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On the cover: a detail from "Freeing Political Prisoners", a sculpture by Vytautas Kašuba, 1941 • The cover design by Kęstutis Čerkeliūnas.

RESISTANCE

Revolutions begin not with desperation, but with hope—the hope that victory for the just will be attained, that the existing order will be overthrown. Man does not go to die for the sake of death but for the sake of fulfilling a hope for victory. This phenomenon of hopeful confidence, not admitting the possibility of defeat, is evident in the series of revolutions and resistance movements during and after the Second World War. Camus, in his editorials, justified the French who delayed the start of their resistance until the situation was no longer hopeless, until there existed some possibility of success; in his letters to a German friend, he displayed confidence that German tyranny was coming to an end.

It was just such hope and confidence which gave rise to the Lithuanian resistance movements. The country revolted against Soviet rule in 1941 when the Germans were defeating Russian armies which had been disorganized through attacks by the underground. When it became evident to Lithuania that cooperation with the Nazis would yield not independence but more tyranny, high resistance was leveled against the Germans. As the Germans increased their power, the Lithuanians' hope for independence lessened once more, and resistance went underground.

Then in 1944, when the Russian armies returned with greater force and again occupied Lithuania, men left their homes and went into the forests to organize active resistance.

There were two reasons for this action. The most obvious was that of avoiding suicide, either ideological or real, by remaining and serving the Soviet regime; the more important reason was that of concluding, from past history,

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that such tyranny could no longer be tolerated and was to meet its end soon. Such reasoning had been initiated by the West: Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Atlantic Charter pointed out logically that the existence of a Communist Russia would not be possible.

Again, the Lithuanian people felt hope; once more they grew confident. Despair in their situation was not considered. They died confident when they heard Truman's promises to resist Communism. They died without hesitation because the CIA had told them they would not be abandoned. Great and powerful was the underground in Lithuania, and the country could not be governed by the Communists while there was active resistance.

But resistance and revolution which start with hope can end in defeat, resulting in desperation and bitterness. The post-war resistance was a movement which could not be successful. What happened there is, in principle, familiar, for by now we have read Mao Tse Tung. We now know the history of Malaya, of Viet Nam, of Laos. Mao has said that the revolutionary is like a fish in the sea; his success depends upon the local population. Conversely, move the population into collective farms and you will have little resistance; this is what happened in Lithuania.

Lithuania had no Tunisian border to shelter her fighters; she had no Switzerland to serve as a meeting place for her leaders. With the collectivization of the farms, active resistance became a hopeless fight. After men died in desperation or succumbed to the temptations of surrender under false promises by the Communists while there was active resistance.

We Western countries should learn a lesson from this. We might have been justified in not pressing our principles—our Fourteen Points, our Treaty of Versailles, our Atlantic Charter—to their logical extremes, for there may have been other duties we owed. After all, we do have the over-riding principle of preserving peace, of avoiding self-annihilation, of pursuing political morality. In the eyes of Eastern Europeans, however, we have failed them; this, together with the nature of the Communistic System, as developed among them the cautious man, the man who no longer believes in slogans, the man who no longer is susceptible to wishful thinking.

There is another point deserving recognition. Each revolution, regardless of success, brings its tolls. Each revolution has its depressions. In each revolution, some dangerous elements are destroyed. And after each unsuccessful revolution, there remain fewer who will dare to have thoughts of resistance. In Hungary, Lithuania, in Eastern Europe generally, resistance has decimated the middle class and, thereby, its own strength.

The resulting dilemma is this: In order to keep the spirit of resistance alive, the West must say "We are with you." But, if some event beyond the West's control turns this spirit into a revolution and the West cannot, or will not, carry through, tragedy is preordained.

There is also this final lesson. Even the Communists have not been able to perfect a system of thought control. Let a country be repressed, let a country lose its leaders, there still will remain the spirit of resistance. The collectivization process and the Russian divisions may have destroyed the Lithuanian underground, but there remains the nationalism of the people. There have been demonstrations, there has been covert sabotage. There happened thousands of minor events which display a spirit of resistance.

"Passive Resistance" we may call it, for at present, lacking hopeful confidence, there is no justification for more. Yet there remain the seeds for a revolution. Let there come an event supplying the hope for independence and there will again be active resistance.

We must realize that once the possibility of being either free or completely integrated into the Russian System is offered Eastern Europe, the nationalists will accept only freedom, however logical the integration might seem. Men who have carried on resistance and who will fight in such open revolt, will hold a moral claim to this freedom they desire. If their claim is defeated, they, with hopes of victory uppermost in their minds, will again turn to the arms they once put down.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTS in LITHUANIAN HISTORY

Vaclovas BIRŽIŠKA

The history of Lithuania under the control and occupation of Russia at the end of the eighteenth century has scarcely been touched by Lithuanian historians. The older generation of historians did produce some monographs dealing with the subsequent centuries; the younger generation of Lithuanian historians, however, has been satisfied with merely elucidating one or another fragment of that age, sometimes even using as source material literature which misrepresents the past of Lithuania. The nineteenth century in particular has received very little attention. Because of this shortage of material, the layman, even with the best intentions, cannot acquaint and familiarize himself with the ages that led to his own era. It is the intention of this article to briefly consider the attempts at reestablishment of the Lithuanian state at the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century, events that were of the utmost importance in the evolution of the concept of independence and the modern Lithuanian state.

I

When Lithuania became one of the provinces of Poland at the declaration of the so-called constitution of May 3rd, 1791, internal agitation began in Poland and in Lithuania. At this, Russia, relying on the "Targovicites" (the anti-constitution federation formed in Targovica), led her forces into Lithuania and occupied the country after a brief war. Moreover, at the same time Catherine II addressed the Lithuanian people and declared in an appropriate manifesto that she was the defender of the freedom and rights of Lithuania. It must be pointed out that, ironically, many phrases and mottoes from this manifesto were literally quoted by the Bolsheviks when occupying Lithuania in 1940.

On March 24, 1794, the so-called Kosciuszko rebellions against the partitioners of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began in Krakow, Poland. General Thaddeus Kosciuszko was named the chief ("naczelnik") of the Polish-Lithuanian state. Somewhat later an artillery colonel, Jokū-

The late Professor Vaclovas Biržiška (1884-1956) was a noted authority on Lithuanian history. For many years he taught at the universities of Lithuania, was the Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and later the Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Vilnius. After coming to the United States, during the years of 1951-1953 Professor Biržiška served as an honorary consultant for the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

bas Jasinski, organized an insurrection in Vilnius, which he took on April 22-23, 1794. Once Vilnius was taken, the revolt quickly spread across Lithuania.

During the course of the insurrection it became necessary to form a governing body which could prepare the country to resist and to fight the occupant, organize the administration and courts, and protect the country from anarchy and lawlessness.

On April 24, 1794, the Supreme National Council of Lithuania was forced by the insurrectionists in Vilnius. The Council recognized Gen. Kosciuszko as the supreme commander of the revolt and Col. Jasinski as commander of the Lithuanian forces. This council, supported by the military forces, soon transformed itself factually into a "Provisional government" of Lithuania, acting independently of the corresponding organs in Poland.

The Supreme National Council of Lithuania in its Lithuanian proclamations to the nation, called itself "Viresnibe arba Roda šio čiesia Lietuvos", or "Roda neydidžiausia naradaus Lietuvos".

This "Provisional government" of Lithuania paid special attention to the Lithuanian-speaking peasantry and, for the first time in all the years of union with Poland, not only used the Lithuanian language in addressing the nation on various political, administrative, and legal matters but also tried to Lithuanianize the names of the members of the Council as they appeared on the proclamations. Not only the Supreme National Council of Lithuania, but all of the organs which it formed as provisional ministries were Lithuanianized for political purposes. For example, in one proclamation to the Palanga district, which announced that it is being placed under the authority of the provisional treasury, the signatures are Lithuanianized.

Gen. Thaddeus Kosciuszko, under the pressure of nobility which did not care for the separation of the Supreme National Council of Lithuania, dismissed the Council and on June 10, 1794, appointed a Central Deputation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, responsible to the Supreme National Council of the Polish-Lithuanian State. The name of the new authority itself indicates that the Central Deputation was an administrative organ of the Polish National Council. Kosciuszko soon dismissed Colonel Jasinski as the head of the Central Deputation, for many influential nobles feared his radicalism. Col. Jasinski was replaced by General Micheal Wilhorski who soon resigned his post to another general sent in from Poland (Gen. S. Mokronowski).

The insurrectionists, however, were not able to force the Russians out of Lithuania, on August 7th, 1794, Vilnius again fell into Russian hands. In the following year, the third partition occurred, and the entire country, except for Užnemunė which was given to Prussia, was occupied by Russia. The "provisional government" and all

of its "ministries" were liquidated. Some of its members perished, others were captured by the occupant and were forced into exile in Siberia. A few managed either to find a hiding place in Lithuania itself or to escape abroad, emigrating West and there joining Napoleon's Polish legions.

After the death of Catherine II, the new Czar, Paul I, granted amnesty to many of the insurrectionists exiled in Siberia. Thus some members of the former "provisional government" returned to Lithuania. Some sought seclusion in their manors, but others managed to find local administrative positions since there was a shortage of suitable personnel within the ranks of the Russian occupational government. In this manner the local nobility was drawn into administrative and, particularly, legal work.

II

After the Duchy of Warsaw was formed in 1807, some of the more prominent Lithuanian political figures began to negotiate with Czar Alexander II for the formation of an independent Grand Duchy of Lithuania ruled by the Russian Czar, which would eventually be united with Poland. The Russian government participated in these negotiations, creating hopes of eventual success. The Russians, faced with Napoleon, were interested in creating an atmosphere of rapport and friendly relations with Lithuania since she would play a major role in the impending war.

When the war between Napoleon and Russia began in 1812, the huge Napoleon's army surged into the Lithuanian districts of Užnemunė and through Kaunas. No insurrections occurred at that time in Lithuania, as has been falsely reported by some authorities; one army advanced while another retreated, but Lithuania herself remained completely passive. Some of the more responsible Lithuanian politicians withdrew along with the Russian army.

The strategic position of Lithuania was of crucial importance in this war, and Napoleon was naturally concerned with the defense and custody of the country. Having just crossed the Lithuanian border, Napoleon issued a proclamation to the Lithuanian people, addressing them not only in Polish but in Lithuanian as well (with the help of M. Kairiukštis). Unfortunately, no copy of this proclamation exists today.

On July 1, 1812, as soon as Napoleon arrived at Vilnius, he published an act creating the Provisional Government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Napoleonic Provisional Government was not a creation of the Lithuanian people and did not express their wishes. It was formed for the advancement of the interests of the French Army and not for the people of Lithuania. The Napoleonic Provisional Government was not organized at the request of the local nobility, as some of the Lithuanian historians have maintained, but forced upon the country by an invading power. The ex-

pressed purpose of the Provisional Government was to insure the safety of the French army, and to protect its means of communication, to supply their army with food and transportation, and to recruit as many local people as possible for the French forces.

The following people were appointed to the Napoleonic Provisional Government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Stanislas Soltan, Prince Alexander Sapieha, Joseph Sierakowski, Count Francis Jelski, Count Alexander Potocki, Charles Prozor, Gen. Joseph Ignace, Kosakowski, Prof. John Sniedecki (Rector of the University). With the sole exception of Sniedecki, these men were the most wealthy landowners not only in Lithuania, but in Poland as well. Commissions functioning as ministries were formed at the same time. Soltan was appointed as the President of the Commission of Provisions; Prozor was in charge of the Police; Sierakowski of Finance; Sapieha of War; Jelski, of Justice; Potocki, of the Interior; Sniedecki, of Education and Religion. As President of the Provisional Government, however, Napoleon appointed the Dutch General Dirk van Hogendorp by the act of August 12th, 1812, and gave him the title of Governor General of Lithuania. The representative of the civil government of France to the Provisional Government was Eduard Bignon of Warsaw, a former resident of France.

The main task of this government created by Napoleon consisted of assisting the military activities of the French in Russia. To further aid this aim, the administrative set-up of Lithuania was reorganized according to the French model: prefects were appointed in the districts, and in each of the four departments (Vilnius, Gardinas, Minsk, and Bialystok) into which Lithuania was divided, were formed three-member commissions constituting the local governing organ.

Napoleon commissioned the Provisional Government to administer financial matters, to regulate army provisions, to organize the local army, civil guard, and gendarmes. Even in these matters, however, the Provisional Government was not independent and autonomous. For example, in organizing four regiments of cavalry and five of infantry, the leaders and their staffs were appointed by Napoleon himself. This formation of a "Lithuanian Army" and its incorporation into French forces was in fact one of the most important accomplishments of this Provisional Government. Already on July 25, 1812 it stipulated the following contingents of recruits: Vilnius — 3000 men, Minsk — 3000 men, Gardinas — 2500 men, Bialystok — 1500 men. On August 1st, the number of cavalry was fixed: Vilnius — 1377 men, Minsk — 1307 men, Gardinas — 996 men, and Bialystok — 370 men.

On August 12, 1812, an order was issued to form six battalions of gendarmes, with 6 companies each, for the purpose of capturing defectors and for maintaining order. On that same day,

each town was ordered to organize a civil guard which every property owner, artisan, and merchant from the age of 18 up to 50 must join. In this manner the French method of recruiting was brought into Lithuania and the Provisional Government in this respect had the same functions as the department councils and prefects in France.

Even though the Provisional Government was designed to function in the interest of the French army and not for welfare of the country itself, it was hoped that it would in the end serve to free the country once and for all from the Russian occupant and that the victorious Napoleon would grant independence to a Lithuania united with Poland.

Along with military activity, certain political steps were also being taken. On June 28, 1812, an Act of Confederation was drawn in Warsaw, calling for the restoration of Polish independence. On July 11, 1812, the Warsaw Confederation sent a communication to the Provisional Government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania asking it to join the Confederation. Action was immediately taken and meetings of local nobility and gentry were held in various Lithuanian cities. A wish to join the Polish Confederation and thereby to also join independent Poland was expressed at these meetings. Soon afterwards, the Provisional Government of Lithuania sent several of its members to Warsaw and on August 12, 1812, the Warsaw Confederation received its announcement of Lithuania's wish for union with Poland.

At this time, however, the fortunes of war shifted, and turned against the French. The French army began to retreat from Russia and later to flee across Lithuania. The newly-formed Lithuanian military forces retreated together with the French army. The administrative system organized during the war collapsed and disintegrated. The Russians quickly reoccupied Lithuania and reinstated Russian administration. Wishing to soothe Lithuanian fears and produce pro-Russian sentiment, Czar Alexander declared an act of amnesty as early as December 12th, which forgave all crimes committed in Lithuania against Russia and her regime during the war. Thus the members of the Provisional Government who had not managed to escape abroad were left unpunished; they merely had to present to the Russian government an explanation for their behavior during the war. For example, the rector of the University, John Sniedecki, completely absolved himself from all blame by stating that he joined the Provisional Government only to protect the property of the University from being used for military purposes. A similar account was presented by Mykolas Roemeris, who had been appointed President of the City of Vilnius by Napoleon's decree.

III

Up to the time of the Congress of Vienna and even later, attempts were always being made to

unite Lithuania, a separate political entity, the Poland which had become a "kingdom" ruled by Russia after the Congress of Vienna. Hopes for this union rose when property sequestrated after 1812 was returned by the order of April 15th, 1814, and when the restoration of a Lithuanian army was planned by the order of July 13, 1817, and recruits from Lithuania and Byelorussia formed an independent Lithuanian corps. This so-called Lithuanian corps, however, was not even stationed on Lithuanian soil and soon became an ordinary part of the Russian army.

A strictly military uprising began in Poland on November 29th, 1830, forcing the Russians to move all of their forces stationed in Poland to the North, to the Lithuanian border. News of the uprising quickly spread across Lithuania, but since Lithuania did not have its own army, the Lithuanian nobility delayed concrete action, if not private agitation, even though at that time Russian forces were few in number and conditions for revolt in Lithuania were very favorable. But when the Russian government began a massive recruitment program, in February, 1830 the people themselves began to revolt in some of the districts of Zemaitija (Samogitia). The revolt spread across Žemaitija (Samogitia). In many vicinities the insurrectionists attacked armed Russian convoys transporting recruits and incorporated the freed recruits into their own groups. When this movement had branched out widely in the country, the nobility joined also. On March 26, 1831, Raseiniai were taken; on March 28th, Telšiai and Šiauliai. Later, the insurrection spread elsewhere — to Upytė (Panevėžys), Ukmergė, Užneris (Švenčioniai), Trakai, Ašmena — and soon included almost the entire country except for Kaunas and Vilnius. The insurrection was characterized by the fact that masses of lower-class people voluntarily joined the lines of the insurrectionists, hoping for the abolition of serfdom after victory.

As the insurrection spread and grew, there arose a need for organizing the country for war with the occupant and for the formation of a civil government. In contrast to what occurred during the revolution of 1794, no central governing body covering the entire country was organized. As soon as armed insurrection began in an area, a local "provisional government" was formed; there were as many such "governments" as there were districts. Thus Lithuania became a unique federation of independent, autonomous districts.

The insurrectionists having taken Raseiniai, a "provisional government" of Raseiniai was organized on March 28, 1831. It consisted of Juozas Rimkevičius, Julius Gruzevskis, and Ignas Stankevičius. When the rebels forced the small Russian army to retreat to Prussia, the nobility and gentry of Raseiniai assembled on April 15, 1831, and formed the Integral Provisional Government of

Raseiniai whose leader was Ezekielis Stanevičius. The necessary commissions were also soon organized, with Rokas Psecisevckis heading the Police, Leonardas Volmeras heading Provisions, Jancevskis heading the Treasury, and Kazimieras Kontrimas heading the War Commission.

When the insurrectionists captured Telšiai, the assembled nobility elected Anipras Jacevičius (Jacewicz) as leader of the insurrectionists. At his suggestion the "provisional government" of Telšiai was immediately organized. Vladimiras Gadonas was appointed as head of this "government" and he chose the other members and organized the necessary commissions of Justice, Police, Welfare, Factories, Provisions, Post (Communications), Forestry, Commissariat, and Recruiting. This "provisional government" considered itself also to be the governing organ of the military forces of the insurrectionists. For example, following the law of 1794, it gave Jacevičius the rank of General.

In Šiauliai, leadership of the high military command was taken by Pranas Konstantinas Herubavičius, who formed the "provisional government" from the local gentry. It consisted of Kau-neckis, Adolfas Psecisevskis, and others. When the Russians quickly captured Šiauliai, the "provisional government" was forced to withdraw.

Somewhat later, in Panevėžys, the "provisional government" of Upytė was formed, according to an old tradition. First of all, the assembled nobility and gentry formulated an act of confederation. Then they elected Karolis Zaluskis, president of the "provisional government", and chose the following members: Kazimieras Trukovskis, Juozas Kozakovskis, Mykolas Meistavičius, Tomas Eidrigevičius, Eustakas Karpis and Teodoras Ropa (the latter two were elected in absentia and did not join the "government"). Commissions were also shortly formed: War, Justice, Administration and Executive.

Later short-lived "provisional governments" of the districts were also established. The president of the Užneris (Švenčioniai) "government" was Mostovskis. Pezdzieckis, Polis, and Saroka were members of the Ašmena "government". However, the insurrectionists were not too successful in the eastern section of Lithuania and the provisional "governments" quickly had to disband and disappear.

The organization of the civil governments differed among the districts. Yet the main purpose remained the same everywhere — to aid the insurrectionists with arms and provisions, to maintain internal order, and to guarantee property rights and personal freedom.

Sometimes the military government attempted provisional "government" of the Upytė district, took under his command the insurrectionist forces of the Upytė and Ukmergė districts and demanded that all of the Žemaitija (Samogitia) insurrectionists follow suit. But the "provisional govern-

ment" of Telšiai(following the advice of Jacevičius, refused to comply because they considered Žaluskis unfit for such a role and its functions.

The lack of one, united, and unifying civil and military government was not beneficial for the insurrection and produced negative results. At that time there were no competent figures in Lithuania with the necessary popularity and authority either among the military or among the civilians who could have united the country under their command. United military action was only taken when the leaders of the various insurrectionist forces had agreed to such a course.

When General Gelgaudas (Gielgud) arrived in Lithuania with a corps of Polish troops, certain changes were attempted even in the organization of the civil government. On June 12th, 1831, Gelgaudas, preparing in Žeimiai to attack Vilnius, issued an act establishing the Provisional Polish Central Government in Lithuania. He appointed the General of the Polish Army and Senator, Tadas Tiškevičius, president; Kazimieras Kontrimas, head of the Treasury; Jonas Gelgaudas, head of the Police; Gabrielius Oginskis, of War.

The Lithuanian insurrectionists, however, did not recognize the Provisional Polish Central Government in Lithuania even though it was composed of local Lithuanian nobility and gentry. The "provisional governments" of the districts, therefore, did not obey the orders of the Polish Provisional Government in Lithuania and did not disband after its formation. Jacevičius, the leader of the Žemaitija (Samogitia) insurrectionists, later wrote in his memoirs that such action on the part of Gelgaudas was not designed to help rebellious Lithuania but was the act of a conqueror and invader of Lithuania ("swycieski najezdnik Litwy"). The Provisional Polish Central Government in Lithuania remained close to the shelter of Gelgaudas' Polish corps throughout the entire time of its existence and together with it withdrew to Prussia. This Provisional Government had no ties nor relations with the Country. The country had nothing to do with it and did not heed its commands and decrees. When the Provisional Government tried to expel the "provisional governments" of the districts and to make their members merely administrative organs under its own control, no one in the districts, paid any attention, completely ignoring the order.

When the insurrection ended with the retreat of Gelgaudas' army into Prussia, the Provisional Government that he had organized went with him, together with many members of the "provisional governments" of the districts. Most of them later reached France and joined the emigrant movement.

Since the emigrants of both Poland and Lithuania had concentrated in France, political action was begun. First of all, the emigrants tried to create favorable public sentiments among the nations of Western Europe, so that in the event of a

new international conflict it would be possible to regain the independence of Poland and Lithuania. An organization of Lithuanian and Byelorussian emigrants existed in Paris for a few years; it was formed by members of the Lithuanian "provisional governments" and by the leaders and members of various insurrectionist groups, and was independent from the Polish emigrants. This was the first political organization of this type which definitely and purposefully sought the independence of Lithuania. Even though among the Lithuanian emigrants there were members such as Aleksandras Varkolevičius of Žemaitija, (Samogitia) who in the book *Gwiazdka na Zmudzi*, (The Christmas Tree of Žemaitija) published in France in 1844, tried to show that independent Poland would encompass the whole of Lithuania and that in such a state only one language, Polish, should exist, while Lithuanian and Samogitian (the language of Žemaitija) would have to disappear — there were other members who did not subscribe to such views. For a while a truly Lithuanian spirit was very much alive not only in political affairs but in language and speech as well. At this very time in France the priest Kajetonas Zabitis was writing poetry in Lithuanian and was translating the works of Adam Mickiewicz into Lithuanian. One of the most active leaders of the rebellion in Žemaitija (Samogitia), Dominikas Daubaris (who had Lithuanianized his name from Dowbora) corresponded in Lithuanian. Lidvikas Kobeckis, who called himself Korilskis, an insurrectionist active in Warsaw, had managed to preserve his knowledge and use of the Lithuanian language to such an extent that he taught Adam Mickiewicz Lithuanian songs (several texts of these songs are still extant today, written in Mickiewicz's own handwriting) and, while in Paris, wrote his copious and prolific works on the physical sciences only in Samogitian (the Language of Žemaitija). Some of these works were published in French and Polish translations. On the other hand, another emigrant from Žemaitija, Adomas Underevičius, who during the insurrection had written in Lithuanian *Gieysmi Zemaycziu Telsziu Pawieta Wayno Metu 1831* (The Songs of Telšių District of Samogitia. During the War of 1831), during the emigration in France switched to writing poetry in Polish. One in the songs of the cited work by Mickiewicz had the following phrase: "Dabar Lenkay neprapuole, had Zemytiay gyvi" - - - - "the Poles are not yet lost while the Samogitians are still alive."

The participants in the Lithuanian insurrection, men like Godonas, Gastovtas and others, even though they used the Polish language, tried to remind their countrymen of Lithuania and especially of Žemaitija (Samogitia), and left behind numerous works which have not lost their value today. However, the harsh conditions of emigration soon forced the dissolution of their organization. Only a few men attempted to return

secretly to Lithuania and to organize active agitation against the Russian occupation (for example, the conspiracy of Simanas Konarskis.)

