherty sovetskikh natsii*, pp. 187-220.