IV

The insurrection of 1863 also began in Poland, but quickly spread into Lithuania and there became very different in character. In Poland only the nobility, gentry, and townspeople took part in the insurrection. In Lithuania, the major role in the revolution was played by the farmers and peasants, although the gentry was also a significant force in Lithuanian affairs. The peasantry constituted the largest mass of insurrectionists. The chief motivating factor in this case was the official abolition of serfdom which, however, was not actually executed. The lack of progress in abolishing serfdom created such a mood among the peasantry that they grabbed the nearest and often the crudest weapon and joined the ranks of the insurrectionists not so much for political as for economic reasons, seeking to advance agricultural reform. This mood coincided with the ideas of the insurrectionists' manifesto proclaimed on January 22, 1863, by the Polish Populist Central Committee, acting as the Provisional National Government. The Lithuanian text of the manifesto was made even more strict in order to further affect the feelings and emotions of the farmers and peasantry of Lithuania. When the insurrection had advanced beyond the half-way mark, groups of insurrectionists consisting of peasants, headed by Rev. A. Mackevičius, Bižis, Lukošūnas, Puidokas, Dinsmanas and others, existed alongside groups from the gentry. The former were very active and operated until as late as the end of 1864, outlasting the gentry's insurrectionist groups. Despite their great sacrifices (the men lost in battle, sent into exile and penal labor camps in Siberia, executed, hanged; entire villages banished without reason), the Lithuanian peasantry was in a sense victorious during this insurrection — they won their land. The Russian government was frightened by this almost universal insurrection of the farmers and peasants and, wishing to distract and remove them from all temptation to rebel while at the same time economically harming the gentry and nobility, instituted a much stricter land reform in Lithuania than in Russia herself.

The insurrectionists also had to organize secret organs which were to assist, spread, and augment the revolt — which, in other words, would play the role of a "provisional government". This time, however, they were not organized according to the example provided by the insurrection of 1831; the Polish were especially anxious to preserve the ties of Lithuania with Poland throughout the insurrection.

Even before the insurrection, in 1862, a Committee of Lithuania had been formed to prepare

the nation for the insurrection. It was headed by Vaclovas Przybylskis, with Kastantas Kalinauskis, Pranas Dalevskis, and L. Zvięzdowski as the other members. Before the insurrection began, the members of the committee, except for Kalinauskis, were quickly sent on secret missions elsewhere. Kalinauskis was called by the Polish historians of the insurrection "the young Marat of Lithuania" not only because of his clearly democratic ideas and opposition to the nobility, but especially for his anti-Polish tendencies. It is true that Kalinauskis was a supporter of an insurrection in conjunction with Poland, but his ultimate purpose was different. He desired the creation of a Lithuanian state completely independent from Poland.

The Lithuanian nobility, frightened of this "Marat's" influence, assembled in Vilnius in the beginning of February to publicly discuss the question of land reform. At the same time, on February 7th, they secretly elected a provisional committee of insurrection, the so-called Committee of the Whites (The Committee of Lithuania headed by Vaclovas Przybylskis was called The Committee of the Reds). Jokūbas Geistaras (Jakob Gięysztor) was chosen as president of the Committee of the Whites, while Mikalojus Giedraitis, Antanas Jelenskis, the marshal of the Minsk nobility Jappo, Aleksandras Oskierko, and Starzinskis were elected members. When the insurrection began, this committee communicated with the Polish Provisional National Government in Warsaw. The latter, however, did not recognize the Lithuanian Committee of Whites as the independent provisional government of Lithuania and considered it to be merely a branch of the Warsaw Government — the Branch Administering Lithuanian Province. (Wydział zarządza jancy provincysmi Litwy"). One of the first acts of this committee was the dissolution of that group of "separatists", the Committee of Lithuania headed by Przybylskis, assigning its members various secret functions outside of the borders of Lithuania and sending them out of Vilnius. The president of the committee, Vaclovas Przybylskis was sent to Warsaw as the Secretary for Lithuanian Affairs in the Provisional National Government of Poland, and the other members were also sent elsewhere. The Committee of Lithuania ceased. Kalinauskis, who was still in Vilnius, was included in the Branch of the Warsaw Government mainly because of his resilient relations with the Lithuanian insurrection. But soon even Kalinauskis was assigned to Gardinas, as the department's commissar.

The local organizers of the insurrection were not pleased with the "provincial" title and meager role given to them; on this account, a continuous battle was waged between Vilnius and Warsaw during the revolt. Later Warsaw demanded that the Lithuanian Branch call itself not the Ruling (zarządzający) but only the executive (wykonawczy) branch and that it be composed only of

president Geistaras, of four members, and of a commissar delegated by the Provisional National Government in Warsaw. This commissar was to have the right to appoint all other officials of the insurrectionist organization, even without consulting the other members of the Lithuanian Branch. Warsaw thus planned to make the entire insurrectionist organization in Lithuania dependent directly on Warsaw. The Lithuanian Branch did protest against such wide powers of the commissar, but nevertheless accepted him. When Kalinauskis and Malinauskis later demanded that the Branch's name would be changed to Governing Branch, the Warsaw Government rejected this proposal and sent Kalinauskis to Gardinas so that he would not paralyze the activity of the commissar.

As the insurrection spread throughout the land, the organs that should have supported it and that should have organized the secret government wasted most of their time on internal bureaucratic quarrels and bickering. The situation improved, however, when the Lithuanian Branch of the Polish Provisional National Government almost completely fell apart in June, 1863, because of arrests and flights abroad. Kalinauskis alone remained. Kalinauskis, having gathered the other "Reds", took charge of the affairs of the Lithuanian Branch and immediately proposed the severance of all ties with Warsaw. To save face and preserve prestige, Warsaw sent Oskaras Aweyde as commissar to Vilnius, but he was unable to displace Kalinauskis. Aweyde himself was soon arrested and, while in prison, revealed all that he knew about the insurrectionist organization and organizers.

Lithuania did in fact have a separate provisional government which, however, did not execute the functions of such an institution and exerted a very slight influence upon the progress of the insurrection.

V

When the insurrection was suppressed, almost all of the leaders and participants in the insurrectionist groups found themselves either facing the hangman's noose or in the forced labor camps in Siberia. In Lithuania herself, a new period of harsh oppression began. One of the most ruthless aggressive measures by the Czarist rulers was the prohibition of Lithuanian press and intensified Russification of the country. Even the partially-won victory for land was not sufficient to contain the reaction of the Lithuanian peasantry to this barbaric measure. For forty years a continuous struggle for Lithuanian press was waged by the Lithuanian nation.

The events that occurred in Lithuania during the years when the Lithuanian language and press were banned find no parallel in the histories of other nations. This was a war waged against the

government of the occupant; a war in which the usual weapons were not used; a war, whose principal weapon was a book. And the burden of this war was carried by the common people. Especially in the beginning, and even later, there were many in the Lithuanian intelligentsia who vacillated, wavered, inclined to give in to the Russian pressure and to accept the Russian alphabet. There were, however, no such men among the common people. During the entire forty-year period when the Lithuanian press was banned, no Lithuanian betrayed a propagator or owner of Lithuanian books to the Russian police. The children of the Lithuanian peasantry forcefully and fearlessly rejected all books written in the Russian alphabet. Although the Lithuanian intelligentsia did play an important role in this war for the Lithuanian language by organizing the printing of Lithuanian books in Lithuania Minor (Prussian Lithuania), the actual brunt of war was carried on the shoulders of the Lithuanian peasantry. They secretly carried these books across the border, they heroically propagated them across the land, theirs was the largest (90%) offering, even financially, in this struggle to win back and preserve the Lithuanian language and press.

This unique war against the occupant differed still in another respect from the political movements which previously had been active in Lithuania. There were no central organs directing this resistance. It is true that towards the end of this struggle for the Lithuanian book the first Lithuanian political parties had formed in embryo. These parties, in addition to other goals, sought the independence of Lithuania. None of these parties, however, attempted to take control of this struggle for a Lithuanian press. Yet among some of the fighters, the idea had already germinated that the war for a Lithuanian press was also the war for Lithuania's independence. The first to spread this idea was Jurgis Bielinis, the most zealous of the propagators of the Lithuanian press, already called the "king of books". Although this idea was never put into practice, the Lithuanian farmer and peasant nevertheless won this forty-year long war against the Russian government.

VI

Immediately after the victory of the Lithuanian press, a revolutionary movement with political and cultural goals began. As yet it did not have a central leadership. The culmination of this national movement was the Great Assembly of Vilnius in 1905, when for the first time the representatives of all sections and strata of the Lithuanian nation gathered to discuss the future of their country. The Great Vilnius Assembly of 1905 set a course of autonomy for Lithuania, formulated the goals of the country. It did not, however, elect a central organ for the realization of those goals. Thus the struggle was carried on either by local



A group of Freedom Fighters in Native Forests, 1947

revolutionary organizations, such as the already existing Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and the Lithuanian Peasants' Association, or by the unorganized masses of peasants incited by various agitators. Although this short rebellion — carried on in diverse fashion throughout the country and after resulting only in local victories — was ultimately lost, nevertheless the revolutionary fervor in Lithuania of 1905 created a politically conscious nation and set the stage for the eventual regaining of Lithuania's independence after World War I.

No new revolutionary movement gave birth to the declaration of Lithuania's independence in 1918 and the formation of the Provisional Government of Lithuania in 1941. They were the results, the fruits of a struggle with the Russian occupant which had lasted more than a hundred years. Although resistance and war did not produce concrete victories in those days, they un-

doubtedly strengthened the idea of an independent, autonomous Lithuanian state and incorporated into the ranks of the fighters for independence the common people, who had not played a part in the public affairs of Lithuania until the end of the eighteenth century. The work of rebuilding the Lithuanian nation became the task of the common people: the farmer, the peasant. When World War I had created favorable conditions, the common people were the ones who brought the nation to a point where on February 16th, 1918, the Council of Lithuania, selected by the Lithuanian Conference, proclaimed the act declaring the independence of Lithuania, and on November 2nd, 1918, formed the true provisional government of Lithuania, which took sovereign rule into its hands and rebuilt the Lithuanian nation into a free, independent, and autonomous state.

The DEVELOPMENT OF RESISTANCE and the NATIONAL REVOLT AGAINST the SOVIET REGIME in LITHUANIA IN 1940 - 1941

Stasys DAUNYS

1. Soviet-Lithuanian Relations Before 1940

With the Treaty of Riga in 1920 the Lithuanian Republic determined its eastern border and freed itself from all Soviet influence. In 1926 it signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, strengthening the neighborly relationships of the two countries. These two treaties determined Lithuanian-Soviet relations until the beginning of the Second World War. Although the Communist Party was banned in Lithuania, in the area of foreign affairs the Republic maintained good relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders often stated that the young Lithuanian Republic managed itself quite well and scrupulously adhered to its treaties. No danger was felt from the Soviet Union, and this feeling of security was partly due from the fact that until the fall of Poland in 1939 Lithuania did not have a common frontier with Russia. Attention was focused on the danger from Nazi Germany especially when in March of 1939 it seized the area of Klaipėda (Memel).

While Germany was ending its preparations for war, it desired to guarantee its safety in the East, to procure certain strategic materials, to get diplomatic, moral, and propaganda support. On August 23, 1939 it signed the secret treaty with the Soviet Union which contained a secret annex. The contents of the treaty were not disclosed. Only in 1945 at the trials of Nuerenberg did the details come to light after the original treaty document had been found in the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this secret treaty Germany and the Soviet Union resolved to keep peace in the event of a war and allocated Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland into their respective spheres of influence. As a result of this treaty, on September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland.

When the war began, not everyone realized its true nature. At first the leaders of several

countries which were not involved in the hostilities considered the war as an affair which did not affect them, and various countries declared their neutrality. Among them was Lithuania. The leadership of those nations did not discern the real conflict which had developed between the Nazi and the Communist ideologies and which conflict had given this war an aspect of totality.

Only the dramatic events of the war showed its true nature and proved that neutrality of the small and the middle-sized European nations was a legend. They all became toys in the great game of war. On the one side there was the classic Anglo-Saxon democracy, on the second there was the destruction bearing German Naziism, and on the third there was the Eurasian Communist World. There was no place for neutrality in this triangle. Sooner or later everyone would have to take sides or be trampled and used by one of the sides for the furtherance of war goals. Passive neutrality was thrown on the ground, beaten, and desecrated.

During the German-Polish war, the Soviets exercised their treaty privileges and occupied the eastern provinces of Poland, Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine. The Lithuanian capital Vilnius together with the surrounding area, all of which had been in Polish hands since 1920, also fell into Soviet hands. The Soviet advance into Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine was not characterized as a necessary step in the war effort against Poland, but was announced as the giving of help to the brotherly nations of the Byelorussians and the Ukrainians who were thrown into a state of anarchy after the fall of Poland

Stasys Daunys, at present the editor of a Lithuanian political quarterly I Laisvę (Towards Freedom), was an active participant as a journalist and as a resistant against the Soviet regime in the events described in his article.

and the escape of the Polish government to other countries.

Having taken the area of Vilnius, the Soviet armies stopped at the border of Lithuania, and thus in the autumn of 1939 the Soviet government demanded that the Lithuanian Republic commence negotiations on the subjects of ;

1. The return of Vilnius and the surrounding area to Lithuania.
2. Signing a Lithuanian-Soviet mutual assistance treaty.

The negotiations were mandatory. The presence of the Soviet army at the Lithuanian frontier did not permit a choice.

In the negotiations, the Soviet delegation stated that the Soviet Union does not desire Lithuanian territories and that it has decided to return to Lithuania the City of Vilnius and its surrounding area both of which it considered as integral parts of Lithuania. By this act the Soviet Union was manifesting its good will and in order to make this good will bilateral, Lithuania must assent to a mutual assistance treaty. In the opinion of the Soviets, the danger of war was great, that war would come from the West, and Lithuania would not be able to defend itself. In order to assure security of the Soviet Union, such a treaty was absolutely essential. Pursuant to the treaty the Soviet Union would station a limited number of its army in Lithuania; its presence would decrease the danger of war against Lithuania and the Soviet Union. Similar treaties were demanded of and signed with Latvia and Estonia.

The Lithuanian-Soviet treaty was signed on October 9, 1939. It provided for the return of a small part of the Vilnius area together with the city itself. The major area, which is presently a part of the Soviet Union proper and which pursuant to the Treaty of August 12, 1920 had been recognized as an integral part of Lithuania, was retained by the Soviet Union. Twenty thousand Soviet troops were stationed in Lithuania and maintained by Lithuania.

2. The Occupation of Lithuania

On May of 1940 the Soviet press and radio began accusing Lithuania of breaching the mutual assistance treaty. They stated that Soviet soldiers were being kidnapped, tortured and even put to death and that others were being recruited for espionage service; this could not be tolerated by the Soviet Union.

A special commission of jurists was appointed to examine the veracity of the accusations. It was headed by Prof. A. Tamošaitis. The commission found no evidence to support the Soviet claims. The Soviets rejected the findings and demanded that the Lithuanian government send its Prime Minister A. Merkys and its Foreign Minister J. Urbšys to Moscow.

After Prime Minister Merkys returned to Lithuania, the Soviet government presented an ultimatum to Mr. Urbšys. This ultimatum presented in Moscow on June 14, 1940 demanded the following:

1. That the Minister of the Interior Gen. Skučas and the former Director of the State Security Department Povilaitis be put to trial.
2. That there be a change in the membership of the government so that the new government "would be capable of and determined to honorably discharge the duties under mutual assistance treaty of the Soviet Union and Lithuania and who would be resolved to curb the enemies of the treaty".
3. That Lithuania accept a number of Soviet troops sufficient to insure the fulfillment of the treaty and avoid provocative actions.

An answer to the ultimatum was demanded before 10 A.M. of the next day, June 15th. The Lithuanian Council of Ministers assembled on June 14th; the President of the Republic Antanas Smetona presided. Having examined the international and geographic situation, the government decided to accept the ultimatum. The Council of Ministers resigned. The President directed Gen. Raštikis, a former head of the Army, to form a new government. Moscow refused to agree to his appointment. On June 15 the President of the Republic left the country. The same day the Red Army marched into Lithuania. On the next day, Moscow sent its emissary, the Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V.G. Dekanozov, who together with the Soviet Minister to Lithuania, N. Pozdniakov chose, appointed and confirmed the procommunist Lithuanian government and formally established the occupation of Lithuania. Simultaneously the Red Army occupied Latvia and Estonia.

3. The Sovietization of Lithuania and the Nation's Reaction

Having occupied Lithuania, the Soviets were cautious during the first three weeks. They attempted to create the opinion that Lithuania was not occupied, that the Red Army did not interfere with the internal affairs, that they were merely attempting to make sure that the treaty of 1939 was enforced. Three noncommunist ministers were included in the new procommunist government which had called itself the People's Government. The new government had no power. All decisions were made by emissars from Moscow. These tactics were used by the Soviets to achieve several aims:

1. To gain control of the secret police; its head was now Antanas Sniečkus, a man whose fidelity to Moscow was unquestionable.
2. To gain control and to change the police, which was now renamed the militia.

3. To avoid any talk about occupation, so that resistance would not develop.

But the patiently mild behavior of the Soviets ended in three weeks; soon sovietization began in the full sense of the word. On July 6th, and during the night of July 7th, the first wave of arrests took place. Among the arrested were ex-ministers of the government, heads of various organizations, editors of the press, prominent leaders. In accordance with the Soviet method, arrests were conducted secretly at night; there was no official mention of arrests. The radio and the press were silent. Those arrested were not advised of the charges. Most of those arrested were sentenced in absentia by the NKVD courts to terms ranging from eighteen to twenty-five years of hard labor. They were sent to the various labor camps in the Soviet Union. There was never any legal representation of the accused.

On June 21 the Lithuanian Nationalist Party was closed.

On June 25 the Lithuanian Communist Party was legalized: several days before all Communists had been freed from prison. Despite all Communist propaganda about the persecution of Communists in Lithuania, there were only 240 of them in prison and most of them were not Lithuanians. Altogether the Communist Party of Lithuania had only 1,500 members.

On July 1, the Lithuanian Seimas (Parliament) was disbanded.

On July 2, the Lithuanian Army was renamed as the Lithuanian Peoples' Army and the institution of political commissars was established in it.

On July 13, the Lithuanian National Guard was liquidated.

On July 16 a state of emergency was declared.

On July 20 the Lithuanian Boy Scouts and a number of other organizations were banned.

Newspapers were closed down; editors received announcements which they were compelled to print as their own and which stated that they were ceasing publication voluntarily as they had fulfilled their purposes.

Economic robbery started with the nationalization of banks, factories, and trade establishments. The Lithuanian **Litas** was replaced by the Soviet **Ruble**. Wages were increased by 20% while at the same time prices increased by several hundred percent.

Various foreign consulates, missions, and trade missions were closed.

Within one month Lithuania was subjugated physically, spiritually, and culturally. There remained a single party, a single press, a single system. Lithuania was separated from the Western world.

Spontaneous resistance began soon after the occupation of the country. Various factors gave rise to this resistance. The population quickly

realized that the country was subjugated and was being communized and russified. During the twenty years the younger generation had turned to the West and enthusiastically attempted to absorb its values. The young people studied in France, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Switzerland, and in other Western European countries. Lithuanians and Russians did not have any common bonds. They were different from the Russians in their ancestry, their culture, their traditions. The communist system and atheism were strange to them. They were familiar with Russian aims which had not changed since the last partition of Lithuania and Poland during the times of Catherine II.

The country was particularly disturbed by the arrests of the innocent and the confiscation of private property. But the strongest factor in the will to resist was the hope of independence through a probable Russo-German war.

In July of 1940 the procommunist government called a teachers' convention. There had been no communists among the teachers, and their replacement by an ideologically loyal group was an impossibility. The Communist government had to choose between keeping the old teachers or closing the schools. It was hoped that in this convention, the teachers would be familiarized with the new aims in the area of education and would be convinced not to resist. There were 15,000 delegates and participants. At the end of the final meeting, when the last speech had been made by the government representatives and the communist leaders, the teachers rose and sang the Lithuanian national anthem. Shocked by this action, the members of the presidium of the convention also stood up. Only the procommunist writer Petras Cvirka sat down again and lit a cigarette to demonstrate against the anthem; his behavior caused much anger. The anthem was followed by prolonged ovations. But the next day the press censured the teachers for an "inappropriate" demonstration. Subsequently several teachers lost their positions or were arrested. However, news of the demonstration by the teachers spread through the country and encouraged further expressions of resistance.

After the Lithuanian Army had been renamed as the Lithuanian Peoples' Army and became a part of the Red Army, it was ordered to hold meetings and to demonstrate in the streets. These parades were watched by thousands of unhappy people. Much dissatisfaction arose in the army, and resistance began to find expression among the soldiers. At the same time mood to resist arose among the students.

There is an old tradition in Lithuania to honor the dead on November 2nd of every year. That day candles are lit at the graves, people assemble to sing hymns, and Mass is said in the cemetery. In 1940 about 20,000 people assembled at the

cemetery of Kaunas (the population of Kaunas was approximately 150,000). The center of assembly was the memorial for those who had died for Lithuania's freedom. The memorial was covered with candles, and those assembled sang a popular hymn over and over again, until midnight:

*Mary, Mary, make our slavery lighter
Save us from a dreadful enemy...*

The militia remained passive until midnight. The streets were patrolled by Russian soldiers. After midnight the militia began to disperse the crowd. No shots were fired, but the people were beaten with rifles. A series of arrests followed during the night. High school and college students were especially numerous among the arrested.

During January and February of 1941 the Soviets allowed a certain number of German soldiers to supervise the repatriation of German Lithuanians. The resistants understood that the German desire to remove people of German descent meant that Germany was preparing for war. This increased hopes among the resistance.

Throughout 1940 there were no periodical publications of the resistance. This was purposely avoided in order not to give the Soviets any sign that a widespread resistance network was functioning and was preparing for an insurrection. Only a few statements were distributed.

The organization of resistance "quintets" began in the summer of 1940. These quintets were organized in high schools, universities, and among the Workers. The Lithuanian Army had hidden weapons in preparation for resistance; now these had to be allocated and distributed secretly. There was no central leadership of the resistance until November 17, 1940, but the quintets discharged their duties and displayed great discipline and perseverance. The leaders of the resistance maintained close contacts and prepared for a formation of unified resistance leadership.

4. The Birth of Organized Resistance and Preparation for a Revolt

During the months of June and July of 1940 about 1,000 Lithuanians, noted politicians, scientists, social and cultural leaders — were able to escape from the Bolshevik terror. Some of them settled in Berlin. This politically active group, headed by the former Minister to Berlin Col. Kazys Škirpa, on November 17, 1940 organized the Lithuanian Activists Front (LAF). The principle goal of the LAF was to provide political leadership to Lithuania's underground, prepare for a revolt against the Soviet regime, and to reestablish the independence of Lithuania. Col. Škirpa has written widely on the circumstances in which the LAF was born. He has correctly observed that

"The plan for a more determined unification of our national efforts was not born on November 17, 1940, when the nucleus of LAF was

formed. It was born much earlier, in July, when I was still in the Lithuanian Legation. The plan was not given to me by some outsider. It was a natural development from the news that the Moscow-Berlin pact might suddenly explode and that there were hopes of reestablishing the sovereignty of Lithuanian State without waiting for a further opportunity. This eventuality demanded concrete preparations on our side. It was for this purpose that I formed the first LAF platform. As in this, so in all subsequent, LAF platforms the goal to rebuild Lithuania's independence and sovereignty was placed ahead of all other platforms, theses and ideals of the LAF...

Generally there was adherence to the determination not to beg anything from Hitler Germany, but only to prepare properly for the reestablishment of Lithuania's independence and state sovereignty through a national uprising while utilizing the destruction of the Moscow-Berlin pact." (See *Į Laisvę* (Toward Freedom), Chicago, Ill., 1961, No. 27 (64), pp. 4-5)

The establishment of the center of the LAF fortified the determination of those who remained in Lithuania. They waited for the war between Germany and Russia and for a sign to revolt. The LAF in Berlin established contact with the activists in Lithuania. The first liaison man to secretly arrive in Lithuania was Albertas Švarpaitis, a captain in the Lithuanian Air Force. He was also the first victim of the liaison team. Betrayed by his own cousin, he was captured and subsequently shot.

On March 24, 1941, the LAF in Berlin drafted the "Directives" for freeing Lithuania:

"The signal for an uprising will be the moment when the German army crosses the Lithuanian border and attacks the Russian armies. If the LAF leadership shall discover when this moment shall occur, it shall attempt to convey the news through the secret liaison men at either side of the border so that the news would be transmitted to the centers of Kaunas and Vilnius. In any event, the true signal will be the German crossing of the border. As long as this shall not have occurred, do not follow any orders, in order to avoid provocation.

If we were not able to reach an agreement with the Germans concerning the formation of a new government, that is if when the Germans start the war they would not circulate proclamations of our government and our Activist Front; also, if Radio Berlin would not transmit news of the formation of our government, then we would have to recognize that the Germans have aggressive plans against Lithuania.

Even in this case we should not abstain from revolt. It should be carried out as planned. The government then should be proclaimed by Vilnius Central Committee in a revolutionary manner so that Germans would again be faced with an accomplished fact." (See *Į Laisvę*, 1961, No. 27 (64), p. 7).

At the end of March, 1941, the second liaison man arrived at the LAF center, a former Boy Scout leader who now took on the duties of commuting between Vilnius and Berlin. He informed the LAF that the activists in Lithuania were prepared for an uprising and were awaiting the beginning of the war. Škirpa familiarized the liaison man with the cited directives and told him that Germany has secret intentions toward Lithuania: Germany did not desire an uprising in Lithuania and would probably refuse to recognize Lithuanian independence. When the war started, the uprising had to begin on time and a government had to be formed and announced before the German army reached Kaunas and Vilnius.

At the end of April the liaison man, crossed the well-guarded Lithuanian border and was noticed by the Russian guards. There was an exchange of fire, and the next day he was found unconscious. He was taken to the nearest hospital where having regained consciousness, he gave the information to a nurse who was working with the LAF. She transmitted the news to Kaunas. The liaison man was moved to a prison hospital in Kaunas, was freed during the uprising and is now living in the United States.

There were two leadership centers of the LAF in Lithuania: one in Vilnius and the other in Kaunas. Both planned an uprising in their respective cities and had determined that leadership should be taken over by the center which would meet with more favorable conditions. The Vilnius center concerned itself with military and political matters, while the Kaunas staff handled organizational matters. In the beginning it had been decided that the declaration of Lithuanian independence and the formation of a provisional government should be made by the Vilnius center, but events changed the plans.

During the night of June 13 the Soviets carried out mass deportations. About 40,000 Lithuanians were deported. This deeply affected the contact among the resistants and affected the LAF headquarters in Vilnius. At the same time the Soviet behaviour aroused the whole country. In the light of these events, it became probable that the Kaunas LAF would have to bear the main burden of the uprising and the declaration of Lithuanian independence. The Kaunas Headquarters made plans to take over the city radio stations, provided itself with spare parts for the transmitters to cover the eventuality of not being able to take over the radio station or in case of its destruction.

Originally the uprising was prepared for May 1 after messengers had notified the LAF that war would start on that day. The guess proved to be wrong. A new report stated that war would begin between the 18th and the 26th of June. The underground leadership decided to keep watch on

the 22nd, for the Nazis, always seemed to begin their major offensives on Sundays.

5. The Insurrection and the Formation of the Provisional Government.

War began on the night of the 21st. In the pre-dawn hours of June 22nd German planes bombed the airports of Kaunas and various other airports throughout the country. Confusion reigned among the Red Army. At midnight (Kaunas time) the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov announced over the radio that war had started and declared total mobilization. This mobilization was supposed to affect Lithuania, but because of the panic it was never carried out.

Levas Prapuolenis, an emissary of the LAF staff, established headquarters at the old people's home in Kaunas. The rest of the staff located themselves at the Institute of Chemistry. In the basement the students hid the militia of two districts of Kaunas who had joined the insurrectionists.

On the night of the 22nd., a group from the Institute of Chemistry was directed to destroy a liaison center of the Red Army. After completing the mission they destroyed a military telephone center in the city's suburbs. The same group then took over the post office and the city's telephone-telegraph center. In order to deceive the military commandant of the city, they telephoned and notified him that German paratroopers have landed in the vicinity of Kaunas. Other groups disrupted telephone and telegraph communications. This added to the panic. At midnight Soviet officials and the NKVD began leaving the city.

On the morning of the 23rd notice was given that the radio station is ready for transmission. At 9:28 a.m., on behalf of the LAF staff, its emissary Levas Prapuolenis declared Lithuanian independence, announced the membership of the provisional government, and called on the nation to revolt. The Lithuanian national anthem followed.

At that time the streets were still filled with the retreating Red Army. The danger to those in the radio station was great. Yet it was essential that independence be declared before the German armies reached Kaunas or Vilnius.

Insurrection spread through the country. Population in the towns and villages took to arms. The portions of the Lithuanian Peoples Army which had not been taken out of the country revolted. The insurrectionists lacked arms, but when arms depots were taken, they found automatic rifles, pistols, machine guns, and grenades. About 100,000 people participated in the uprising; two thousand of them were killed in action.

On June 24 the Provisional Government assembled for the first meeting. The German Wehrmacht had not yet reached Kaunas.

In an indirect way, the Lithuanian uprising in 1941 could have been pleasant to the Germans; even though the uprising itself was not organized by the Germans, but prepared and carried out by Lithuanians, it was directed against the Russians, whom the Germans were fighting. The formation of the Provisional Government of Lithuania, however, was entirely an anti-German act, for it was organized against their wishes and counter to their plans, and directly opposed German aims in Lithuania. Later events confirmed this, because the six-week long existence of the Provisional Government was a continuous battle with the Germans.

When I arrived at Kaunas, I first went to the quarters of the Provisional Government, for, after all, I myself was a member of it. In its meeting I informed the members of the Government about everything that was known to me in Berlin.

THE RELATIONS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF LITHUANIA WITH THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES

June 23 - August 5, 1941

Stasys RAŠTIKIS

This information turned out to be very useful to the Government. Since Prime Minister Kazys Škirpa was detained by the Germans in Berlin and could not come to Lithuania, the Provisional Government was in fact led by the Minister of Education, professor Juozas Ambrazevičius, a man of quick orientation, an acute and hard-willed politician. Even in the first meeting of the Government he suggested that I take over the leadership of the Government, but I declined without any vacillation. The members of the Government deplored the fact that Škirpa could not come, but also were happy that I arrived, because they had no direct contact with the Germans, and the Germans had orders to boycott the Provisional Government. They hoped that I might maintain liaison with the German military government.

Almost all German soldiers understood our needs very well and were ready to help, but all



MEMBERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, JUNE 1941. Sitting from left: Vytautas Landsbergis-Žemkalnis—Minister of Communal Economy, General Stasys Raštikis—Minister of Defense, Professor Juozas Ambrazevičius—Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Education, Dr. Juozas Pajaujis—Minister of Labor and Social Security, Antanas Novickis—Minister of Communications; standing from left: Professor Balys Vitkus—Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Ksaveras Vencius—Minister of Health, Juozas Senkus—Director of Information, Dr. Adolfas Damušis—Minister of Industry, Colonel Jonas Šlepetys—Minister of Internal Affairs, Jonas Matulionis—Minister of Finance, Mečys Mackevičius—Minister of Justice, Pranas Vainauskas—Minister of Trade and State Control, Levas Prapuolenis—Representative of the Lithuanian Activist Front. Missing in the picture: Colonel Kazimieras Škirpa—Prime Minister and Rapolas Skipitis—Minister of Foreign Affairs, who were prevented by the German authorities to assume duties.

of them complained that these matters had been removed from the jurisdiction of the German military government and transferred to the Reich Ministry for Internal Affairs. The Ministry for the East which was led by Julius Rosenberg was not yet in existence. Since my most important questions were political in nature, the German military officials usually just promised to refer the questions I raised to higher authorities with a favorable recommendation.

At that time, the Germans in Kaunas avoided speaking about Lithuanian political issues; the one exception was Dr. Greffe, who wore the uniform of an SS major and talked about them free-

General Stasys Raštikis, the former Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Lithuanian Republic and its Minister of Defense, was an active member of the Provisional Government of Lithuania in 1941. He was highly regarded as a military man by many German military leaders and was able to defend Lithuanian interests during the first months of German occupation of Lithuania. At present General Raštikis resides in Monterey, California. This article is an excerpt from his memoirs Kovose dėl Lietuvos (In the Struggle for Lithuania).

ly. It seemed that only he was authorized to handle these questions. This was soon confirmed by other German officials. I had not visited him at all, but he found pretexts to come to me, usually at the headquarters of the Provisional Government. I informed the acting Prime Minister Juozas Ambrazevičius about each of these talks in detail.

At the beginning of these talks Dr. Greffe avoided even the words "Lithuanian Government" or "ministers", and used to say "diese Herren" — these gentlemen. But later, little by little he became more facile.

What then did the Germans want?

The existence of the Lithuanian Provisional Government was very unwelcome to them, the more so, because at that time neither the Latvians nor the Estonians had declared their Provisional Governments. Dr. Greffe, as Dr. Kleist (director of the foreign policy bureau of the NSDAP) tried to soften this up by saying that the Germans cannot recognize the Lithuanian Provisional Government, because it was announced without consulting with the German Government. The Germans had to either push aside or transform this

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unwanted Lithuania Government into a docile organ. The Germans did not dare take very radical steps, especially after the successful Lithuanian uprising against the Russians. Their action was as follows:

1. They detained Škirpa, Prime Minister of the Lithuanian Provisional Government, not only forbidding him to come to Lithuania, but even isolating him from political action in Berlin. This, however, did not destroy the Provisional Government and did not stop its action. It is also necessary to remark that Rapolas Skipitis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government, was also detained in Berlin.

2. They allowed General Stasys Raštikis, the Minister of Defense of the Provisional Government, to come to Kaunas from Berlin, because they wanted him and Škirpa to quarrel, and wanted to make the Provisional Government amenable to German wishes through him. The first goal was partly achieved, because Škirpa did become angry at Raštikis. The Germans failed in their second aim, because Raštikis came to Kaunas and worked as a member of the Lithuanian Provisional Government, not wrecking, but defending it.

3. All German officials and agencies in Lithuania had orders to boycott the Lithuanian Government and avoid all official connections. This German gambit placed the Provisional Government in a very difficult situation.

4. The Germans tried hard to hinder the work of the Provisional Government. The Government was not allowed to announce its decisions, directions, and information in the press, telegraph, radio, or public proclamations. It was forbidden to have means of transportation, and the automobiles in its possession were confiscated. Later, the Government's headquarters were taken. Even the negatives of the photographs of the Provisional Government were confiscated and destroyed.

5. German propaganda released in Lithuania, and partly abroad, broadcast that Lithuanian independence is a phantasy of the Lithuanian intelligentsia and that the Lithuanian farmers, who make up the majority of the nation, want no independence, and only wish for order, quiet, and a satisfied life. It was asserted that the Government has the trust of only a small part of the Lithuanian nation, the intelligentsia, and even that is not unanimous, because even the intelligentsia are divided among themselves.

6. The Germans demanded much directly from the Government. I had to withstand this German fire, for the Germans did not speak with the other members of the Government about political questions. I had, so to speak, an attorney's role, because the Germans raised demands to the Provisional Government through me, and our Government reacted and answered the Germans through me. In these talks the Germans were most often represented by Dr. Greffe.

At first the Germans demanded that the Lithuanian Provisional Government disband itself. In its place a Council of Trustees — "Vertrauensrat" — was to be formed which was to consist of four to eleven members. The Germans could not give more detail about the function of such a Council. I received the impression that Dr. Greffe himself did not know what such a Council would do. One detail was significant — in all talks about the Council Dr. Greffe even too scrupulously avoided the word "state" when talking about Lithuania. At the beginning Dr. Greffe somewhat reservedly mentioned the candidacy of Bishop Vincentas Brizgys as a member or even chairman of the Council. Later the chairmanship of the Council was offered to me. Complete freedom was offered in choosing members of the Council and even in determining their number. The Germans had left themselves one reservation: Dr. Pranas Germantas-Meškauskas, later general Counselor for Education, should be a member of the Council (he later was imprisoned by the Germans in the Stutthof Concentration Camp, and died after liberation). I refused the offer.

A new approach was tried. Dr. Greffe, and later Dr. Kleist (who came to Kaunas from Berlin on July 11th and talked to Dr. Juozas Ambrazevičius and Dr. Zenonas Ivinskis) explained that the members of the Lithuanian Provisional Government could remain and function, because the German Government had nothing against them personally; they collectively could make up the Council-Vertrauensrat — which the Germans so greatly desired. Thus the Germans had thought up a new variant to liquidate the Provisional Government of Lithuania — the Government does not disperse, but is only rechristened, or reformed into the Council. This matter was deliberated in a meeting of the Government, and after short discussion it was unanimously agreed to refuse the German offer. After this refusal, the Germans came back to their first demand — the Lithuanian Government should dissolve itself.

The Provisional Government accepted as principle a suggestion of mine: the Government should not liquidate itself — let the Germans do the liquidating. The Germans repeatedly asked me whether the Government had already dissolved itself. I always answered politely that the Government had no intention of doing that. When Dr. Greffe once more asked me the same I answered in an angry tone that we had no intention of committing hara-kiri. I was warned by my friends in the Government that I should be more careful with the Germans, because I could fall into the hands of the Gestapo.

In their demands that the Provisional Government of Lithuania liquidate itself the Germans tediously used only two arguments: first, that the Lithuanian Government was formed without an agreement with Berlin, and second, since the great

war was going on and Lithuania was German-occupied, the Lithuanians had no reason for politicking — they should aid the German struggle and faithfully follow all German directives; after the war was over, Hitler would take into account the Lithuanian contribution to the struggle and suitably reward them.

On several occasions I asked the Germans to talk not only with me alone, but with J. Ambra-sevičius, or to come to a meeting of the Provisional Government and talk with all the ministers; the Germans however, avoided this broader contact with the Provisional Government of Lithuania.

Much later, it was learned through Škirpa in Berlin (from Dr. Marquert, the chief political counselor of the German military government) that the Germans had planned to make Lithuania into a protectorate; this concerned only Lithuania, for such protectorates were not foreseen for Latvia and Estonia. The representatives of Berlin in Lithuania did not mention anything about such plans.

7. The Germans tried to move the Provisional Government even through provocations. Here is one example. The Provisional Government had a document which clearly indicated that some Lithuanian forests in the district of Jurbarkas were already assigned to the German forestry administration center, which was in East Prussia. This news really moved some of the members of the Provisional Government, and with good reason, since this signified the German intention of quietly annexing some border zones of Lithuania to East Prussia. It seemed that the Germans were bent on striking fear into the Provisional Government, showing its weakness and demonstrating their own power. We had to react. On the same day, therefore, without waiting for a meeting of the Government for this purpose, I protested strongly to Dr. Greffe, on behalf of the Lithuanian Government and requested an immediate recall of this order of the East Prussian forestry administration. At this time I again had to talk to Dr. Greffe rather strongly. With him I talked openly, in the military fashion, without handling an obvious matter with white diplomatic gloves, for I knew that such a tactic sometimes works better on a German. Dr. Greffe was astonished at my strong reaction and immediately promised to investigate this unpleasant incident and correct the "mistakes".

8. Since the Germans were unable to break the Lithuanian Government by other means, they began to use threats. The same Dr. Greffe once admonished me that I influence the other members of the Government, making negotiation with the Government impossible, and for this threatened me with the Gestapo. I answered angrily that I did not fear any threats. On another occasion, again through me, the Provisional Gov-

ernment, (and I, also) was warned that the Germans could liquidate the members of the Government or take them to a concentration camp. All of these threats were made in connection with the German demand that the Government liquidate itself.

9. In the action against the Lithuanian Government the Germans used some Lithuanians belonging to an ultra-right nationalist faction (formerly led by Dr. Augustinas Voldemaras). Through these people the Germans hoped to explode the Lithuanian Government by the hands of Lithuanians.

The first step was the formation of a Lithuanian national-socialist party. The ultra-right nationalists began to group themselves here. The formation of such a new party, however had no wider appeal, hence the project was soon buried. Later the same ultras received permission from the Germans to form a Lithuanian nationalist party. It was formed, but its life was also short. On July 9th, a dozen persons in the ranks of the ultras, led by Lieutenant Kurmis of the Gestapo, wrote and submitted a petition to the Germans, in which the following three points were emphasized:

(a) It was requested that the Lithuanian Provisional Government be not recognized by the Germans, for it was formed and declared without the knowledge of Lithuanian nationalists and their leaders.

(b) It was suggested that no Lithuanian Government be recognized until Professor Augustinas Voldemaras returns to Lithuania.

(c) It was requested that until the return of Professor Voldemaras Lithuania be administered by the German military government.

The document was inspired by the Gestapo, but, alas, written by the hands of Lithuanians, directed against the Lithuanian state.

10. Finally, on the night of July 23-24, the German Gestapo, aided by some of the above ultras, staged an open uprising against the Lithuanian Government. On that night the ultras, after securing the loyalty of some younger officers and soldiers of the Lithuanian military Commandant's battalion, changed the leadership of the battalion, removing Colonel B., in his place substituting Major Šimkus. The Lithuanian Commandant's quarters were surrounded, and the insurrectionists demanded that Colonel J. Bobelis resign. After Bobelis refused to resign, the rebels appointed their own Commandant Captain Kviecinkas. That night at about 3:30 A.M. Pyragius phoned me at my home and in the name of the insurrectionists demanded that I order Colonel Bobelis to cease resistance and hand over the Commandant's office to Captain Kviecinkas. When I started talking a bit roughly, Pyragius warned me that they were doing this with the consent of the Germans (Gestapo). I refused the demands.

Since it was clear that the revolt was Gestapo-inspired and supported, it was necessary to avoid shedding Lithuanian blood, for the Gestapo was just waiting for such an incident. Therefore it was necessary to act very cautiously. I immediately reported the insurrection to the German military Commandant General von Pohl. He also was careful with the all-powerful Gestapo and suggested that the incident be terminated without shots being fired. The revolt was thus ended. At this time the rebels did not dare go further than the Commandant's office and the Commandant's battalion. General von Pohl did not recognize Captain Kviecinskas, the rebel-appointed Lithuanian Commandant of Kaunas, and did not cooperate with him, but in contrast, General von Pohl sent a letter of thanks to the former Lithuanian Commandant, Colonel Bobelis. That was the general's delicate protest against the combinations of the Gestapo.

These, then, were the methods the Germans used in acting against the Provisional Government of Lithuania, trying to make it liquidate itself. But the Government still existed.

The Provisional Government wanted to confirm its position: it called together representatives of various political groups and leaders of the public life, to whom it explained German demands and its answers to the Germans, and asked for frank answers of whether they supported the position of the Provisional Government. Universal approval was obtained. Such approval began to flow in from the provinces by means of resolutions, even from the factory workers in Kaunas. The Provisional Government saw, knew, and felt that it was not alone, that the nation supported it. Therefore it could stand courageously.

One of the most unpleasant questions at that time in Lithuania was the Gestapo action against the Jews and especially the mass executions of the unfortunate Jews. This was a horrible thing. Through the centuries, Lithuanians had lived in good relations with the Jews, there were no "pogroms" in Lithuania, in contrast with Poland, Austro-Hungary and even Russia itself. During the years of independence the Jews themselves had called Lithuania "little America", in which they lived very well. During the first Russian occupation, however, the Jews in Lithuania, conducted themselves rather badly, for together with the Russian bolsheviks they managed to leave many extremely painful wounds. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian nation did not think of vengeance and take up the same means as the Germans, that is, the destruction of all Jews. The action being carried out by the Gestapo raised the anger of all moral Lithuanians, but no Lithuanian could stop this German action. The Lithuanian Provisional Government was powerless and in the strongest fashion dissociated itself from this German action.

The Jews of Kaunas were being pushed into a ghetto. They elected a delegation which wanted to talk to the Lithuanian Provisional Government. Failing to meet other members of the Government, the delegation phoned my adjutant, asking to see me. I agreed to see them and we met in my apartment. Both delegates were old acquaintances of mine: the former Chief Rabbi in the Lithuanian armed forces, Sniegas, and a lieutenant in the Lithuanian army reserve, attorney Goldbergas, who was the former chairman of the association of Jewish veterans of the war for Lithuanian independence — during the first Bolshevik occupation he was imprisoned in Kaunas as a political prisoner. Both delegates mostly complained about the very bad living conditions in the ghetto. I almost prophetically turned their attention to the fact that at this time it was important not to worry about the bad living conditions, but about those inhuman German national-socialist tendencies, which can lead to an almost total liquidation of the Jews. The delegates agreed entirely with my opinion. I explained to them that the Provisional Government of Lithuania was powerless in the Jewish question, as in many other questions, and could not do anything. I did not need to argue this point — they themselves knew this very well. I promised to raise the Jewish matter in the German military government, for I did not have any contact with the Gestapo. The delegates were satisfied and thankful to me for this promise.

On the next day I went to the German military Commandant, General von Pohl, and told him that the Lithuanian Government and the Lithuanian community was very much concerned about the German action against the Jews. General von Pohl stated that he could do nothing in this matter and suggested that I talk with General von Rocques. I asked von Pohl to come with me to that general. He agreed, and we both arrived at the former Lithuanian Armed Forces Headquarters building, where Gen. Rocques' staff was located. The following were present during this talk: Lieutenant General von Rocques, Major General von Pohl, General Rocques' Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Kriegsheim, the adjutant of the general, and I. The adjutant took stenographic notes of the entire talk. I began to explain the displeasure and worry of the Lithuanian community and Government at the German persecution and destruction of Lithuanian Jews.

"You (Lithuanians) have not yet become accustomed to it, but you will have to accustom yourselves," the general interrupted my statement.

"No, Herr General, we shall not accustom ourselves", I answered.

"But that is done by the Gestapo, not by the German army".

"Yes, Herr General, but our Government and I myself think that now, during the war, and

especially here in Lithuania, which is near the theatre of operations, the military government has not only the biggest, but also the highest, authority".

Both German generals smiled slightly. I continued:

"Therefore I came to you to express our displeasure and worry in this matter and to ask you to stop the action now being carried out against the Jews in Kaunas and in the provinces".

I saw that my statement was not pleasing to the general, but he quickly controlled himself and began to explain that it is the field of the Gestapo and that the military government cannot have influence in this matter. General von Pohl agreed with my opinion that this Gestapo action is arousing the emotions of the local Lithuanians. After a longer talk our host promised to inform his superiors about the Lithuanian public opinion and my statement. With this our interview was finished. I was pleased that I accomplished even this. In bidding farewell, however, Gen. von Rocques suddenly poured more cold water on my head. In saying good-by and giving his hand to me he said:

"Herr General, do not fret and worry, this action will soon be over".

The chief representative of the German military government in Lithuania talked not about stopping the action, but about its completion.

I could not tell anything gratifying to the Prime Minister, for the last sentence from General von Rocques' lips that the Gestapo action against the Jews will soon be over boded evil, because it could be understood that the planned number of Jews would be executed and hence the action itself would be completed. I had only a small satisfaction for myself that I had done everything possible under the conditions of the time. It is of interest to point out that on October 28, 1948, Lt. Gen. Karl von Rocques was sentenced to 20 years in prison in the war criminal trials at Nuerberg.

After several days I met Rabbi Sniegas again. I could only tell him that I tried to obtain something from the German military government, but I could draw no optimistic conclusions from what I managed to learn.

The situation of the Provisional Government was becoming difficult. It was decided to send me to Berlin in order to discuss questions about Lithuania and its Government in the central agencies of the German Government. I had already received German consent for the journey. Even the day of my flight to Berlin had been appointed. The journey, however, was called off, courtesy of the Gestapo. Reason: Berlin will send a representative to Kaunas to clear up the political issues. And indeed, several days later, on July

11th, Dr. Kleist arrived in Kaunas. Here he indeed conferred with acting prime minister Dr. Ambrazevičius and Prof. Dr. Ivinskis. Dr. Kleist's mission to convince the Provisional Government of Lithuania that it should reform into a Council of Trustees was a failure, as was the mission of the first Berlin representative, Dr. Greffe, which had the same aim.

In the middle of July we received a dispatch from Škirpa, in which he wrote that on July 14th he met with Dr. Schuette and that, in order to relieve tension, on some issues he showed a spirit of accommodation with the Germans. This dispatch worried some members of the Government who speculated on the nature of Škirpa's concessions, but later events made these worries obsolete.

On July 26th Škirpa wrote to Dr. Ambrazevičius:

"... These days I learned from reliable sources that the Germans intend to institute a civil government (Zivilverwaltung) in Lithuania. I was told that such a decision had already been made, and the Verwaltung will begin to function on the coming Monday. It will consist of the following: at the forefront will be a mixed Lithuanian-German Commission. Agencies, the apparatus of the government and the municipal governments will remain Lithuanian. We will be allowed to have our own police. The territory will remain as it was at the last stage of Soviet rule. Border guard units will be mixed in composition. We will not be able to have our own money — the "ostmark" will be introduced... All three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) will compose the Baltikumgau (Baltic region) with Staatthalter Lohse at the head (up to this time Lohse was Gauleiter of the Luebeck region). He will reside at present at Kaunas, later at Riga. He will leave for Kaunas on Monday to take over his duties.

... From whom and how the top organ of administration will be composed could not be learned here at present. It is guessed that the Germans will try to get our Government to cooperate in setting up the organ of administration, so that the Government itself would be smoothly liquidated..."

It was already known in Kaunas that at the side of the German **Zivilverwaltung** an institution of general councilors (Generalraete) was being organized and the Germans wanted that the members of the Provisional Government would remain such general Councilors. The future General Commissioner for Lithuania and head of the **Zivilverwaltung** Dr. Von Renteln had not yet arrived at Kaunas, but his Commissariat was being formed in the quarters of the former Lithuanian ministry for Commerce and Industry.

Dr. von Renteln arrived and set a date to see the Provisional Government. It was August 5th. At the appointed hour all ministers were ready

to see Dr. Renteln, but at the last minute we received a message that General Commissioner Dr. von Renteln will not receive the entire Provisional Government at the appointed hour, and asks Gen. Raštikis to come alone at that time; for the entire Provisional Government there will be an audience at a later hour on the same day. We could not understand what this new and unexpected German maneuver meant.

I went. The Commissioner received me very politely.

"You, Herr General, are the first Lithuanian, to whom I talk officially".

Well, I thought to myself, what sort of an honor is this? It soon became clear: the Commissioner officially asked me that I be the First General Councilor and also the General Councilor for internal affairs. I thanked him courteously, but refused categorically. The visit did not last long. Dr. Renteln's assistant accompanied me to the street door, and I returned to the quarters of the Provisional Government, where the other ministers were awaiting my return.

I also knew that the Germans offered the post of General Councilor for Education to J. Ambrazevičius, but he also refused.

At the appointed hour in the main meeting room of the building for Trade and Industry took place the rather ceremonious meeting of the Provisional Government of Lithuania and the General Commissioner Dr. von Renteln. He was assisted by a large number of followers and subordinates. Dr. von Renteln and Dr. Ambrazevičius exchanged speeches. The General Commissioner officially announced that the Lithuanian Government was being dissolved. Dr. Ambrazevičius submitted a memorandum to the General Commissioner, prepared by the Provisional Government, in which were declared and strongly argued the rights of the Lithuanian nation to independence and great emphasis placed on the fact that the Provisional Government of Lithuania had achieved important tasks for Lithuania in face of German obstacles, and that the Provisional Government was now being removed against its will and the will of the Lithuanian nation.

Here the German General Commissioner introduced the First General Councilor, reserve general Petras Kubiliūnas.

On the afternoon of August the 5th the Provisional Government of Lithuania had its last meeting, the minutes of which were signed by all the ministers. Here it was described how the Provisional Government came into existence, what work it accomplished, with what difficulties it met, how it was boycotted and hindered by the Germans, and how it was finally pushed aside against its will and protests. In these minutes, the summary of six weeks work, the Provisional

Government stated that it did not originate itself, but was asked by members of the Lithuanian uprising to take the helm of state, that the protection of Lithuania's sovereignty was entrusted to it; during six weeks it tried to do everything in its power to restore land and state; from the beginning the Germans did not recognize either Lithuanian sovereignty or the Provisional Government; they set even some Lithuanian political groups to work against the Provisional Government; the Germans singlehandedly attempted to solve the question of Lithuanian citizens of Jewish descent by such means, which were in clear contradiction to the beliefs of the Lithuanian nation and old Lithuanian traditions; finally, the announcement of the German General Commissioner about the dissolution of the Provisional Government stopped the work of the Provisional Government of Lithuania against the will of the nation and the Lithuanian Government. After the final meeting a photograph of the members of the Provisional Government was made, but the Germans confiscated and destroyed this last photograph.

On the same evening, members of the Provisional Government laid a wreath at the tomb of the Lithuanian Unknown Soldier. Here also the photographs were confiscated.

I shall not speak about the work of the entire Provisional Government because, first of all, some of the work is not known to me because I could not attend all of the meetings of the council of ministers. I can only emphasize that, although it was boycotted and under pressure by the Germans, the Provisional Government bore itself straight, with great willpower and unity. It was not scared by difficult conditions, persecution and cruel reality, for it knew that its aims arose from the Lithuanian hearts and hopes — to serve not the foreigners, but their own nation for its true liberty and independence. Therefore the Provisional Government did not surrender to the Germans for six weeks and, although it was under pressure by the powerful German military and national-socialist machine, worked, as far as the conditions permitted, the work of rebuilding an independent Lithuania. It worked courageously, for it knew that the nation was on its side. It managed to accomplish much in a short time. But German pressure grew with every passing day. At last, when the work of the Government was almost paralyzed, it did not capitulate and resign, but survived to the last and stepped aside only when the power of the foreign occupant, against which the Provisional Government was helpless, removed it. And only after this, the removal and expressed protest, could the Provisional Government of Lithuania write in the minutes of its last meeting on August 5th, 1941 that it was forced to stop its work, against the will of the nation.

1. The Precarious Independence

Even though the Provisional Government of Lithuania was formed as a result of a successful national revolt against the Soviet regime, its activity was circumscribed by the fact that the invading German armies constituted the unquestioned monopoly of military power. Nevertheless, without the power basis but with a universal national support, the Provisional Government clung to life for six weeks, defying German political aims and defending the interests of Lithuania. The mass basis of the Provisional Government permitted it to exercise effective control of the country despite the lack of military power and despite the boycott by the German authorities. This made the Germans apprehensive in taking outright steps to liquidate the Lithuanian authority.

The German Army was greeted by the Lithuanian people as an ally, even as a liberator. The general feeling was that Germany would recog-

THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE DURING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF LITHUANIA

Algimantas P. GURECKAS

nize the Provisional Government and would permit Lithuania to govern itself. The country was celebrating its retained freedom and with a revolutionary enthusiasm proceeded to reestablish its national administration and political institutions under the authority of the Provisional Government. In the first days of July, the Lithuanian state was already reconstituted in all essential aspects. The entire nation participated in this work. The Lithuanian people paid a high price for their freedom. It is estimated that 100,000 young men and women participated in the revolt

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against the Soviet regime, and that about 2,000 were killed in action.¹

Needless to say, national independence was short-lived; quite soon it was evident that complete independence was impossible. The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government and the leader of the Activist Front, Colonel Kazys Škirpa, who at that time resided in Berlin, attempted to exploit the accomplished facts to the insurrection and of the proclamation of the Provisional Government. He appealed to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to Hitler himself, officially requesting recognition of the Provisional Government and permission for himself to return from Berlin to Lithuania to assume actual leadership of the government. The Germans responded promptly. Their reaction came on June 25, from the Gestapo: it placed Škirpa under a house arrest.²

Acting on their own initiative the Germans brought General Stasys Raštikis from Berlin to Kaunas. General Raštikis was the Minister of Defense in the Provisional Government and the former Commander-in-chief of the Lithuanian Army. It was the first German divisive maneuver, an obvious attempt to split the Lithuanian political leadership. But, upon his arrival to Kaunas, Raštikis immediately joined the Provisional Government without any reservations.³ The Provisional Government was functioning under the leadership of the acting Prime Minister and the Minister of Education Juozas Ambrazevičius. Meanwhile, Levas Prapuolenis assumed the actual leadership of the Activist Front in Lithuania.

The German military command in Lithuania had strict orders to ignore the Provisional Government. Any contacts which might imply even a limited recognition were forbidden. But when the Germans entered Kaunas, their local commandant General von Pohl could not avoid all contact with the ministries in charge of police and economy because the Provisional Government was in control of the Lithuanian administration, and von Pohl did not have the necessary German personnel for urgent local tasks. In this way the Provisional Government gained a measure of recognition.⁴

The Lithuanians proceeded at once with an attempt to extend the breach in the German position; they offered to participate in the war against the Soviet Union. The Provisional Government asked the Germans to stop the disarmament and the dispersal of the units of the former Lithuanian Army which was later reorganized by the Soviets into the 29th Soviet Territorial Corps. Those units had participated in the general insurrection and distinguished themselves in the liberation of the capital city, Vilnius. The Provisional Government proposed to use them as a nucleus in the reestablishment of the national army which would join in the battle against the

Soviets.⁵ The Germans did not answer this Lithuanian offer.

The Provisional Government now realized that the Germans would not tolerate its existence. With a stubborn determination it clung to life, demonstrating by its existence the will of the Lithuanian nation to be free. The Germans did everything to make its existence impossible: they blocked its communications with the country, ordered local authorities to disregard and disobey its directives, took control of entire sections of the economy and public administration in their own hands. The nation, however, continued to support the revolutionary government. The local authorities, acting on their own initiative still managed to maintain a precarious contact with Kaunas.⁶

The government survived and, to a limited extent, still continued to control the administration of the country.

Dr. Greffe and later Dr. Kleist, special emissaries of the Nazi Party and the Gestapo, contacted the members of the government and used promises and threats to induce them to dissolve the government or to change it voluntarily into an advisory council to the German administration.⁷ Their efforts did not bring any results. Even the Gestapo organized *coup d'état* against the Provisional Government, using Lithuanian fascist groups, collapsed bloodlessly and ignominiously.⁸

Finally the Third Reich abandoned all pretense, dismissed the Provisional Government, and established an occupational administration. The German *Zivilverwaltung* (Civil Administration) was established on July 25, 1941. Three days later a former Nazi Gauleiter, Reichskommissar Heinrich Lohse, acting under the authority of the Fuehrer, assumed all powers in Ostland (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Belyorussia).⁹ Adrian von Renteln was appointed the Generalkommissar for Lithuania.¹⁰

The Provisional Government still persisted, despite the establishment of the German *Zivilverwaltung*. On August 15, 1941, Generalkommissar for Lithuania von Renteln, in an official audience to the Provisional Government, speaking as an official representative of the Reich, informed that the future status of Lithuania would be decided after the war and declared that the Provisional Government was dissolved. The acting Prime Minister Ambrazevičius protested against this German policy and solemnly affirmed the inalienable right of the Lithuanian nation to independence. The same day the Provisional Government decided to discontinue its functions without formally dissolving itself.¹¹

The Provisional Government expected that the Lithuanian Activist Front would assume political leadership and the representation of the nation. The Front attempted to win the tolerance of the Germans by an appeal to the Civil Administration and to the Fuehrer himself. At that time the German victory against the Soviet Union appear-

ed quite probable. It appeared possible that the war might end in a compromise peace settlement which could leave the Eastern and Central Europe under German influence.

Therefore, in its memorandum of August 5, 1941 the Front went to the outer limit of conceivable concessions. Although its membership included people of all political tendencies, the Front now declared the acceptance of the national-socialist ideology as the guiding principle of its future policies. The only reservations made concerned Nazi methods. The memorandum upheld and emphasized the principles of Christian morality, thus disassociating itself from the Nazi crimes which at that time were already taking place in Lithuania on a large scale. From the Germans the Front demanded recognition in principle of the right of the Lithuanian people to obtain independence without insistence on immediate steps toward its implementation.¹²

The German response did not waste any words; the Activist Front was dissolved and its leaders were arrested.¹³

Now the Lithuanian Nationalist Party reappeared again on the political scene. Although the agents of the Gestapo have infiltrated into this group, they lost the control in its leadership to elements which began to feel uneasy about the ultimate objectives of the German policy in Lithuania. Soon the fascist group made demands which in substance were identical with those of the Activist Front. It insisted on the future independence of the fascist Lithuanian state. Immediately thereafter the leadership learned about German orders to suppress their party. It decided not to wait for the blow; the nationalist party destroyed its files and went underground. Thus the period of the underground struggle began.

2. The German Occupation

If land and soil were desired in Europe it could be obtained by and large only at the expense of Russia; therefore the new Reich must once again resume the march on the road of the Teutonic Knights of old, to gain by the German sword the sod for the German plow and the daily bread for the Nation.¹⁴

When we speak today of new land and soil in Europe, we can have in mind primarily only Russia and her vassal border states.¹⁵

The geographical location of Lithuania made it obvious that it was one of the border states which Hitler had in mind. It was the new land and soil for German expansion.

The Lithuanians knew the history of their country. The implications of Hitler's reference to the Teutonic Knights were clear—they conjured a distinct picture of a system of extermination, enslavement, Germanization, and colonization.

The coat-of-arms of the Teutonic Knights was revived and made the official emblem of Ostland. The actual policies of the German administration fully confirmed its symbolic implications.

The Germans ordered the removal of all Lithuanian flags, forbade the national anthem and certain other songs. They reserved to themselves exclusive housing, shopping facilities, and service establishments of the best quality. Although Lithuanian soldiers had participated in the insurrection against the Soviets, the Germans made them their prisoners of war, unless they volunteered for police service under the German command. Soon the Lithuanian police units were sent to fight guerrillas in Russia and, later, also to the front against the Soviets.

The Germans assumed the direct administration of all communications, of financial institutions and of many transportation facilities. They took the entire industrial and agricultural product of the country, allowing only a modest quantity of food for the farmers' and the city dwellers' consumption.

All those measures caused much inconvenience and hardship, but little real suffering. There was not enough German personnel to supervise the economy, and they had to rely on the Lithuanian administration serving under their authority. The Lithuanian administration tolerated the growth of an extensive black market in food products and, to a lesser extent, in various other goods. The cities were relatively well supplied with food, and the population suffered no starvation.

Most of the economic measures created relatively little resentment. They were either ineffective or could be justified by the needs of war. Most irritation and hate was caused by the measures of colonization.

The Provisional Government had issued a decree rescinding the Soviet nationalization. The German Authorities voided all its decrees for the simple reason that the legislation promulgated under an authority other than the German could have no legal force.¹⁶ The German Administration itself assumed control of nationalized property. It also reserved the right to decide on the future disposition of this property.¹⁷ Thus the entire land and the total productive capacity of the country came under the German control as a huge prize-of-war. Most of the small individual farms remained under the administration of their previous owners, but, from 1942 on, an increasing number of the best estates was transferred each year to German and even to Dutch agricultural companies. They were organized to promote an extensive German colonization of the country and enjoyed special privileges which clearly revealed their true purpose.¹⁸

When the Third Reich occupied Lithuania, immediately all the Jews were rounded up and herd-

ed into ghettos. The conditions there were extremely harsh and degrading, but that was only the first step in this most horrible crime. During a period of about three months, from September to December of 1941, special commandos of the Gestapo, SD, SS and SA took thousands of Jews from the ghettos and executed them. In some cases the German commandos were reinforced by the local sadistic criminals and other dregs of society, but only the cited German authorities were ever in charge of the executions.¹⁹ Soon in the smaller cities throughout the country the entire Jewish population was completely wiped out. In a series of monstrous massacres all Jews, children and old people, men and women, were shot and buried in massive graves.²⁰ In the larger cities with numerous Jewish populations such executions continued for weeks and months. In Kaunas 10,500 Jews were shot during the day of October 23, 1941.²¹

Finally the massive executions stopped. Only in the ghettos of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Siauliai about 38,000 Jews remained alive — a small fraction of the former population.²² There the executions continued sporadically during the entire period of the German occupation, but their scale was reduced, and some Jews survived to bear witness about the monstrous crimes of the "master race".

It is impossible to determine the number of people killed during the German occupation. Many Lithuanians were executed for various reasons or without them — just to intimidate the population. For example the Gestapo shot the Vidmantas and Jagomastas families since they were prominent in the resistance to Germanization of the Lithuanians in East Prussia. In the village of Pirėiupis the Germans burned alive 119 people in their homes. The total population of the village was wiped out.²³ In the poor agricultural area around Vilnius many farmers were executed for "sabotage" since they could not produce and deliver the quantity of food which the Nazis demanded.²⁴ In some cases the Nazis shot even the local guards and participants in the execution of the Jews.²⁵

According to the best available estimate, the total number of people murdered by the Germans in Lithuania seems to be about 300,000, or about 10% of the total population of the country.²⁶

The victims and the population were paralyzed by the horror of unexpected massacres. During the fall of 1941 the Lithuanian underground was not yet organized, and there was no operational basis for any large scale attempts to save the victims. The Germans warned that the people attempting to save Jews would share their fate. However, a considerable number of Jewish children was saved by the population.²⁷

The Provisional Government protested against the persecution and the indiscriminate murder

of the Lithuanian citizens even before the beginning of the massive massacres.²⁸ Later a group of prominent Lithuanian statesmen, Dr. Kazys Grinius, the former President of Lithuania, Rev. M. Krupavičius and Prof. J. Aleksa, the former ministers, protested to the German Administration against the massacres. The only result was their arrest and banishment.²⁹

3. The Underground Struggle

...They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

...They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.³⁰

During the period of political struggle no preparations were made for underground resistance. It arose spontaneously, caused by the German refusal to recognize the right of the Lithuanian nation to independence. The reestablishment of national independence, thus, was the reason and the ultimate objective of the resistance movement. There were two enemies of Lithuanian freedom — Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The resistance movement was directed against both.

Great hopes were based on the Atlantic Charter. It was generally assumed that it summarized the real objectives of the Western powers. The Lithuanians knew the nature of the Soviet imperialism from their direct and bitter experience. They assumed that, since the Soviet imperialism was obviously irreconcilable with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the alliance of the Western powers with the Soviet Union would be fragile.

The underground resistance had to solve a difficult dilemma — how to resist effectively against the Germans without helping the other enemy, the Soviets. The first underground publications emphasized the Lithuanian determination to regain freedom; they informed the people about the objectives of the German policies and protested against their crimes, but there were no proposals for action.

The principal resistance groups — the League of the Lithuanian Freedom Fighters and the Lithuanian Front — were organized in December of 1941.³¹ Both these groups were direct successors of the Lithuanian Activist Front. Working separately they evolved an identical plan of selective resistance. The measures of the German Administration taken in the war effort against the Soviets would be tolerated, and the resistance concentrated against the acts aimed at the enslavement of the Lithuanian nation. Preparations were made for an armed insurrection against the Germans, but the country had to be patient and to abstain

from guerrilla warfare, because that would aid the Soviet war effort.

The resistance movement and the policy of selective resistance enjoyed the general support of the people. During 1942 the underground resistance grew until the entire country was covered by its intricate network. An extensive underground press informed and directed the people. The resistance movement infiltrated all levels of the Lithuanian administration, which effectively sabotaged most German measures directed against the Lithuanian people.³²

The process of consolidation and development of a unified leadership of the resistance was slow. The strength of the movement tempted various resistance organizations to maneuver for future political positions. The internal situation was aggravated when the former political parties reconstituted themselves and joined the resistance. Attempts to achieve unity at first resulted in two centers of leadership. A unified leadership was finally achieved late in 1943 by the formation of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania.³³

Absence of guerrilla action and of sabotage against the German war effort deceived the Germans, and the German Administration underestimated the strength of the resistance movement. The movement was able to expand and consolidate itself with relatively light losses.

After the battle of Stalingrad, the military situation suddenly changed. The Germans realized that it might be difficult to conquer Russia singlehandedly. Their arrogance received a hard blow, and they began to look for allies in the East European nations and peoples. Now the Germans remembered the Lithuanian offer to raise a national army for participation in the war against the Soviets and proposed the formation of a Lithuanian SS legion. At that time the Lithuanians were completely uninterested in a military cooperation with the Third Reich. Even the highest Lithuanian officials, the Councilors General, who were appointed by the Germans, rejected the proposal. Then the Germans themselves announced the formation of the SS legion and called for volunteers.³⁴

The resistance organizations unanimously called for a boycott of the legion. The underground press immediately informed the nation about the decision of the resistance leadership. The boycott was a complete success. There were no volunteers, and the German authorities were forced to announce that the Lithuanians did not deserve the honor to serve in the SS.³⁵

The Gestapo retaliated. The universities as suspected centers of the resistance were closed during the night of March 16-17, 1943. 46 prominent Lithuanian professors, scientists, authors, priests, and officials, including 4 Councilors General were arrested and sent to the Stutthof concentration camp near Danzig.³⁶

German repressions now alternated with periods of intricate negotiations which did not lead anywhere. The Germans still refused to consider any significant political concession; the Lithuanians insisted on the restoration of their political independence. All German efforts to mobilize the Lithuanians to various auxiliary services of the German Wehrmacht were blocked by repeated boycott actions. The Germans attempted to disrupt the resistance movement, but its effectiveness remained intact despite mounting losses. The Lithuanian people had full confidence in the underground leadership and followed its directives with an admirable self-discipline.

During the last months of 1943 the leadership of the resistance became increasingly concerned about the possibility of a second Soviet occupation. The newly-formed Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania now had the urgent task of preparing the nation to meet that eventuality. With the continued deterioration of the German military situation the danger of the second Soviet invasion became almost certain. Meanwhile the activity of the Communist underground in Lithuania increased. The Communists were excluded from the national resistance movement because they were agents of the second enemy — the Soviets. Both totalitarian enemies, the Nazis and the Soviets, demonstrated equal ruthlessness against the Lithuanian people, but the Soviets were potentially more dangerous. The Germans were losing the war; a decision was therefore made to organize the defense of the country against the Soviet invasion.

The Lithuanians dropped the political conditions and agreed to a limited military cooperation with the Germans in the defense of the national territory. The agreement was signed February 13, 1944, with the secret approval of the Supreme Committee. General Povilas Plechavičius, the commander of the prospective Lithuanian Territorial Defense Force announced the agreement and called for volunteers. The response was better than expected. The number of volunteers exceeded the anticipated strength of the Defense Force in its initial phase.³⁷

The Germans were surprised and deeply hurt. They immediately demanded that Plechavičius should transfer the excess of volunteers to the auxiliary services of the German Wehrmacht. The demand was against the terms of the agreement, and Plechavičius refused. A protracted struggle ensued between the Germans and the commander of the Lithuanian Territorial Defense Force. The Germans ignored the agreement and raised increasingly unreasonable demands reinforced by threats against the Defense Force and the Lithuanian people.³⁸ Plechavičius insisted on the terms of the agreement. He was a courageous and proud military leader, admired by his soldiers; the

Germans could not intimidate him. They resorted to various measures of sabotage, interference and provocation. The situation progressively deteriorated and soon reached the breaking point.³⁹

The SS Oberguppenfuhrer Jeckeln, the Commander of the SS and the Police in Ostland, ordered the conversion of the Territorial Defense Force into an auxiliary of the German police under his command. Plechavičius ordered his troops to disobey. The German blow fell on May 15, 1944 when the SS troops arrested Plechavičius and his staff and then attempted to disarm his forces. Most units were alerted and expected the German action. They split into small groups and melted into the countryside, taking their weapons with them. In Marijampolė the troops defended the barracks against the German attack. In a short but fierce engagement both sides had casualties. In the Vilnius area the order of the general alert did not reach the Lithuanian units in time. The Germans disarmed them and immediately executed about 100 soldiers. Then they brought the captured soldiers to Germany and forced them into the auxiliary service of the Luftwaffe. The officers, including General Plechavičius, and the soldiers of the Marijampolė garrison were sent to the Salaspils and Stutthof concentration camps.⁴⁰

The soldiers who escaped from the German attack reorganized into combat groups for guerilla warfare and prepared themselves for action against the approaching Soviet Army.

The available German forces were insufficient to effectively defend the Lithuanian territory; their action against the Lithuanian Defense Force disrupted the Lithuanian effort to participate in the defense of their country. The result was disastrous for the Germans when the Soviet Army invaded Lithuania.

On July 7, 1944 the Soviet Army crossed the international boundary east of Vilnius and again entered the Lithuanian territory. After five days of fierce fighting in the streets of Vilnius, on July 13, the Soviet Army occupied the capital of the country. Šiauliai fell on July 27 and Kaunas on August 1. The Germans held the western part of the country for two months, but on October 8 the Soviets achieved a decisive break-through and on October 10 reached the shore of the Baltic sea at Palanga. It was a military disaster for the Germans since the Soviets trapped strong German and Latvian forces in western Latvia. The entire territory was cleared from the Germans on October 23. Finally, on January 28, 1945, the Soviet Army took Klaipėda (Memel), thus also completing the conquest of the territory which Lithuania had been forced to cede to Germany on March 23, 1939.⁴¹

Lithuania was again under the Soviet occupation.

The struggle of the Lithuanian resistance could not achieve its ultimate objective; there was

no possible course of action which could have brought freedom. All conceivable alternatives would have led to the substantially identical result. With the end of the German occupation only the enemies changed, but the Lithuanian struggle for freedom continued without interruption.

1. Stasys Raštikis, *Kovose dėl Lietuvos* (In the Struggle for Lithuania), Lietuvių Dienos, Los Angeles, 1957, II, 293.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-161.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
4. Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania, August 5, 1941, No. 35 (unpublished).
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.* Invariably the Germans used the representatives of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, or the SD for their contacts with the Provisional Government. The Lithuanians never contacted these organizations on their own initiative, but always attempted to communicate and to deal with the representatives of the German government or with German military authorities.
8. Raštikis, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 301-302.
9. Ostland initially included Lithuania and Latvia; later it was expanded to include Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Western Byelorussia.
10. *Verkuendigungsblatt des Reichskommissars fuer das Ostland*, August 30, 1941, No. 1, pp. 1-2.
11. Minutes . . . of the Council of Ministers.
12. Memorandums of the Lithuanian Activist Front, July 17, 1941 to the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the German Reich and August 5, 1941 to the Representative of the German Reich in Lithuania (both unpublished).
13. Raštikis *op. cit.*, II, p. 316.
14. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Muenchen, 1939), p. 154.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 742.
16. *Verkuendigungsblatt . . . fuer das Ostland*, August 30, 1941, No. 1, p. 3.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, January 24, 1942, No. 3, pp. 7-8. The Text of the charter of the principal German agricultural company Die Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft Ostland m.b.H.
19. J. Laisvė (Toward Freedom, an underground publication of the Lithuanian Front), May 25, 1943, No. 9.
20. *Ibid.*
21. The Trial of German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 1945-1946 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1946). Speeches of the Prosecutors at the Close of the Case against the Indicted Organizations, p. 46.
22. Memorandum of the Lithuanian Socialdemocratic Party's Foreign Delegation, September 24, 1945 (Dėl Laisvos Lietuvos, Stuttgart, 1948), p. 17.
23. J. Laisvė (underground publication), 1943, No. 11.
24. J. Žiugžda (ed.), *Lietuvos TSR Istorija* (History of the Lithuanian SSR. Valstybinė Politinė ir Mokslinė Literatūros Leidykla, Vilnius, 1958), p. 418.
25. Szloma Gol, affidavit quoted by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, *Trial of . . . Major War Criminals . . . at Nuremberg*, p. 45.
26. J. Žiugžda (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 420.
27. Philip Friedman, *Their Brothers' Keepers* (Crown Publishers, Inc., New York, 1957), pp. 138-141.
28. Raštikis, *op. cit.*, II, p. 305-307.
29. J. Laisvė (underground publication), May 25, 1943, No. 9.
30. Joint Declaration . . . Known as the Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1941), 2nd and 3rd principles, p. 2.
31. Juozas Brazaitis, an article, J. Laisvė (Chicago, Ill.), 1953, No. 1, pp. 10-11.
32. Bronius Sakalas, an article, J. Laisvė (Chicago, Ill.), 1957, No. 12, pp. 41-44 and A. Pocius, an article, *Ibid.*, 1755, No. 8, pp. 27-31.
33. L. Prapuolenis, an article, *Ibid.*, 1953, No. 1, p. 17.
34. Raštikis, *op. cit.*, II, p. 321-325.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
38. *Nepriklausoma Lietuva* (Independent Lithuania, an underground publication), April 29, 1944, No. 8.
39. Raštikis, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 343-346.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 346-349.
41. J. Žiugžda (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 434-440.

THE ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SOVIETIZATION OF LITHUANIA AFTER 1944

Thomas REMEIKIS

The armed national struggle against the Soviet regime that developed at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 lasted at least until 1952 and involved the entire nation, without class or position distinctions. In a certain sense it was a war between the Lithuanian people and the occupant — the Soviet Union, because, as will be shown in this article, the resistance involved the entire society and was organized along the lines of a military campaign. It was a calculated attempt to prevent the sovietization of Lithuania until the reestablishment of independence, which was to occur, according to the assumption of the resistance leadership, as a result of an impending East-West conflict.

Although the expectations of a war against the Soviet Union were erroneous and although the resistance movement failed to achieve its ultimate objective, nevertheless, it did considerably retard the sovietization process in Lithuania and left a mark on the nation's history that will remain for countless decades. In fact, the political consequences of the resistance, judging from the contemporary evaluation of it by the Soviet regime, were never as acutely felt as today. It affected the nation socially, economically, militarily, and

psychologically. Even today the soviet regime is still trying to eliminate the consequences of the resistance movement.

1. The Communist Interpretation of the Resistance Movement

Despite its scope and heroism, the Lithuanian patriotic resistance movement against the Soviet regime is very little known in the West.¹ The Iron Curtain was in part responsible for this obscurity. The total nature of the Lithuanian resistance is becoming evident only now, when the Soviet regime itself is producing voluminous testimony on it.

At first the Soviet authorities had evaded discussion of the armed resistance to sovietization in the post-war years. Silence was the official policy on the matter. However, the persistence of the outstanding patriotic deeds of the freedom fighters testified to the falsity of the tactic of silence on the part of the Soviet regime. The younger generation had to be educated in a new spirit. With-

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out a communist version of the resistance movement the youth could be influenced by popular stories and legends of the freedom fighters' heroic deeds.² The awareness of the power of the popular freedom fighters' legend was only one of the factors that forced the regime to break silence on the resistance. The open discussions of Stalinist crimes after the 1956 Congress provided the political climate for discussion of the politically charged question of resistance. Towards the end of 1957 the regime acknowledged the role of the resistance in slowing down the sovietization process and opened the way for an ideological interpretation of the underground.³

It is true that prior to 1957 the regime had once in a while referred to the resistance as "bourgeois nationalist bands", indicating its class nature.⁴ Such references were rare and passing, permissible only to the top echelons of the Party. After 1957 it became a duty of every communist, propagandist, journalist and writer to discredit the partisans and to exhort the heroism of the activists and the *istribiteli* that fought the resistance.

The general line of the interpretation of the national revolt against sovietization was drawn only in 1957. In 1947, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania Antanas Sniečkus made the following statement on the resistance:

"It must not be forgotten that the bourgeois nationalists within the republic's territory are conducting anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation, spreading provocative rumors and, seeking to undermine the work, they attempt to infiltrate into the state apparatus. When German fascism lies smashed and is no longer able to aid the Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists, they expect such aid from the Anglo-American imperialists. Among the bourgeois nationalist combating the people, an important part is played by the reactionary section of the Catholic clergy who try to utilize the religious convictions of the people in the interests of the exploiting classes... the interests of the Lithuanian people demand that the bourgeois nationalists be smashed as soon as possible. We have every means to accomplish this."⁵

Yet in 1962 Sniečkus was still combating the "bourgeois nationalists" on an ideological plane.

The cited statement by Sniečkus provides the guideline for an ideological interpretation of the resistance movement. First, the resistance movement is interpreted from a standpoint of a Marxist class struggle. To the Soviet regime the patriotic resistance was nothing else than a desperate attempt to defend the political and economic interest of the bourgeoisie. Although, as will be seen, all classes and sections of the Lithuanian nation participated in the resistance, the Soviet regime is careful not to mention the participation of workers, poor peasants, or small land-holders while it emphasizes the role of the "Kulaks" and the Catholic clergy, the former officials and army of-

ficers of the republic of Lithuania. The partisans are called "bandits"; the epithets of murderers, agents of Hitlerites and imperialists are often applied. The partisans are terrorists who attack and annihilate the new settlers, the collaborators with the Soviet regime, the Soviet and party officials, the activists, and the Komsomols.⁶

The theory of a direct link between the resistance and Nazi Germany is advanced to further discredit the patriotic revolt. A recently published Soviet series of documents on the resistance movement⁷ emphasizes this point in no uncertain terms. For example, an introduction to one such collection of documents states:

"The published documents show that the bands of bourgeois nationalists were armed by the Hitlerites, and their leading cadres were prepared in schools of intelligence and diversion... when the Hitlerite Reich perished, Lithuanian nationalists found new overlords—intelligence services of the imperialistic states. The new overlords, just as the Hitlerites, used the nationalists and their bands to terrorize Soviet activists and people favorably disposed to the Soviet order, to rob, and to murder. This disorganizing activity of Lithuanian nationalists was necessary for the American, British, and other imperialists, who were preparing war against the Soviet Union."⁸

The same source further states that "the nationalists wanted to frighten the people, with mass terror and murder, to demoralize the activity of organs of Soviet government, to obstruct the creation of a socialistic economy, and in such way to facilitate the execution of intervention by the imperialistic countries, in wake of which they hoped to reestablish a bourgeois system in Lithuania."⁹ As we see from this statement the Soviet line on the resistance goes even further than the Nazi link. Ultimately the Lithuanian revolt is connected with the intelligence services of the Western world. The idea that the resistance movement was just a part of the western "spy" system against the Soviet Union is used to further derogate the resistance. It is hoped that the falsity of such views will be amply exposed in the course of this article.

While interpreting the resistance from a narrow standpoint of class warfare and derogating the freedom fighters to a status of "bandits" and "spies", the soviet regime at the same time attempts to develop a legend of the communist partisan and the activist of the new social order, who is in a mortal struggle with the "bandits".¹⁰ The obvious implication of this tactic is that the resistance movement is still an important problem to the Soviet regime, if not in a physical sense then in an ideological sense. Judging from the extreme reaction of the Soviet authorities to the events of the post-war years, it was evident that some ten years after the armed resistance had ceased, they are hard-pressed to counter the poli-

tical consequences of the resistance movement in the minds of the Lithuanian nation, and especially of the younger generation. An ideological explanation of the post-war resistance and the extreme terrorism of the security forces was, no doubt needed for the indoctrination of the younger communists coming into the Party en-masse after 1956, people who matured in a relatively stable environment.

2. The Motivational Factors of Resistance

Although motivation is individual, several factors may be designated which tended to push many into the ranks of freedom fighters. First of all, the Lithuanian nation had experienced Soviet rule and terror during 1940 - 1941. No one had illusions as to the nature of the regime. To many it was a matter of self-preservation to join the partisans. Among such people may be considered all former officials of the Lithuanian Republic, leaders of political parties, owners of large estates and businesses, individuals of known patriotic and nationalist dispositions.¹¹

Another factor that swelled the ranks of the partisans was mobilization of men, born in 1909 to 1926, into the Red Army, which was declared immediately after reoccupation of Lithuania. The Red Army preparing for a final offensive in 1945, instituted an extensive forced recruitment of Lithuanian men since nobody joined voluntarily. According to a Communist historian, about 200,000 Lithuanian citizens were forced into the Red Army as a result of the mobilization.¹² To those who evaded the agents of mobilization the native woods provided the only alternative. For a long time military service was a motive for joining the partisans.¹³ Furthermore, soviet terror, initiated immediately after the occupation, contributed to the reaction against the regime. Families and relatives of known partisans had no alternative but to join the underground. Similarly, those who were discovered to be aiding the underground joined the partisans as the only way to escape total annihilation at least temporarily.

Of some importance to the resistance movement was the actual preparation by a number of Lithuanian officers for underground activities even before the occupation by the Red Army. In early 1944 the German authorities permitted Lithuanian officers to form Lithuanian home guard units. The German authorities believed, that such Lithuanian units would be useful in their war effort, however, it turned out that the Lithuanian armed units refused to follow the orders of German generals. Many soldiers and officers of these Lithuanian units, armed with German weapons, took to the woods. When the Red Army occupied Lithuania, some of these soldiers and officers provided the nucleus for an armed resistance.¹⁴

As the resistance movement was somewhat receding during 1947, repeated deportations and

the beginning of collectivization again swelled the ranks of partisans.

But perhaps of the greatest importance to the massive development of resistance was the mood of the nation, the evaluation of world situation and a number of illusory exceptions. Many people, including the leaders of the underground, believed that armed resistance was necessary and meaningful since the occupation could last only a limited period. The expectation was that the Western allies would make an early peace with Germany and turn against the Soviet Union. Thus the nation had to resist sovietization at all costs, preserve a national movement and an armed force for the limited time until the Soviet Union would be defeated and independence of Lithuania re-established. How such thinking arose is a complicated question. No doubt in part it was wishful thinking, a device to escape the predicament. Such expectations were due partly to the ideas of the Atlantic Charter and to the disbelief that the Western powers would tolerate Communism, a system which the members of the underground had experienced in all its terroristic and suppressive aspects. However illusory, the expectations of war between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union provided strong motivating force to struggle totally with the occupant.¹⁵ Needless to say, a disillusionment with Western democracies was to occur sooner or later. It came in 1947, when couriers of the underground movement returned from West Germany with the discouraging news that war is far from certain.¹⁶ Despite such news, the underground had no alternative but continue the struggle, which lasted at least until 1951.

Finally, the Catholic Church in Lithuania, experiencing extreme persecution, was forced to support actively the resistance movement.¹⁷ Many priests served as leaders and chaplains of partisan units, and supported the resistance in all conceivable ways. The involvement of the Church in the freedom struggle inevitably brought people from all social and political sectors of the nation into the ranks of the partisans. The defense of national values was intricately connected with the defense of one's faith.

Such expectations, social, political, and ideological forces pushed thousands of people from all walks of life into the underground. Indicative of the non-class nature of the resistance movement is the leadership of the partisan unit in the Suvalkija section of Lithuania. In June of 1945 the following people comprised the staff of a partisan unit of Skardupiai: Rev. Ylius, the pastor of Skardupiai parish, Pileckis—former police official, Pilypas—sacristan of Skardupiai parish, Lasevičius—a farm manager, Januškaitis—a student in a teachers' seminary of Marijampolė, Urbonas—janitor of the Skardupiai Church, Gudelevičius—a carpenter.¹⁸



Vytautas KAŠUBA

FREEING POLITICAL PRISONERS • 1941 • 144" x 48"

3. The Scope and the Organization of the Resistance

The scope of the resistance movement may be determined from the number of killed partisans and the size of the Soviet armed and security forces employed to maintain control of the country. There is some disagreement as to the exact number of casualties among the partisans. In all probability during about a decade of armed strug-

gle the number of partisans killed or later executed is between 30,000 and 50,000.¹⁹ The number of partisans at any time varied between 25,000 and 40,000.²⁰ In 1948, eight divisions of the Red Army and units of air force²¹, at least 30,000 MVD troops, and 40,000 MGB forces²² were stationed in Lithuania. In addition, the MVD was supported by an unknown number of People's Militia and the MGB forces were aided by the *istreibiteli*. The armed forces were seldom used against the partisans and probably most of them would have

been stationed in Lithuania during the tense post-war years regardless of the threat of partisans; nevertheless, they did constitute a potential aid to the security forces and provided a wide margin of safety for the regime. The security forces, adding up to about 100,000 men, motorized and with air support, alone suggest the grave threat to the Soviet regime; this is especially evident if we remember that Lithuania is a nation of about 2,700,000 people. It has been estimated that approximately 80,000 Soviet security forces and 4,000

Communist and Soviet activists were annihilated by the armed resistance.²³

The importance of the resistance movement during the post-war years is further attested by the fact that Beria's deputy, General Kurglov, who in 1953 succeeded Beria, personally directed the armed struggle against the partisans in 1944-1945 and again in 1950-51, when he used at least two divisions of MVD troops. On this and other aspects of the resistance movement we have an enlightening testimony of a former commander

of a battalion of the 668th Soviet Border Guard Division of the MVD, Lt. Col. Gregori Steponovich Burlitski, who defected to the West in 1953. Burlitski participated in several punitive campaigns against the Lithuanian guerrillas. In a testimony to a U.S. Congressional Committee Burlitski has described the armed resistance in the following words:

"At the very beginning in the territory of the Lithuanian Republic there were a great number of the so-called bandit formations: they were very numerous and consisted of many people. They were armed with light weapons. The weapons were both of Soviet and German manufacture. . . . Some of the Lithuanian guerrilla fighters were also armed with light artillery. In some places in the fight against the bandits were thrown not only the MVD units but also regular Red Army units and aviation. This particularly applies to the region of Kaslovrutskia Pasha, not far from the City of Kaunas.²⁴

Time has passed by, the troops were becoming more and more fatigued, the fight continued, and yet the local Soviet government and the party apparatus had not been established at all echelons. The so called bandits were very difficult. They were impossible to catch. Knowing very well the territory in which they operated, and having the support of the local population, they knew exactly what we had in mind, what we planned; when we were loading people on trucks to conduct an operation against the bandits, and they also had information in their possession and left the place they were to go into the forest to join a fight with us only which it was absolutely necessary."²⁵

Some partisan groups had as many as 800 men and could engage considerable Soviet force. Whenever an open fight with Soviet forces occurred, the partisans usually inflicted painful blows on the occupant. For example, a group of 800 partisans engaged two NKVD divisions in 1945. The results were: 150 partisans killed, 800 security soldiers annihilated.²⁶ In other engagements the ratio of killed partisans to killed Soviet soldiers is in several instances as follows: 11 to 94, 33 to 290.²⁷ Thus, it is no wonder, that martial law was maintained in Lithuania until 1946,²⁸ and that strong armed forces had to be kept on constant alert. For example, a small village of Keturvalaikiai, where prior to the war one or two policemen maintained public order, in 1948 there were three MVD men, four MGB men, twelve *istrebiteli*, and thirty Red Army soldiers.²⁹ Every county evidently had such security posts.

Soviet as well as non-soviet sources amply suggested that the Lithuanian armed resistance developed in the entire country spontaneously, without central direction or initiative. According to one student of the resistance, in April of 1945 there were already 30,000 partisans in Lithuania.³⁰

The many armed units slowly began to establish contacts, organize first on regional basis, and reached nation-wide centralization only by 1947.

Attempts to establish a military and political coordination were made as early as 1945.³¹ In the spring of 1945 a Council for the Liberation of Lithuania (*Lietuvos Išlaisvinimo Taryba*) began publishing proclamations to orient the people. However, by May of 1945 most of the members of this organization were arrested.³² At the same time appeared another organization — the Movement of Lithuanian Partisans (*Lietuvos Partizanų Sąjūdis*) — whose express purpose was to centralize the widely-spread partisan group leadership.³³ Soon, however, even this organ was disorganized and centralization took place gradually, through direct contacts of partisan groups.

It took over a year before the contacts between partisan groups led to a formation of central leadership. On June 10, 1946 the Joint Democratic Resistance Movement (*Bendras Demokratinis Pasiapriešinimo Sąjūdis*, or BDPS) was formed.³⁴ The BDPS united various former active and political resistance groups as well as the armed units and passive resisters throughout the country. Its Presidium was formed on a functional basis rather than on the basis of political representation.³⁵ The armed forces of the BDPS were called Freedom Fighters and were directed by the Supreme Headquarters of the Armed Forces.³⁶ Despite constant arrests and casualties the resistance movement managed to maintain central coordination almost till 1952. On February 16, 1948, the central organization was re-formed. On that day the armed partisans disassociated from various political groups and formed a new organization — Lithuania's Freedom Fight Movement (*Lietuvos Laisvės Kovų Sąjūdis*, LLKS).³⁸

On the local level Lithuania was divided into military regions, of which there were three or four at different periods. The regions consisted of several districts. A region was headed by a leader and a military and political staff. Military operations were organized on military bases, with various functional divisions (supply, intelligence, training, etc.) and groupings of armed men from the entire armed force of a region to groups of several men.³⁹

Continuous armed clashes eliminated many officers from the ranks of freedom fighters, and by 1947 their shortage was apparent. In the summer of 1947 the armed resistance organized courses of officers of partisan groups. Seventy-two selected freedom fighters graduated from the first partisan cadet school. Second course was to take place in 1948, but the Soviet security forces disorganized the effort.⁴⁰

The resistance also engaged extensively in propaganda activities. It had an extensive clandestine press, many publications of which have reached the West. From it we learn not only the targets

of the resistance, but also its evaluation of world situation, an important aspect for comprehending the mainsprings of the resistance.

For military aspects of the resistance were perhaps unduly emphasized. The political leaders of importance were either in Siberia or in the West. Leadership of the resistance fell to young people, former officers of the Lithuanian Army. This was one great weakness of the Armed Re-

the military nature of the resistance movement remained unchanged.

An armed force of such magnitude as was the Lithuanian resistance could exist only if the people provided the basic support in food, clothing, and shelters. As long as private farming and isolated homesteads existed, the armed partisans had plenty of food, clothing, and hiding places. Many worked during the day on farms or even



Such groups of uniformed and armed Freedom Fighters of Lithuania for about seven years after World War II struggled for freedom and against sovietization of their homeland (Photos on pp. 10, 35, 38 — courtesy of the book "Partizanai" by J. Daumantas, 1962)

sistance — it fought the Soviets mainly on the battlefields and often forgot the political and ideological aspects of the struggle. In fact, as early as in 1946, differences of opinion on the continuation of armed struggle appeared in responsible circles.⁴¹ Too much blood was shed uselessly, some thought. But the men in the woods had no alternative in an order based on terror and

in soviet agencies, while during the night transformed themselves into freedom fighters. Contrary to Soviet contentions, almost a universal national support, transcending class and social positions, was necessary to maintain an armed struggle for almost seven years. The Soviet regime was well aware of this and acted accordingly. By pauperizing the Lithuanian farmer as a result of state

requisitions and the disorganizing effect on the land reform instituted in 1945, and subsequently instituting collectivization (1943), the Soviet regime was able to deprive the armed partisans the main source for subsistence.

4. The Policies of the Armed Resistance

In order to understand the policies of the resistance leadership we must have in mind their perception of the international situation. It may be recalled that the resistance counted on an immediate East-West conflict. It was, therefore, logical to struggle with all means, to organize an armed force, and to maintain the national institutions, so that independence could easily be established as a result of such a conflict. Thus we see the emphasis on military organization and the total attack on the Soviet regime without consideration of price. Even when the illusion of an East-West war was destroyed by time and couriers from the West, the armed struggle continued. The Soviet terror did not permit a realistic alternative.

Moved by the belief of the temporary character of the Soviet regime in Lithuania and having a good organization and support from the populace, the armed resistance attempted to prevent the sovietization of Lithuania.

They persecuted those who attempted to plunder and loot in the post-war years, in many cases prevented local Soviet authorities from collecting requisitions and performing other functions, liquidated those Party and Government officials who were very ardent supporters of Soviet orders. When the collectivization of agriculture started, the partisans tried to prevent the farmers from joining or the Soviet officials from forcing them into collective farms. Several collective farms were destroyed, many organizers were liquidated.

Let us consider in some detail the two major campaigns of the resistance. The partisan activities during elections are a good illustration of their significance during the post-war years. Whenever elections took place, the partisans attempted to sabotage them. The first election in Lithuania occurred sometime in February of 1946. Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were to be elected. On this occasion, the strategy of partisans was to destroy communication lines (telephones, bridges), to fire on Soviet armed posts in election districts and, thus, to tire them out as groups that will attempt to collect votes in the well as to keep them in one place, to liquidate all villages, and to provide suitable excuses for the populace not to appear at the polling places (one such excuse being the danger from the attacking partisans). According to underground information the result of this election was that only about

28% of voters actually cast their votes. The remaining votes were cast by the election officials themselves. The official announcement, however, was that over 96% of all voters voted.⁴²

Taught by the disaster of the first election, the Soviet authorities did not dare hold elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet until Feb. 9, 1947. Far more careful preparations were made on this occasion. Until 1947 the formal legislative duties had been performed by a Supreme Soviet elected in 1940; thus the election was long overdue. The election is a good illustration of the ineffectiveness of the local Soviet authorities and of the role of the Lithuanian underground. A formal report on the election, drawn up by the Lithuanian underground,⁴³ states that besides the already stationed MVD troops (approximately 50,000 men) and also detachments of the Red Army, just before the election approximately 60,000 additional regular army troops were brought into Lithuania. From 25 to 50 armed men were stationed in each of the 2277 electoral districts. Furthermore, in county and district centers reserve motorized troops were ready to provide additional support. According to this document, the additional regular army troops were brought into Lithuania from Poland, where they had performed similar duties and had engaged in fierce fighting with the Polish resistance. On the election day the populace, at least in the rural areas, simply stayed at home. Facing a total boycott of the elections, the soviet authorities sent out election committees, actually 10-15 armed men, to collect the votes. The underground reports claim that in many cases the itinerant armed committees simply dropped into the urns the number of votes corresponding to the number of voters on the list. According to the underground report only about 15% of the votes were freely cast, the rest being obtained either through threats and coercion or through simple stacking of the urns by the election committees.

A similar situation prevailed in the judicial elections in February of 1948. The election was held on two successive days — on February 9, 1948, elections took place in Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, and Šiauliai; on February 16, in the rest of the country. The reasons for such an arrangement evidently were the lack of reinforcements for the local security forces. The available forces thus could be better utilized in a part of the country at a time.⁴⁴

While the campaign against the falsification of the nation's will was well politically conceived and executed, the same cannot be said of the resistance campaign against Soviet aggressive policy. Unwillingly, the resistance fell into a Marxist-Leninist trap.

When the Soviet regime returned to Lithuania in 1944, it did not immediately set itself upon

the course of collectivization. The regime preferred a more gradual transition from private farming to state-controlled collective farming. The transition period, lasting about three years, was marked by a radical land reform and punitive measures against the larger farmers. In other words, the transition period consisted of the preliminary steps of "de-kulak-ization," such as a wide distribution of land, levying increasingly heavier taxes upon larger farmers or designated "kulaks", emphasis on cooperation in agriculture, deportation of the resisting populace, and propagation of the collective-farming method.

The land reform, undertaken at the end of 1944, was based on an uncompleted version of a land reform decree, formed by the People's Diet on July 22, 1940.⁴⁵ The maximum size of the farms was designated at 30 hectares, except for farms with first class land, whose size could be reduced to 20 hectares, and for farms of "active supporters of German occupants," whose size could be reduced to 5 hectares. The latter provision no doubt was a powerful instrument in the hands of land reform administration, since it could easily be applied to a considerable number of farmers. With such provisions for confiscation of land the regime between 1944-1948 was able to acquire 1,575, 094 hectares of land for distribution. This area comprised at least a fourth of the arable land of Lithuania. A total of 96,330 agricultural workers, landless peasants, and small-holders received land from the state and the number of small farms (up to 10 hectares) was about doubled.⁴⁶

The resistance movement came out strongly against this land reform. By various means the resistance sabotaged the land reform.⁴⁷ Between 1944 and 1946, of the 1,260,925 hectares of land funds only about 650,000 hectares were distributed to the new settlers and small land-holders.⁴⁸ This was exactly what the Soviet regime desired. First of all, the Soviet Regime expected to create a "class struggle" with the land reform, and partly succeeded in this endeavor. Second, by destroying the productivity and disorganizing the farming system, the regime expected to circumscribe the support of the resistance and to prepare the way for ultimate collectivization. By failing to foresee such machinations on the part of the Soviet regime, the resistance movement helped take the ground from under its own feet.

5. Soviet Measures Against the Resistance

From the documents available now it is evident that the Soviet authorities were in effective or complete control only in larger cities. In fact, on occasion the partisans invaded even district centers and annihilated local security forces as well as more ruthless Soviet and party officials. The memoirs and stories of this period by activists and komsomols make it clear that they participated in the sovietization of the country with a gun

in their hands, seldom ventured into the villages alone or unarmed.⁴⁹ There existed two governments in the country — one ruling during the day, another during the night. One prominent communist recalls that in the fall of 1948, when ties again expanded, few of the district party workers remained to sleep at home. They all returned from the village to the party committee headquarters, where they found a measure of safety.⁵⁰

The resistance movement, thus, was the main obstacle to the sovietization of Lithuania and the Soviet authorities utilized every conceivable method to break it. The cited former officer in the MVD, Lt. Col. G.S. Brulitski, who on two occasions participated in the campaign against the partisans, has testified on some of these measures. First of all, to direct the sovietization of Lithuania, in 1944 the Kremlin established an Organizational Bureau for Lithuania of the Central Committee, CPSU.⁵¹ Mikhail Suslov was appointed head of this Lithuanian Bureau. According to Burlitski this Bureau exercised the supreme power in Lithuania and directed the struggle against the resistance, the reestablishment of Soviet and party apparatus. Suslov as the CPSU's troubleshooter was well qualified for this assignment, since during the Second World War he himself directed partisan activities against the Germans, and was quite familiar with partisan tactics. This Org. Bureau for Lithuania existed till about 1947 when the local party and government apparatus had been established. Suslov's functions were taken over by a Plenipotentiary of the Central Committee, CPSU, Vladimir V. Shcherbakov.

In addition to political supervision, Beria's deputy Kruglov was sent into Lithuania to organize an armed onslaught of the partisans. Burlitski had testified that:

"On a very dark September night (1944), in the City of Panevėžys, Kruglov calls in a top-secret operational meeting. At this meeting there are present the commanders of the units of NKVD troops, the deputies of these commanders for political affairs, for intelligence, and also the chiefs of staff of the units, the responsible top leaders of the territorial units of the NKVD in Lithuania. At this meeting Kruglov summarized the results of the fight against the so-called bandit movement in Lithuania and said that up to the present time the measures which have been undertaken have not proved to be realistic, that the Politburo of the Soviet Union and Stalin and Beria themselves are not satisfied with the results of what has been achieved in Lithuania, that it is time to change from words to sharp measures; that order must be brought into Lithuania and that the party and the administrative Soviet apparatus must be reestablished in Lithuania. In the name of Stalin and Beria, Kruglov gives a concrete order that the work of intelligence agents must be intensified and activated."⁵²


After this meeting a reign of terror began. Burlitski goes on to point out that concrete measures undertaken on the direct orders from Beria's deputy Gen Kruglov. The Lithuanian officials involved in this operation were: Lt. Gen. J. Bartašiūnas of the MVD, the Minister of Internal Affairs in Lithuania; Maj. Gen. J. Macijauskas, the Military Commissar for Lithuanian SSR; Antanas Sniečkus, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL). Bartašiūnas and Macijauskas are Russian-educated, served in the Red Army and the Border Guard, were brought into Lithuania in 1940. Sniečkus is an old revolutionary, secretary of the CPL since 1928. Of the Russian officials involved in the operation against the partisans during the first years of occupation, besides the already mentioned Gen. Kruglov and M. Suslov, were the NKGB head for Lithuania Dimitri Jefimov, and a head of a special NKGB division (Osobnii Banditski Otdiel) Maj. Sokolov, who organized provocateur partisan groups. All the mentioned Russian officials were superior in all respects to the Lithuanian Communists. They were the factual rulers of the country.⁵³

The suppressive measures against the partisans undertaken by Soviet organs headed by the cited officials may be described as terroristic. Mass deportations of supporters and possible supporters of the partisans were undertaken. It is known that during the period of 1945-1950 eight mass deportations were carried out. According to the underground reports and testimony of eyewitnesses, the dates of deportations and number of deported are as follows:

1945 — in August and September	— 60,000
1946 — in February	— 40,000
1947 — during the entire second half of the year	— 70,000
1948 — on May 22	— 70,000
1949 — on March 24-27 and in June	— 50,000
1950 — in March	— 30,000

Thus, during five years approximately 320,000 people were deported from Lithuania.⁵⁴ The number of deported is estimated, yet in view of the data of the 1959 population census in the Soviet Union, the estimate seems to be quite accurate. The 1945 deportations evidently were a part of the initial campaign against the underground. The 1946 deportation was a retaliation for the boycott of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The 1948 and 1949 deportations were designed to break the resistance to collectivization. While the deportations, no doubt, eliminated many potential and actual supporters of the resistance movement, they also had the effect of increasing the number of freedom fighters.

Soviet terror did not end with deportations. Entire villages that supported the underground



Two Lithuanian partisans on a liaison mission to the West, 1947

were burned, armed men were liquidated on the spot. The entire country, especially the forested areas, were combed by armed forces. Intelligence operations were intensified. Maj. Sokolov organized a special training school in Vilnius for partisan provocateurs and infiltrators.⁵⁵ Provocateur partisan units were organized to discredit the resistance movement. These bands and individuals of provocateurs tried to discover the supporters of the partisans among the populace and attempted to infiltrate the partisan movement, to discover the identity and hideout of the leaders of the resistance. But the most treacherous aspect of the provocateur band activities was that they attempted to confuse the populace by plundering, stealing and by murder of peaceful inhabitants. While the well-organized partisans could unmask the provocateurs and spies, the populace in many instances was confused and fearful.⁵⁶ The bodies of slain partisans were desecrated in every market place in Lithuania.⁵⁷

Together with terror, the soviet authorities in 1946 announced an amnesty to all the partisans who would surrender. The text of the amnesty, signed by the head of NKVD in Lithuania Maj.

Gen. J. Bartasiūnas, by itself indicates the fierce conflict at the time.⁵⁸

The amnesty called on the security forces to finally crush the resistance. To the surrendering partisans freedom and documents were promised. The amnesty advocated the partisans to kill their leaders and to surrender. It ordered families of partisans arrested and deported and threatened severe punishment to those who do not report hiding places of partisans.

The leadership of the underground, in order to abate the terror, permitted the partisans to avail themselves of the amnesty.⁵⁹ The resistance movement thus somewhat shrank and went into a more passive and deeper underground. It was again reactivated when the regime initiated collectivization. From various sources cited it is evident that the organized struggle against the regime continued until the end of Stalin's rule. The mentioned Burlitski has testified that:

"During DH 1950-51 the entire fight against the so-called bandit movement of Lithuania was entrusted to two MVD divisions, so-called divisions for special tasks — the 2nd and 4th Special Task Division. The headquarters of the 2nd Special Task Division was located at Vilnius and the commander was General Vetrov, and the 4th Division for Special Tasks is located in the City of Šiauliai and the commander of the division is General Piashov. These two divisions, under the command of those two generals I just mentioned are actually doing all the work and all the fighting against the so-called bandit movement in the territory of the LSSR, of course in connection and cooperation with the local units of MVD."⁶⁰

Gen. Kruglov in 1950-51 again directed the final massive assault on the underground. The year 1951 probably marks the end of organized armed resistance. In 1951 the last important partisan leader J. Daumantas-Lukša, who was allegedly parachuted into Lithuania by the CIA, was ambushed and liquidated.⁶¹ The continuous massive attacks by Soviet security forces constantly whittled the ranks of the partisans, the deportations and collectivization eliminated the basis of resistance movement.

The armed resistance decided to gradually demobilize and thus end the violent phase of the nation's resistance against sovietization. Basically demobilization is said to have been accomplished by 1955.

6. A Conclusion and Continuation

Scattered partisan groups were still active in 1956 and perhaps later; this is indicated by several items in the Soviet press. On September 17, 1955, an amnesty for the participants of the underground was again offered. On March 22, 1956

Sovetskaia Litva published a KGB appeal to the partisans still in hiding to avail themselves of the amnesty. Also several former partisans were arrested in 1957. Finally in 1959 three partisans were killed in Samogitia (Žemaitija).⁶² At the same time these items point to the insignificance of the armed, active resistance as a political force. These items are significant only insofar as they remind the violent post-war struggle for freedom. Today, national resistance to the Soviet regime has taken another form. Instead of an armed struggle for freedom, the Lithuanian people are now waging a cultural and social struggle for national existence.

The story of the Lithuanian resistance is a tragic story because thousands of men were sacrificed for the unjustified belief in the moral commitment of Western Democracies. The resistance failed to consider the fact of power politics of the dominating states, whose victim Lithuania had become during the first days of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the struggle of the Lithuanian people against an occupying power and an alien system was a moral struggle, for it sought to assure the enjoyment of basic human rights for the Lithuanian people.

1. A note on the sources on the Lithuanian resistance movement.

An eye-witness account of the resistance movement between 1944 and approximately 1948 is that of J. Daumantas, *Partizanai už Geležinį Uždangos* (Partisans Behind the Iron Curtain), Chicago, 1950. J. Daumantas is a pseudonym of Juozas Lukša, who may be considered the last revered leader of the partisan movement. He twice crossed the Iron Curtain to bring information to the West and to become informed on the political situation in the West. His book is an account of his experiences in the partisan units and contains a number of important documents on the Lithuanian partisan activities. According to Soviet sources, J. Lukša was parachuted into Lithuania sometime in 1950, allegedly as an agent of the American intelligence. It is known that he was killed in an ambush in 1951 by Soviet security forces.

J. Lukša's story of the patriotic resistance to sovietization is corroborated by a testimony of Lt. Col. G. S. Burlitski before a congressional committee investigating the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. Burlitski was in command of the 2nd Battalion, 668th Soviet Border Guard Division of the MVD until his defection to the West in June of 1953. He participated in the punitive action against the Lithuanian partisans between 1944 and 1951. His account of the Lithuanian resistance is found in Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Rep., 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Hearings, pt. 2, pp. 1368-1375 (hereafter cited as *Hearings*, pt. 2).

There are also a number of accounts of partisan activities by people who since have reached the West. See, for example, Kazys Jurgaitis' testimony in *J. Laisvė* (Toward Freedom, Lithuanian Political Quarterly, Chicago, III.) 1961, No. 24(61), pp. 25-31. The best Lithuanian summary of the armed resistance is that of Prof. Juozas Brazaitis, "Partisans During the Second Soviet Occupation", *J. Laisvė*, 1961, No. 24(61), pp. 3-18. The most extensive English account of the resistance movement is found in the recently published book by K. V. Tauras, *Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast*, Voyages Press, New York, 1962. Tauras' book is an English summary of Daumantas' book and Burlitski's testimony. Valuable is also E. Mačiulika's *Lithuania in the Last 30 Years*, New Haven, no date, Ch. XII. See also articles by Stasys Zymantas, in *Lituanus*, 1960, No. 2 and 1956, No. 2. The *Lithuanian Bulletin*, published by the Lithuanian American Council, New York, N. Y., 1944-1951 is a valuable source on the factual situation in Lithuania at that time.

Soviet sources on the patriotic resistance are even more abundant. The Soviet press constantly publishes stories and documentary testimonies on various aspects of the Lithuanian resistance, as viewed through the communist prism, of course. The significant and interesting point of the communist version of the resistance movement is that its non-interpretative, factual parts in general agree with those provided by non-soviet sources, cited above. One of the more important Soviet works on the resistance is a "documentary sketch" by M. Chienas, K. Šmigelskis, E. Uldukis, *Vanagai iš anapus* (Hawks from the Other Side), Vilnius, 1960. It describes two groups of resistance fighters who are trained by American intelligence officers in Western Europe and parachuted into Lithuania in 1950 and 1951. A leader of one group was the already mentioned Juozas Lukša. Comparing the Soviet version with available non-soviet information, it is reasonable to believe that the Soviet version is correct as far as facts, dates, names, and places are concerned. The periodical Soviet press has published numerous memoirs of communist activists who fought the partisans; confessions of captured partisans, and their supporters; documents of the security organs. These will be cited in the course of the article.

2. The term "Freedom Fighters" was actually used by the partisans to designate themselves.

3. See Tiesa, Dec. 22, 1957, and *Komjaunimo Tiesa* of the same date.

4. For some of the early official references to the resistance movement see Sniečkus' speech in the XIII Plenum of the Central Committee, CPL, Tiesa, May 17, 1947, p. 2; M. Belousov, "Bourgeois Nationalists—the Most Bitter Enemies of the Lithuanian Nation", *Sovetskaja Litva*, May 23, 1948, p. 2.

5. Tiesa, Dec. 24, 1947.

6. Belousov, op. cit.; LTSR Mokslų Akademija, *Archyviniai dokumentai apie nacionalistų antiliaudinę veiklą* (Archive Documents on the Anti-People Activity of the Nationalists), Vilnius, 1961, p. 33. (Hereafter cited as *Archyviniai Dokumentai*.)

7. A series of documentary booklets, under the common heading *Faktai kaltina* (Facts Condemn) recently appeared in Lithuania. These booklets are prepared by an Editorial Board for Publication of Archive Documents of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences. They cover alleged crimes of the "bourgeois nationalists" between 1941 and 1952. As far as the armed resistance is concerned, besides the cited *Archyviniai dokumentai*, for our purposes of the series *Faktai kaltina*, *Žudikai bažnyčios prieglobsty* (Murderer in the Shelter of the Church), Vilnius, 1960, is important because it not only expounds on the role of the Catholic Church in the resistance but also provides important data on the scope, organization, and goals of the armed resistance.

8. *Archyviniai dokumentai*, p. 33. See also *Vanagai iš anapus*; op. cit., which is devoted to proving the involvement of Western intelligence services in the Lithuanian resistance.

9. *Archyviniai dokumentai*, pp. 33-34.

10. In recent years the communist partisans in the German war have written many glowing accounts of their deeds; see, for example, P. Kutka, *Girioj aidi šūviai* (Shots Echo in the Forest), Vilnius, 1958. An example of the glorification of the activists is that of A. Viršulis, *Netolimos praeities žygdarbiai* (Heroic Deeds of the Recent Past), Vilnius, 1958; "Born of Storms", *Komjaunimo Tiesa*, June 30, 1961, p. 2. A notable part of literature, written since 1957, has been devoted to advance the legend of the activists.

11. Who the "anti-soviet elements" were was well known from the experiences of the June 1940 deportations of some 30,000 people. Everyone belonging to the general categories of people cited could expect a similar fate. See a complete NKVD document, which enumerates the "anti-soviet elements", in J. Prunskis, *Lietuvių Archyvas: Bolševizmo metai* (The Lithuanian Archive: The Years of Bolshevism), Brooklyn, 1952, pp. 29-30.

12. Partijos Istorijos Institutas prie LKPCCK, J. Sarmaitis, ed., *Revoliucinis judėjimas Lietuvoje* (The Revolutionary Movement in Lithuania), a collection of articles, Vilnius, 1957, p. 647. The number appears to be distorted since it would mean that practically every man between 18 and 49 would have been mobilized.

13. The mobilization into the Red Army is covered in more detail by E. J. Harrison, *Lithuania's Fight for Freedom*, New York, 1952, pp. 68-70; also Daumantas, op. cit., p. 34.

14. Harrison, op. cit., pp. 43-46, 53.

15. See *Archyviniai dokumentai* and *Žudikai bažnyčios prieglobsty*, op. cit., *passim*, for the political expectations of the resistance. Also Daumantas, op. cit., *passim*.

16. Daumantas, op. cit., pp. 304-306.

17. *Žudikai bažnyčios prieglobsty*, op. cit., contains a number of interrogation records of a bishop, priests, and former active members of the resistance, showing the involvement of the Catholic Church in the resistance.

18. *Ibid.*

19. J. Brazaitis in *J. Laisvę*, 1961, No. 24 (61), p. 3.

20. *Mačiuka*, op. cit., p. 126.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Lithuanian Bulletin*, Jan.-March, 1949, pp. 11-12.

23. Tauras, op. cit., pp. 50-52.

24. The location here referred to is a very wooded and swampy part of Lithuania, called the Kazlų Rūda Forests.

25. Hearings, pt. 2, pp. 1369-1370.

26. Daumantas, op. cit., p. 102.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 101.

28. *Mačiuka*, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

29. *Ibid.*

30. J. Brazaitis, in *J. Laisvę*, 1961, No. 24 (61), p. 4.

31. See *Žudikai bažnyčios prieglobsty* for the early centralization plans.

32. Daumantas, op. cit., pp. 77.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

35. *Lithuanian Bulletin*, Jan.-March, 1949, p. 8.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Daumantas, op. cit., p. 233.

38. See Stasys Žymantas' article in *Lituanus*, 1960, No. 2, p. 44.

39. Daumantas' book, op. cit., pp. 391-397, contains a statute of one military region.

40. Tauras, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

41. This is apparent from the testimonies contained in *Žudikai bažnyčios prieglobsty*, op. cit.

42. Daumantas, op. cit., pp. 159-174.

43. The document here referred to is written in the form of an act or a report on the elections in the Suvalkija region of Lithuania. It is reprinted in its entirety in Daumantas' book, op. cit., pp. 250-257. An English translation of the document is found in the Documents section of this issue of *Lituanus*.

44. *Mačiuka*, op. cit., p. 111.

45. *Teisės Mokslų Fakultetas, Vilniaus Valstybinis V. Kapusko Vardo Universitetas, Tarybų Lietuvos valstybės ir teisės dvidešimtmetis* (Twenty Years of the Soviet Lithuanian State and Law), Vilnius, 1960, p. 144 (hereafter cited by title only).

46. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

47. Daumantas, op. cit., p. 107.

48. Tiesa, May 17, 1947, p. 2.

49. Viršulis, op. cit., for example, writes about a number of Komsomols and communists who were killed in the post-war struggle between the resistance and the Soviet authorities.

50. E. Bilevičius, *Nemunas grįžta savo vaga* (The river Nemunas returns to its course), Vilnius, 1961, pp. 189-190.

51. Hearings, pt. 2, pp. 1371-1372. The Org. Bureau for Lithuania is rarely mentioned in Soviet sources. The author has discovered just one reference to it in connection with the Soviet recognition of "aid" of Lithuania from "fraternal republics" in the post-war years. See *Tarybų Lietuvos valstybės ir teisės dvidešimtmetis*, p. 161.

52. Hearings, pt. 2, p. 1370.

53. From personal files on Lithuanian Soviet regime, compiled by the writer.

54. Vincas Rastenis, "Lithuania's Population in Soviet Statistics", *The Baltic Review*, Dec. 1956, No. 9, p. 20.

55. *Lithuanian Bulletin*, March-April, 1948 pp. 8-9; Daumantas, op. cit., p. 243.

56. Daumantas, op. cit., pp. 107-109.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

58. Amnesty order is cited by Simas Miglinas, *Pavergtoji Lietuva* (Enslaved Lithuania), Memmingen, Germany, no pub. date, pp. 41-42. See Documents section of this issue of *Lituanus* for the complete text of the amnesty order.

59. Daumantas, op. cit., p. 117.

60. Hearings, pt. 2, p. 1373.

61. *Vanagai iš Anapus*, is the Soviet story of partisan leader J. Lukša-Daumantas.

62. These items are cited by J. Brazaitis, *J. Laisvę*, 1961, No. 24 (61), p. 12.

**SELECTED DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL
ON THE LITHUANIAN RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM
1940 - 1960**

Editorial Note: The documents presented herein are not intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative of the highlights of a continuing struggle of the Lithuanian nation for freedom and independence. Furthermore, these documents are intended to suggest one great flaw in the unity and strength of the Soviet Union—the lack of popular basis for Communism in Lithuania and generally in Eastern Europe.

The presented documentary material indicates that from the very first days of subjugation by the Soviets and later by the Nazis the Lithuanian people waged a relentless fight for the reestablishment of independence. The documents refute the Soviet lie that the Lithuanian people have freely accepted the Soviet system. In fact, an armed struggle was waged against the Soviet regime for about seven years, until the armed resistance was subdued by the sheer overwhelming Soviet security forces. Nevertheless, signs of passive resist-

ance against the Soviet regime are numerous even today. An extreme crisis in the Soviet Empire could easily transform the passive resistance into an armed uprising, as the example of the Hungarian Revolution certainly suggests.

Wars of national emancipation by the colonial peoples have been sanctioned and even incited by the Soviet Union. The West could easily turn this weapon against the Soviet Union with even more devastating results, for, as the perseverance of twenty years of resistance to the Soviet regime in Lithuania indicates, under certain conditions, there is a possibility of a total revolt against the Soviet colonial system by the peoples in Eastern Europe. The tactical importance of this fact cannot be underestimated in the actions of Western democracies. The nurturing of a hope for freedom in Eastern Europe can only coincide with the interests of the Western world and the interests of freedom.

I. Early Resistance Against the Soviet Regime — Spring of 1941

I. Excerpts from a Detailed NKVD Memorandum on Anti-Soviet Activities Throughout Lithuania.

No. 2/1504 of 14 April 1941.

AA — 4 copies

To — comrade FEDOTOV, State Security Commissar of Third Rank, Commander of the Section 2 of the GUGB (All-Union Board of State Security) of the NKVD of the USSR, City of Moscow.

DETAILED MEMORANDUM REGARDING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY LEAFLETS SPREADING ON THE TERRITORY OF THE LITHUANIAN SSR

From the moment of the establishment of Soviet rule in Lithuania, the counter-revolutionary nationalist element developed an active anti-Soviet activity, choosing as the basic method of its hostile subversive work, the distribution of counter-revolutionary leaflets, and anonymous papers.

In the main, the leaflets called for the overthrow of the Soviet government, the sabotage, the boycott of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, spread angry lies regarding the Party and government leaders, and disseminated provocative rumors of a "coming war of the USSR with Germany," etc.

Mass dissemination of counter-revolutionary leaflets took place in all of the counties of the Lithuanian SSR.

The authors and disseminators of anti-Soviet leaflets and anonymous letters, who had been exposed in a number of instances, appeared to be members of the counter-revolutionary formations among former members of the anti-Soviet political parties and organizations, nationalistic school youths and (university) students.

Most actively, and on a mass scale, the leaflets were distributed by the hostile element during the period of preparation for the elections into the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

We cite the facts of dissemination of counter-revolutionary leaflets by individual counties of the Lithuanian SSR. from the moment of the establishment of a Soviet form of government to January 15, 1941:

IN THE CITY OF KAUNAS:

Beginning with September 1940, handwritten and multigraphed anti-Soviet leaflets began to appear systematically on the streets of the city of Kaunas, in the educational institutions, under the slogan:

"Long live independent Lithuania"

"Down with the communist terror"

"Lithuania for the Lithuanians"

ect.; up to 50 pieces of such leaflets were disclosed.

In consequence of the undertaken agency-operative measures, an anti-Soviet organization was exposed and liquidated. Its membership consisted of students of the secondary schools who called themselves "LNP" — "Lithuanian Independence Party," which maintained ties with organized groups in the secondary schools (gymnasias) of Kaunas, Vilnius, Ukmergė and other cities of the LSSR, whereto the counter-revolutionary leaflets were directed and where they were disseminated.

26 persons, active members of the organization, were arrested in the case.

Among the arrested persons were:

1. **Henrikas BLIUMENTALIS** — student, born in 1924, German, son of a lawyer, member of the "Kulturverband."
1. **Vytautas SVILAS** — student of the VIII Class, born in 1925, Lithuanian, son of the director of a department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania.
3. **Romualdas BORTKEVICIUS** — student of III Course of the Superior Technical School 18 years old, son of a peasant.
4. **Zigmas KAULAKIS** — student of the VIII Class of the secondary school, born in 1925, Lithuanian, from a family of intellectuals, son of a building proprietor.
5. **Eduardas BOKAS** — student of the VIII Class, born in 1925, Lithuanian, son of a civil servant.
6. **Eugenijus MACIEJUNAS** — student, born in 1924, Lithuanian, son of an officer in the Lithuanian army.
7. **Julius BANDZIUS** — student, born in 1925, son of an officer in the Lithuanian army.
8. **Aras GINTAUTAS** — student, born in 1923, Lithuanian, son of an officer of the Lithuanian army. And others

We reported this case to you in detail, by No. 1215 of 12 November 1940.

During the period from October to the date of the elections in the city of Kaunas, anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed, addressed **To the Lithuanians, To the Farmers**, and an illegal counter-revolutionary newspaper **Laisvoji Lietuva** (Free Lithuania); these made their appearance on various dates in single pieces. The leaflets were typewritten and hand written, and were multiplied by rotator or mimeograph. **Laisvoji Lietuva** was multiplied by rotator.

In pre-election days, the contents of these leaflets especially propagandized a boycott of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

On 10 and 11 January 1941, we practically completed the agency-study of the file **Vrag** (The Ene-

my), which dissected the authors and disseminators of the counter-revolutionary newspaper, *Laisvoji Lietuva*.

Arrested in the case were:

Povilas MALINAUSKAS — born in 1910 Lithuanian, employee of the telegraph agency "Elta," former National Guardsman.

Kostas SIPKAUSKAS — born in 1914, Lithuanian, employee of the "Zaibas" typography, former member of the Catholic youth organization "Pavasaris."

Vladas TELKSNYS — born in 1915. Lithuania, employee of the "Zaibas" typography, former member of the Catholic organization "Pavasaris."

Jonas JABLONSKIS — born in 1906, Lithuanian, former secretary of the Lithuanian Legations in Stockholm and Berlin, lately employed as editor of "Elta", telegraphic press agency of Lithuania. From a scientist's family.

During the search of MALINAUSKAS at the place of his employment, the following materials were found and seized:

- 1) 14 copies of the illegal anti Soviet newspaper, *Laisvoji Lietuva*.
- 2) 66 copies of anti-Soviet leaflets, including *Litovets* (The Lithuanian, in Russian), which had been disseminated earlier.
- 3) 40 copies of the bulletin of the organization *Laisvosios Lietuvos Sajunga* (Association for a Free Lithuania).
- 4) 75 combat cartridges for a *Parabellum* pistol.

During the search of the private quarters of Malinauskas, the following was found and seized:

- 1) A pistol of the *Parabellum* system, two clips for it and 72 combat cartridges.
- 2) A rotator, on which the counter-revolutionary newspaper *Laisvoji Lietuva* and counter revolutionary leaflets were printed.
- 3) Two packages of wax and three packages of rotator paper.

It was established in the course of the investigation that this counter-revolutionary organization, calling itself *Movement for a Free Lithuania — Laisvosios Lietuvos Sajunga*, manufactured and disseminated only one issue — 500 copies of the issue No. 1 of the newspaper *Laisvoji Lietuva*, and several hundred counter-revolutionary leaflets.

(Two copies of the newspaper, the leaflets and photographs are enclosed with the packet pertaining to the city of Kaunas.)

We informed you of this case in detail, by No. 1 186 of 24 January 1941

During the months of December and January, an anti-Soviet leaflet was disseminated in the University of Kaunas. It was mimeographed and directed to Lithuanian Men and Women Students, — signed: *Association of Lithuanian Activists of the Partizanas Branch of Kaunas*. In addition thereto, counter-revolutionary leaflets under the slogan of Lithuanians, we shall not surrender to the Moscovites, unsigned, multiplied by rotator, were disseminated. Both leaflets appeared in small quantities, up to 10 pieces. Distributors of the latter leaflet were not exposed.

(An original leaflet and translation are enclosed, see the packet pertaining to the city of Kaunas.)

At 22 o'clock on 16 February 1941, during the attempt of the nationalistic studentry and high school youths to organize an anti-Soviet demonstration in front of the monument to the unknown soldier in Kaunas, our previously decoded secrets enabled us to detain 10 persons, university and high school students, at the very beginning of the assembly (the demonstration was prevented).

The arrestee — during the interrogation admitted that he is a member of a counter-revolutionary organization, *Association of Lithuanian Activists-Guerrillas*, active in the university of Kaunas which possesses a rotator and a mimeograph machine, publishes and prints counter-revolutionary leaflets signed — *Association of Lithuanian Activists-Guerrillas*, which had been exposed previously.

In the light of the testimony of —, 5 students are being investigated.

The case of — was agency-listed, an agency file entitled "*The Mutineers*" was started.

Simultaneously, an anti-Soviet newspaper, *The Forbidden Idea*, was disseminated in secondary school. In consequence of the undertaken measures, the anti-Soviet grouping which printed and disseminated this counter-revolutionary newspaper in the city of Kaunas was exposed and liquidated (see the agency file, *Organizer*). *The Forbidden Idea* was mimeographed.

The following were arrested in this case:

Stepas LEONAS — born in 1921, Lithuanian, employee of the *Nemunas* shipping office, former Boy Scout leader, from a family of workers.

Aleksandras KANCLYVIS — born in 1910, German, jurist, former 1st Sergeant of the waterways police, from a family of peasants.

Eleonora RUTELIONYTE — born in 1922 Lithuanian girl, student of the 9th Class, former member of Catholic and Girl Scout organizations, from a family of civil servants.

Feliksas POVILAITIS — born in 1920, seller of the magazine *Maistas* in the city of Vilnius.

Mykolas KAMINSKAS — born in 1895, former Nationalist and National Guardsman, employee of the Lithuanian Railroad Board.

A detailed report was submitted to you by No. 1/422 of 9 February 1941.

The following materials were found and seized during the search of the private quarters of Leonas:

- 1) A mimeograph and necessary materials for the same.
- 2) 14 copies of the anti-Soviet newspaper *The Forbidden Idea*.
- 3) Anti-Soviet manuscripts for the published outlaw newspaper.
- 4) Anti-Soviet books published under the Smetona's government.

Anti-Soviet manuscripts, written by her for the newspaper *The Forbidden Idea*, were seized from Rutelionyte.

8 copies of the newspaper were seized from Povilaitis (he was arrested in Vilnius).

The investigation established that they prepared and disseminated up to 200 copies of the anti-Soviet newspaper *The Forbidden Idea*.

(Original newspapers *The Forbidden Idea* and photographs are enclosed in the packet pertaining to the city of Kaunas.)

2. An NKGB Report on Initial Armed Skirmishes with Lithuanian Resistance Groups.

TO ALL COMMANDERS OF COUNTY BRANCHES AND SUBDIVISIONS OF THE NKGB OF THE LITHUANIAN SSR, COMMANDERS OF THE FRONTIER DETACHMENTS 105, 106 AND 107.

Comr.

City of

A number of instances of banditry were fixed in the last few days on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR.

It was established that a portion of the hostile element, slated for the arrest and exile beyond the frontiers of the Lithuanian SSR went into hiding, passed into outlaw status, and engaged in the formation of bandit groups during the period of the effecting of the operation of purging of the republic. Thus for instance:

1. The Rokiškis county branch reports that one instance of banditry outbreak was noted within the county territory on 16th June.

2. According to the report of the Marijampolė county branch of the NKGB an armed band of about 20 persons emerged in the area of Prienai town on 17th June. The band is commanded by a former officer of the Lithuanian army. According to available data, the band has 2 machine guns and other arms.

Instances of banditry outbreaks were also recorded in the territories of the counties of Šiauliai and Utena.

Regardless of these serious signals, Commanders of the county branches of the NKGB essentially failed to attribute any significance to them, did not make appropriate operational deductions, and did not expand the agency network for the exposal and liquidation of the bandit groups.

In consequence thereof, there were instances of killing and wounding of the operative personnel employed in the liquidation of the bandit groups. For instance:

On 17th June comrade Kuzmin, Deputy Commander of the Utena county branch of the NKGB, organized two ambushes in the Narokai village for liquidation of the bandit groups.

In consequence of the unorganized state and the exceptionally unserious approach to preparations for the operation, the two ambush forces opened cross-fire on each other at two o'clock at night, in consequence whereof militiaman Povilas Boreyko was killed.

In Marijampolė county, during the liquidation of a bandit group composed of four Rimas brothers, formerly active Voldemarists, the collaborators who were taking part in the operation opened absolutely unnecessary fire, in consequence whereof militiaman Muravyov was wounded.

An analogous fact occurred in the Rokiškis county. The absence of agency work and the exception-

nally unserious outlook regarding the facts of banditry outbreaks, are attested by the fact that the counties enumerated above, having initially reported in several phases banditry outbreaks which had taken place, up to the present time failed to organize agency operational tasks which would safeguard the liquidation of the bandit groups, and did not even identify and did not report the composition of the bandit groups, members of families of their participants, their armament, etc.

I PROPOSE:

1. Each instance of a banditry outbreak must be immediately traced and liquidated without a delay.

Measures undertaken for the exposure and liquidation of bandit groups must be immediately indicated and reported to me in detail. The work must not be interrupted until the complete liquidation of the band and its base. I place personally upon the commander and his deputy in UO of the NKGB (County Branch of the People's Commissariat of State Security) the leadership over this task.

2. The commanders of the Marijampolė, Rokiškis, Utena and Šiauliai county branches of the NKGB must on 23rd June specifically submit to me their detailed reports regarding the instances of banditry outbreaks which had taken place, the results of the undertaken operational measures, and their operation-recruitment (of agents-informers) must also be conducted.

3. In each instance of banditry outbreaks, relatives and persons close to the bandits must be immediately identified and taken into elaboration, for the exposure and liquidation of the bandit groups; (of agents-informers) must also be conducted.

4. To the same end, organize the passing into "outlaw" status of the verified agents made up of former National Guardsmen, kulaks, officers, etc., in the locale of appearance of the bandit groups; likewise organize escapes to the forests, on the pretext of hiding from persecution by the organs of the NKGB, — with the calculation of infiltrating such agents into the bandit groups, for the full exposure and liquidation of the latter. Each and every such combination must be effected only following its confirmation by me.

5. Having accurately identified the exact location of bandit groups, immediately report to me or my deputies, in order to secure practical assistance by the armed forces.

6. In the next few days, conduct the recruitment (of agents-informers) among circles close to the elements who had gone into hiding from the repression.

7. Conduct the recruitment into agency network among village elders who, due to the nature of their

duties, personally know all local inhabitants and may inform you of the occurrence of suspicious gatherings, the absence from home of this or that inhabitant, the appearance of suspect persons, the preparations for flights into outlaw status, etc.

8. In recruiting the agency network, lay the basic stress on infiltrating same among the kulaks, National Guardsmen and former officers.

Every 5 days starting with June 25th report to me the work accomplished by you in this direction. Indicate in your reports the characteristics of the agents recruited by you, the facts of banditry out-

breaks, and the operational measures undertaken for their liquidation.

People Commissar of State Security of the LSSR
or Major of State Security Forces —
(GLADKOV)

June 21st, 1941
City of Kaunas

No. 45
Authentic —

Deputy Operational Plenipotentiary of the
Secretariat for Codification.

(SEMYOKHINA) (signature) Semyokhina

II. The Revolt Against the Soviet Regime and the Formation of the Provisional Government of Lithuania, June, 1941

3. Instructions to the Underground by the Leadership of the Lithuanian Activist Front on the Timing of an Anti-Soviet Insurrection.

ON GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AT THAT TIME

German-Russian relations are not based on mutual understanding, but rather on a temporary similarity of interests. During the past two years it has been important for the Germans to avoid two fronts, because at that time strong French and English military forces were still in Western Europe. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is trying to avoid a clash with the gigantic military machine of Germany because of fear; she desires to wait until Germany and her enemies have become weakened through deadly combat. The Soviets hope that at such a time the Red Army would gain importance in relation to the other military forces of Europe and that, after prolonged war, conditions would favor an expansion of communism over the European continent, if not over the entire world. Since Germans foresee these aims of the Soviet Union, German-Russian relations are not and cannot be stable...

At this time German-Russian relations seem to be collapsing completely. Responsible German officials, well-oriented in German politics, have ceased to hide their animosity toward the Soviet Union, an express opinions in private conversations that a conflict between the Germans and the Russians is imminent. No one, however, dares to say when this might occur. Undoubtedly they do not even know when, because this fact is a highly guarded secret of the German high command. Some express opinions that a German-Russian war will start this spring; others think that it might commence in the fall, but still others believe that war could erupt abruptly if

the Soviet Union were to commit another act that would be too bitter for the Germans to swallow.

The best indications of the imminent German-Russian conflict are the large-scale troop movements from all other areas of the East: to East Prussia, Poland, and Rumania. What portion of the troops has already reached the above mentioned regions is known only to the supreme command of the German Army. These troop movements are going on continuously; in many places, therefore, regular railroad transportation has been stopped. It is worthwhile to note that troops are being moved out of France and from regions where preparations had been made for an airborne invasion of England.

Generally speaking, it seems that these German war-preparations are not routine defensive preparations against the Soviet Union, with the expectation of decisive operations elsewhere. On the contrary, facts indicate that at this time preparations are made for a decisive invasion of the Soviet Union... Whatever the case may be, in the light of these recent happenings it cannot be supposed that German war-preparations are designed only to frighten the Soviet Union. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that it is necessary to treat this imminent German-Russian armed conflict seriously and to begin preparing for it early...

On aid from democratic countries

It seems dubious that England could have or would have an interest in again seeing an independent Lithuania, even though English statesmen have uttered many beautiful words about national independ-

ence. First, England is geographically distant from Lithuania. Secondly, England could help only if she were to win this war, and that is impossible to foretell at this time; besides, it would be necessary to wait until the end of the war, which is not possible, because communists are destroying everything in Lithuania and are mercilessly murdering Lithuanian people. Thirdly, after winning a war England herself would be weary and would have to stabilize the situation of Western Europe. Under such conditions it is doubtful that England would have the necessary willpower and energy to take up the new task of compelling the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Baltic States, which would mean a war with the Soviet Union. It seems especially unattainable now, because England is actually seeking support from the Soviet Union...

On the means of attaining the goal

National independence is not granted freely; it can only be achieved by dedicated struggle in which no sacrifice is too great. Even if a country fails to achieve freedom, it can never forsake its ideal, in spite of the sacrifices and length of the struggle for freedom. Lithuania has lost its independence, but no one can deny her right to regain freedom or the right to fight for it.

Lithuanian statesmen and Lithuanian organizations abroad are continuing their attempts to keep the spirit of Lithuanian independence alive wherever possible. Diplomatic efforts, however, are not sufficient; they are only supplementary. If the nation itself did not fight for its independence, such efforts would be of little value in regaining independence or reconstructing our state. The struggle inside our country, therefore, will be a decisive factor in liberating Lithuania. It would be also incorrect to think that Lithuania's independence can only be won by aid from foreign powers and that there is no reason at all to sacrifice the valiant sons of our country in an uneven struggle with a more powerful enemy. Such thoughts are a trait of spineless politicians, who are never able to make up their minds. Lithuania, if reconstructed by a foreign power, would not be dear to us. Besides, no one will rebuild it if we will not rebuild it ourselves. Assistance is necessary to us as a small nation, but it is needed only as assistance. The brunt of the struggle should fall on our own shoulders. The more we can bear, the more power we will attain in the relationship between our goals and those of the foreign power whose assistance we will try to use. Because of the current political conditions in Eastern Europe, aid is coming to us naturally; we only have to know how to use it reasonably to further our own interests. This aid will be utilized best if, when the decisive moment comes, we revolt, take the government into our own hands, and not wait for someone else to do this for us.

Thus our forcefulness, our determination to win the struggle regardless of sacrifices, and our active battle with the enemy is the road which we have to take; only in this way can Lithuania regain national independence and freedom...

On the Declaration of the new Lithuanian Government

There is basis for a hope that we may come to an agreement with Germany. So far, however, this is uncertain, because the Germans are trying to re-

main as reserved as possible on this question. Will we be able to establish an independent government beforehand? That we will only find out at the last moment, just before the German Army starts its march against the Red Army or perhaps even when the war will already have begun.

Whatever happens to the establishment of a government, our most important task at the time when Germans will start moving forward is to take over control of the Governmental apparatus. This could be a decisive move in retaining Lithuanian independence. We should therefore organize the underground in such a manner that when the German armies start moving forward, a spontaneous revolution would erupt over the entire land. The goal of this revolution is to take the complete governmental apparatus in our hands and place the Germans before an accomplished fact with which they will have to deal later. An energetic revolt would not only have significance in our struggle for power, but also would have moral-political implications. Lithuanians then could strengthen their demands to re-establish independent Lithuania before the war ends. Finally, it also would have great international significance since that would show to the entire world that Lithuania is determined to regain its independence; with this strong argument in their hands, our diplomatic corps could intensify the struggle to defend Lithuania's right to be free and independent.

If we were not able to reach an agreement with the Germans concerning the formation of a new government, that is if when the Germans start the war they would not circulate proclamations of our government and our Activist Front; also, if Radio Berlin would not transmit news of the formation of our government, then we would have to recognize that the Germans have aggressive plans against Lithuania.

Even in this case we should not abstain from revolt. It should be carried out as planned. The government then should be proclaimed by Vilnius Central Committee in a revolutionary manner so that Germans would again be faced with an accomplished fact.

An act proclaiming the creation of a revolutionary government should be prepared at the proper time and should have moral-political significance not only for the present but also for the future, since it would be especially significant for the legalization of the government and would serve as an indestructible argument for Lithuanian diplomats to defend the interests of free Lithuania throughout the world.

The act should be written and proclaimed by the Lithuanian Activist Front as the sole representative and executor of the will of the Lithuanian nation.

On conduct immediately after the revolt.

Our men should take over public offices and industries. It is suggested that whenever possible officials of independent Lithuania, such as county commissioners, mayors, directors of post offices and of railway stations, should be returned to their posts. Instead of establishing a temporary people's militia, the police should be restored.

The above-mentioned officials should be urged to immediately resume their former positions and to wear the uniforms that were worn in independent

Lithuania. All other external symbols that indicate the existence of the state should also be restored.

The officials should immediately enact laws and orders for the enforcement of public safety and tranquility. The orders should be circulated widely and carried out sternly, so that the populace would realize that the government exists.

Restoration of former officials, their uniforms and their symbols, and speedy enactment of laws are all acts that should prove to the Germans that the governmental apparatus has been reconstructed and exists as it should. The Germans, faced with the accomplished fact in such a manner could not ignore it.

4. Proclamation of the Re-establishment of Independence by the Provisional Government of Lithuania.

The formed Lithuanian Provisional Government of the newly-reborn Lithuania hereby proclaims Lithuania to be a free and independent state.

Before the entire world the young state of Lithuania enthusiastically promises to participate in a new constituent organization of Europe.

Having been tortured and terrorized by the Bolsheviks, the Lithuanian Nation is determined to build its future on the basis of national unity and social justice.

Signatures Follow

Vilnius, Kaunas June 23, 1941

5. An Appeal of the Lithuanian Activist Front to the Lithuanian Citizenry to Protect National Resources and Maintain Public Order.

The Red pillagers have been forced back by the German army. The Lithuanian nation, freed from oppression, is determined to once again be free and independent. A provisional government has already been formed and is taking the national apparatus in its hands.

As they retreat, the Red pillagers are still plundering industrial concerns and killing our people.

Fellow countrymen, protect national industries and private property.

Workers, organize the protection of industrial concerns.

Government employees, protect your departments and do not exploit documents and property.

Lithuanian policemen, take over the protection of the people in your areas of residence.

Various instructions and information are continually being supplied over the radio and by the press.

The Headquarters of The Lithuanian Activists.
June 24, 1941.

6. The New York Times of June 24, 1941, Reports Revolt in the Three Baltic States.

Helsinki, Finland, June 23. Actual or impending revolt in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was declared by anti-Soviet sources today to be threatening Russia along her North West frontier.

Reports of revolt in Lithuania and a call for an uprising in Latvia were broadcast to the Baltic area by the Lithuanian radio and the German station at Koenigsberg, East Prussia. Latvia was reported under rigid Soviet martial law.

According to the United Press in a dispatch from Stockholm, Sweden, a broadcast, purportedly from

Kaunas, said that Lithuania had proclaimed her independence.

Estonia, third of the Baltic States absorbed by Russia last Summer, was expected by Baltic political exiles to revolt with the approach of Nazi armies.

First word of an uprising against Russia came in a broadcast by the Lithuanian radio at Kaunas which proclaimed a revolt and said a "front of Lithuanian activists" had ordered the Red flag removed and the Lithuanian standard raised on official buildings.

New Regime Set Up

The broadcast said that K. Skirpa had assumed the premiership of the new anti-Russian Government and that Gen. S. Raštikis had returned as Defense Minister. Mr. Skirpa had fled to Germany where he had been Minister to Berlin, before the Russian occupation.

Stockholm, Sweden, June 24, 1941. Well inform-

ed quarters said the broadcast heard at 10:25 A.M. declared Lithuania a "free and independent country." The proclamation was followed by the playing of the Lithuanian national anthem.

Dispatches from Berlin in the Stockholm newspaper Aftonbladet inferred that the Baltic revolt against the Soviets embraced all three Baltic States creating serious difficulties for the Russians.

7. A Proclamation of the Provisional Government of Lithuania to the Nation, June 25, 1941

The independent state of Lithuania has been re-established. In its flight, the Red Army took along the leaders of the so-called Soviet Lithuania which it had established. The history of Red Lithuania is finished; we are closing that chapter. We are closing this chapter as a nightmare, for this one year and eight days destroyed all that our best people built in twenty years. It ruined the welfare of the farmer and destroyed the balance between income and spending for the laborer and the white-collar worker. Industrial equipment was plundered and industrial plants, which had been constructed with such difficulty by workingmen, were destroyed. Tens of thousands of Lithuanian people were exiled. The remaining were forced to become implements of Russian imperialism and Bolshevik chauvinism.

The state of independence, which was regained in the last several days, was paid for by the great many sacrifices and deaths of innocent citizens and members of the resistance.

Today, we, together with the entire nation, bow our heads in reverence to those heroes and martyrs. In the name of our nation, we bow before the supreme sacrifice—the sacrifice for one's country.

The German march to the East made it possible for us to proclaim the independent state of Lithuania. This strengthened our confidence that even small nations do not perish, even though they may temporarily succumb to a foreign yoke. This also made it possible for us to once again participate in the culture of the Western world.

When definite patterns of relations between the German Reich and Lithuania will be established, a permanent Lithuanian government will be formed and the difficult task of rebuilding the nation will begin once more. This task will not be as it was during the sadly remembered regime before June 15th, 1940, which ended in the dishonorable dissolution of the state. Neither will be as it was in Soviet Lithuania during the red regime, before June 23, 1941.

A new era, a new life, a new creative activity. The state will make every effort to enhance the welfare of not just one faction or one party, but of all the Lithuanian people having a heartfelt interest in the Lithuanian nation. This past year and especially the last several days showed which citizens are loyal to the nation, on whom the nation can depend in times of stress. These are the Lithuanian farmers,

the laborers, and the students. Improvement of the moral and spiritual welfare of these majorities, their representation in the government, and due recognition for their personal initiative are the means to be used in establishing the proper basis for national existence.

Class struggle is not necessary to us. There is no need for a struggle between the laborer and the farmer, for both are working men. We are too small to afford the destruction of one another in battles. Let large nations permit themselves this extravagance; we cherish every loyal citizen with no discrimination as to creed or class.

Labor was never intended to be the means by which the capitalist or the state exploits the worker. The state as we have learned from the gruesome past, may exploit the worker just as badly as the private capitalist does—the state not only exploits the citizen but also destroys his entire life.

Labor is intended to be the means of bettering the standard of living for all who partake in it, whether on the farm, in an office, or in the arts and sciences. Labor is meant to show the worker and the majority of the citizens that the standard of living is rising, and, if it is not rising, to show that all in the independent nation are enduring the hardships equally and are forging ahead to a better life.

In truth, let us be prepared to endure many hardships. We were all robbed—the farmer, and the laborer, and the white-collar worker. Above all, however, we become free and independent. This thought alone will help—must help—us bear all hardships. This thought must encourage every Lithuanian who loves his country to fulfill his daily tasks with as much determination, with as much humble dedication as was shown by our heroes dying for our country. It is just as heroic to live and toil for one's country as it is to die for it.

The Provisional Government does not make any promises. It feels that even without promises the nation understands its goals and agrees with them. These goals are not determined by the Provisional Government; they are simply gathered by it from three million hearts and are formulated by it—we wish to remain independent, and are determined to sacrifice everything and give everything for Lithuania

The Provisional Government of
Independent Lithuania

III. National Resistance During the German Occupation of Lithuania, 1941 - 1944

8. Underground Press on the Relations between the Provisional Government of Lithuania and German Authorities.

On June 25 the Military Commandant of Kaunas Gen. Pohl stated emphatically to the representatives of the Provisional Government that he cannot negotiate with the Provisional Government, that he has no authority in this matter; and from all relationships it was evident that he was being prevented from maintaining any kind of relationship with the Provisional Government. From this moment on, it was clear to every sober-thinking Lithuanian that the Germans are against the reconstitution of an independent Lithuanian state and that the revolt of our nation against the bolsheviks and the formation of the Provisional Government were contrary to the imperialistic ends of Nazi policy. This was the naked reality; nevertheless, it did not frighten the Provisional Government, it did not confuse and did not force the Provisional Government from the road to creation of an independent Lithuanian state.

Even if the Germans did not permit the organization of national corps; even if they did not permit the Provisional Government the use of any means of transportation; even if the liaison with the country had to be maintained by the crudest means; even if the Provisional Government was not allowed to publish its orders and laws or to announce them over the radio; briefly, even if the Nazis suppressed the efforts of the Provisional Government with all the might of their military machine, nevertheless, the Provisional Government, through its unbreakable courage and work, accomplished very much in a relatively short time in organizing the administration of the state and the local governments, in the economic and especially in the educational sectors.

It is neither the time nor the place to evaluate work and goals of the Provisional Government. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that these were the goals stemming from three million Lithuanian hearts, which then, as now, were beating for one unquieting

desire: we want to be independent, we are prepared to sacrifice and give up everything for Lithuania.

In view of such a mood in the nation, at first the Germans avoided showing the naked brutality of their imperialistic policy toward our nation. For this reason, in the beginning the Nazis attempted to swing the Provisional Government to their side. However, the mission of Dr. Greffe (of the Hauptamt der Sicherheitspolizei u. des SD) and Dr. Kleist (of the Foreign Policy Bureau of the NSDAP) failed to persuade the Provisional Government to transform itself into a committee or a council of the German Government that was acceptable to the Germans, because the Provisional Government, as the expessor of the national will, comprehending well that the nation revolted against the red slavery not in order to become enslaved by the Nazis, refused at any price to betray the entrusted safekeeping of independence.

When the Sicherheitspolizei-directed betrayal during the night of July 23, carried out by the old German agent (a former major of the Lithuanian Army) J. Pyragius and by his group of political aventurists, failed to find any support in the nation, then there was nothing left for the Nazis to do but to openly destroy Independent Lithuania, which had been liberated from the bolsheviks and reconstructed. This was done by the act of July 25, 1941. On that day the Ostland was formally born, with Lohse, Renteln, Lentzen, Cramer and other brownshirts at the head.

Nevertheless, the Provisional Government factually continued to execute its functions till August 5, when in its last session the Provisional Government was forced to contend that, since civil government in Lithuania was taken over by the functionaries of the Reich, the Provisional Government considers its work to be stopped against its own will.

9. Joint Declaration of the Lithuanian Political Parties and Combat Organizations.

As the end of this frightful war draws nearer, the Lithuanian nation, separated for more than three years from the outside world by a wall of bayonets, desires that the world should hear the true voice of the Lithuanian People.

The Lithuanian State was first established in the twelfth century. The Lithuanian nation lost its independence for the first time in 1795 when the Lithuanian State was incorporated in the Russian Empire. From 1795 the Lithuanians took advantage of every occasion to endeavor to restore the Lithuanian State (e.g., 1812 and 1863) until they were finally able to accomplish their desire in 1918. The Treaty of July 12th, 1920, between Lithuania and Russia states that "Russia without any reservation recognizes Lithuania

as a separate and independent state with all the juridical consequences ensuing from such recognition and voluntarily renounces for all time the rights of sovereignty which it has exercised over the Lithuanian people and their territory" (Art. 1).

On September 28th, 1926, there was concluded between Lithuania and the Soviet Union a Non-Aggression Treaty, according to which both states "mutually promise to respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability under all circumstances."

This Treaty was again confirmed on October 10th, 1939, by the Treaty for the Restitution to the Lithuanian Republic of Vilnius and the Vilnius Territory and for Mutual Assistance between Lithuania and the

Soviet Union. By the same Treaty Lithuania was forced to accept Soviet garrisons.

In a speech made to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on October 31st, 1939, the President of the Council of the Peoples' Commissars and Commissar of Foreign Affairs, speaking of this Mutual Assistance Treaty with Lithuania and similar treaties with the other Baltic States, stated: "We stand for the conscientious and exact observation of the treaties concluded, on the principle of entire reciprocity, and declare the idle talk about the sovietization of the Baltic States to be profitable only to our common enemies and to all kinds of anti-Soviet provocateurs."

Despite this, on June 15th, 1940, the Soviet Union carried out a military occupation of Lithuania and on July 21st the sovietization of Lithuania was proclaimed. In an act passed on the same day with the view of union with Soviet Russia, it was expressly stated that the sovietization of Lithuania had been accomplished with the help of the Red Army, "thanks to the Soviet Union alone" (Official Journal No. 719, Serial 5744). All this happened in spite of the fact that (according to data disclosed during the congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party, held in February, 1941) at the time of the entry of the Red Army, the Lithuanian Communist Party had barely 1,500 members (see "Tarybų Lietuva" of 1941, No. 35) out of a population of 3,000,000. And even of those 1,500 members the majority were not of Lithuanian origin. Upon the declaration of the sovietization of Lithuania (favored by 1,500, and it may be even fewer, Communists), the Lithuanian State was incorporated in the Soviet Union against the will of 3,000,000 people and contrary to international treaties.

As will be seen from the note of the German Foreign Office to the Soviet Government on June 21st, 1941, the incorporation of Lithuania in the Soviet Union came about as a result of agreements between the Soviet Union and Germany, according to which Lithuania was originally recognized as entering into the German sphere of interest. Later Germany renounced her interest in the greater part of Lithuania "während ein Streifen des Gebietes noch in der deutschen Interessensphäre verblieb" (While a strip of the territory still remained in the sphere of German interest). That "Streifen des Gebietes" comprised the districts of Šakiai and Vilkaviškis, —with parts of the districts of Mariampolė and Seinai. Regarding the renunciation of its interest in this part of Lithuania also, the note of the German Government states: "Als dann später an Deutschland dieserhalb hergetreten wurde ueberliess die Reichsregierung ...auch diesen Teil Litauens der Sowjetunion" (when later Germany was approached on this subject, the German Government... gave this part up also to the Soviet Union). This "giving up" of Lithuania to the Soviet Union is said to be correlated to the fact that Lithuania refused to take part in the war against Poland, the ally of Great Britain, on the side of Germany.

From the very beginning the Lithuanian nation has held the sovietization of Lithuania and her incorporation in the Soviet Union to be null and void.

The domination of the Soviets in Lithuania did not last long; it was ended by the outbreak of the German-Russian war and by the Lithuanian revolt against the Soviet Government at the beginning of that war. During this period the Lithuanians formed a Provisional Government, which was set aside by the German occupation authorities and Lithuania has

since been living for over two years under German military occupation.

As the war enters its final phase the Lithuanian nation awaits with the greatest anxiety the decision to be made concerning the future of Lithuania. The Lithuanian people believe that this war may decide the question of their very existence; that as a result of the war they will either be left to live as a nation and a state or will be annihilated by the well-known methods for the destruction of nations, methods which have been already applied to the Lithuanian people for over three years. The Lithuanians see no third way out for them. The fact alone that Lithuania which has taken no direct part in the war, has proportionately lost more people than any one of the belligerent states explains the anxiety with which Lithuania awaits the morrow. According to approximate statistics, Lithuania, which at the end of 1939 had about 3,000,000 inhabitants has since the beginning of the war lost more than 250,000 people. About 45,000 were lost during the Soviet occupation, either killed in Lithuania or deported to die in distant Russian lands; among these were many of the flower of Lithuanian youth and of her intellectuals. Over 4,000 lost their lives bearing arms during the latter part of June, 1941, in the uprising against the existing German occupation. The greater number of those who perished during the German occupation were Lithuanian citizens of Jewish origin. Besides these, on the occupation of the country by the Red Army, tens of thousands fled from Lithuania to whatever lands were open to them. From the very beginning of the German occupation thousands have been taken away to forced labor in Germany. There is no doubt that many thousands of those who fled from Soviet occupation and of those forcibly taken to Germany will never return to their homes. Since June 15, 1940, the lives, liberty and property of the Lithuanians have been completely at the mercy of foreign rulers.

In the course of the war and under present circumstances, should Lithuania's occupation by an alien power again change hands, the Lithuanian nation may expect a new and still more terrible wave of extermination. Those who according to the doctrine so foreign to the Lithuanian people, would be destroyed first have been dubbed "enemies of the people"; these "enemies of the people" are practically the whole of the more active, more vital element of the nation.

In calling the attention of the world to this critical situation, the Lithuanian people wish at the same time to emphasize that in this fourth year of their struggle against foreign occupation and for the national independence of Lithuania, they are fighting for their very existence; that they, too, even as other nations, great or small, await the establishment of "a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Signed by:

The Lithuanian National Union, The Peasant Populist Union of Lithuania, The Union of Combatants for the Liberty of Lithuania, The Lithuanian Nationalist Party, The Social-Democratic Party of Lithuania, The Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party, The Lithuanian Front.

10. Declaration of the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania (VLIK).

To the Lithuanian People!

The Lithuanian nation, endeavouring to liberate Lithuania from the occupation and to restore the functioning of Lithuania's sovereign organs, temporarily impeded by foreign forces, stands in need of united political leadership. With this aim in view, the Lithuanian political groups, as the exponents of the nation's political thought and instruments of its application, have agreed to unite all forces for common action and have created the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania.

The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, entering upon their duties, declare that: —

1. The freedom of the Lithuanian nation and the independence of the Lithuanian State are indispensable conditions for the nation's existence and well-being.
2. The sovereign State of Lithuania has not disappeared by reason of its occupation by the Soviet Union on 15th June, 1940, and the diverse other acts perpetrated by force and fraud under cover of that occupation resulting in disruption of the functions of the sovereign organs of the State, were brought to an end by the popular revolt of the Nation on June 23rd, 1941, and the functions of the sovereign organs of the State were temporarily resumed by the Provisional Government.
3. After liberation of Lithuania from the occupation, the Constitution of 1938 will remain in force until it is appropriately amended in a legal manner.
4. A Provisional Government of the Republic will be organized, when the proper time comes, within the Supreme Committee of Liberation of Lithuania on a coalition basis and by agreement of the political groups.
5. The democratic organization of the State of Lithuania will be effected in conformity with the interests of the people as a whole and with general post-war conditions.
6. The laws governing the election of the President of the Republic and of Members of Parliament will be modified in accordance with the principles of democratic elections.

7. The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, having undertaken leadership in the struggle and labour for the liberation of the country, for the resuscitation of the functions of the sovereign organs of the State, for the restoration of the democratic order and for defense of the country against Communism and other life-disrupting factors, will endeavor to bring about the broadest possible consolidation of the community, at the same time eliminating misunderstandings among the political groups.
8. Recognizing the great importance of the national armed forces in the struggle for liberation of Lithuania, the Committee will by all available means support the restoration of the Lithuanian army.
9. The Committee will maintain close contact with Lithuanian Legations and Consulates and will collaborate with Lithuanians abroad, especially with American-Lithuanians, as well as with all nations that recognize the principle of self-determination of nations and the right of Lithuania to independence.
10. In order to facilitate the cultural and economic progress of the nation and to accelerate the country's return to normal life, the Committee will collect and arrange the appropriate material for the use of liberated Lithuania's administration, as well as for regulation of the national economy, social life, justice and education.

The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, in making this declaration to the Lithuanian people, invites all Lithuanians of goodwill of all political parties to imbue themselves with the spirit of unity and collaboration in this unequal struggle for liberation of Lithuania.

"For the sake of this Lithuania
Let the unity of her people blossom!"

(From the Lithuanian National Anthem)

THE SUPREME COMMITTEE FOR
LIBERATION OF LITHUANIA.

VILNIUS, February 16th, 1944.

IV. Armed Struggle Against the Soviet Regime, 1945-1952

11. Text of the MVD Amnesty Order to Surrendering Freedom Fighters.

VILNIUS, FEBRUARY 15, 1946

The Red Army having heroically liberated the Lithuanian SSR from the German Fascist invaders, the organs and the army of the Peoples' Commissar of the Interior, supported by the citizens and the protectors of the people, accomplished a great feat in crushing the Lithuanian-German nationalist bands.

Almost all of these bands and the illegal and anti-soviet bourgeoisie nationalist organizations have been destroyed in most of the districts.

The leaders of the Lithuanian-German nationalists, with a few exceptions, have been captured and exterminated. Those members who had been forced into the gangs by deceit, or threat, or terrorizing, surrendered to the organs of the Peoples' government

and returned to peaceful work. Many of them re-deemed their sin against the Fatherland by conscientious effort and work.

It is known, however, that some bandits surrendered to the organs of the Peoples' government not on their own volition, but on the instructions of their leaders; moreover, it is also known that they did not give up their arms, that they still maintain contact with their leaders, and that they help the Lithuanian-German nationalists execute their inhuman crimes against peaceful citizens.

Giving due consideration to the fact that some remnants of the Lithuanian-German nationalists still survive and hinder the peaceful life of the citizens by their acts of banditry, and striving to finally liquidate these Lithuanian-German remnants

I order:

1. That the heads of the districts and counties of the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior, the army of the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior, and the groups of protectors of the people immediately take stern measures to wipe out the remnants of the Lithuanian-German nationalists in all of the districts of the Lithuanian SSR.

2. That no repressions be aimed at those bandits who surrender freely, even the leaders among them, or at the members of the LLA and other bourgeoisie nationalist organizations after they surrender and give up their arms, that they be allowed to return to their homes, and that passes be issued to them.

3. That members of the gangs who are forbidden to surrender at their own wish to the organs of the Peoples' Government, destroy those leaders and prepare to come with their arms to the offices of the

Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior. No person who has killed a leader of a bandit gang, or a bandit preventing them from surrendering, will be prosecuted.

4. Bandits who surrendered earlier but who have not as yet given up their arms, and all other individuals holding arms, are obliged without delay to return them to the offices of the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior.

5. That the families of the bandits and members of the bourgeoisie nationalist organizations, who have not surrendered to the offices of the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior, be taken into custody and sent into exile.

6. Inhabitants whose homes and farms house bunkers or other hiding places for bandits and others hiding from the organs of the people are obliged without delay to inform the offices of the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior concerning this.

Individuals who have not surrendered concealed arms and who have not reported bunkers or hiding places on their property will be captured and tried as bandits.

7. Individuals who know the locations of bunkers and hiding places, regardless of where these places might be, are obliged without delay to report this to the offices of the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior.

All who knowing the location of bunkers and hiding places did not report them to the offices of the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior will be captured and tried as accomplices of the bandits.

Lithuanian SSR Peoples' Commissariat
of the Interior

Major General Bartašiūnas

12. Excerpts from the Testimony of a Former Soviet Border Guard Colonel to the Select Committee On Communist Aggression (U. S. H. of Reprs., 83rd Cong. 2nd Ses.) On Punitive Measures Against the Lithuanian Freedom Fighters.

Mr. McTigue. What was your next assignment, Colonel, after the deportation operation?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. After the deportation operations were finished my unit as well as many other units were transferred to the territory of the Lithuanian Republic, in order to fight the so-called bandit-movement.

Mr. McTigue. The so-called bandit-movement was the resistance movement against the Communists in Lithuania, is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. Absolutely so.

Mr. McTigue. When were you assigned to Lithuania? When did you come there?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. After the deportation of the Crimean Tartars, either at the end of June or beginning of July of 1944.

Mr. McTigue. Will you tell us something about what happened there?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. After the Red army has occupied Lithuania and the Germans left, the Soviet Government has started creating a party and administrative apparatus for Lithuania, beginning with the central committee of the Communist Party in Lithuania at the top and going all the way down to the smallest village.

The absolute majority of the Lithuanian people did not want this party, and administrative Soviet apparatus. The more advanced part of the population organized itself in what the Soviets called bandit bands, and these so-called bandit groups disposed, liquidated the Soviet Party and administrative representatives. They killed them. It is characteristic that these so-called bandits liquidated and disposed of the party leaders and the administrative leaders but only those who were actually Lithuanians, because they considered that these people were traitors to their own country. And these resistance groups did not touch, did not molest the representatives of the party and the Government which were Russians, Ukrainians, and belonged to other nationalities of the Soviet Union. In order to strengthen the party apparatus and the Government apparatus at the various levels in the various command levels of the Lithuanian Republic, the Soviet Government sent a great number of troops into Lithuania.

Within these many units which were transferred to the region of the Lithuanian Republic was also my unit.

From July 1944 to February 1945, I participated in the fight against the so-called bandits. I was in a

few counties in my work in Lithuania. I was in the territory of Wilna County, Taurage County, Shauliai County, Kaunas County, Urburg County, and many others.

Mr. Kersten. These so-called bandits were the young men, young Lithuanian patriots trying to fight for the independence of their nation of Lithuania; is that not right?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. Absolutely correct. But these so-called bandits were supported by the other majority of the Lithuanian population. At the very beginning in the territory of the Lithuanian Republic there were a great number of the so-called bandit formations; they were very numerous and consisted of many people. They were armed with light weapons. The weapons were both of Soviet and German manufacture; they also had machine-guns, heavy machine-guns, Soviet machine-guns, type Maxim, and they also had the German machine-guns which were manufactured in Czechoslovakia in the Skoda Works. Some of the Lithuanian guerrilla fighters were also armed with light artillery. In some places in the fight against the bandits were thrown not only the NVD units but also regular Red army units and aviation. This particularly applies to the region of Koslov-rutskia-Pasha, not far from the city of Kaunas, in the region of the city of Kaunas. Time has passed by, the troops were becoming more and more fatigued, the fight continued, and yet the local Soviet government and the party apparatus had not been established at all echelons. The so-called bandits were very difficult. They were impossible to catch. Knowing very well the territory in which they operated, and having the support of the local population, they knew exactly what we had in mind, what we planned; when we were loading people on trucks to conduct an operation against these bandits, and they also had information in their possession and left the place where they were to get into the forest to join a fight with us only when it was absolutely necessary. However, whenever they had a chance, they of course, tried to win a fight, and that lasted approximately till September 1944. When the Soviet Government saw that it was not achieving any results, the Soviet Government made the following decision in September 1944 in the Lithuanian city of Panewecsis; with a special assignment and special rights this brought the deputy to Beria, General Kruglov.

Mr. McTigue. Is General Kruglov the individual who has succeeded Beria?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. That is the same one.

Mr. Kersten. As I understand it, Serov and Kruglov have succeeded Beria; is that correct?

Mr. McTigue. Before you proceed, it is true, then, up to this point that the Lithuanian bandits, or the partisans were fighting the Communists and had been very, very effective; is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. Yes.

Mr. McTigue. They had become so effective, as a matter of fact, that the Kremlin had lost patience with the whole operation in Lithuania; is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. Absolutely correct.

Mr. McTigue. And in losing its patience the Kremlin decided to send into Lithuania its topman, Kruglov, to enforce the laws or the operation in its most stern manner; is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. Correct.

Mr. McTigue. Proceed, Colonel, please.

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. On a very dark September night, in the city of Panavescis, Kruglov calls in a top-secret operational meeting. At this meeting there are present the commanders of the units of NKVD troops, the deputies of these commanders for political affairs, for intelligence, and also the chiefs of staff of the units, the responsible top leaders of the territorial units of the NKVD in Lithuania. At this meeting Kruglov summarized the results of the fight against the so-called bandit movement in Lithuania and said that up to the present time the measures which have been undertaken have not proved to be realistic, that the Politburo of the Soviet Union and Stalin and Beria themselves are not satisfied with the result of what has been achieved in Lithuania, and that it is time to change from words to sharp measures; that order must be brought into Lithuania and that the party and the administrative Soviet apparatus must be reestablished in Lithuania. In the name of Stalin and Beria, Kruglov gives a concrete order that the work of intelligence agents must be intensified and activated.

He orders not to spare any efforts and not to spare any money to create an agent's net, to find out the base and the leadership of the so-called bandit movements, also, who helps and assists them, and to liquidate this base of operations, and he said that, and I quote: "Enough of this sentimental approach, of this sentimentality," and to use all necessary measures in order to get all the information and to brook no interference and to use whatever means are necessary in order to get information from the partisans themselves, from their relatives, or from the people whom the partisans use for liaison purposes. He also ordered that the troops become more active in their fight against the so-called bandits. He told them to comb through the forests, through clearings in forests, villages, and he also ordered that during this so-called combing-through operation, if somebody tries to make a getaway even though he is not armed, if he tries to run away, this particular person is to be considered a bandit. The kind of person who tries to run, although he is not armed, against these people firearms are to be used and they are to be killed without any further ado. No court is necessary for them. If these people happen to take refuge or run into a house or into a farm or into a village, then this particular house or farm or village is to be considered a bandit farm, a bandit house or a bandit village, and these houses or farms or villages are to be destroyed by fire. Property and domestic animals which happen to be in this particular farm or house or village which is to be considered bandit has to be confiscated, and turned over to the local party apparatus or local Soviet apparatus. At the end of the meeting Kruglov expressed the hope in the name of the central committee of the Soviet Union and also in the name of the Ministry of Commissars of Internal Affairs, that this noble assignment which was given to the troops and to the operational organs of the NKVD to liquidate the bandits will be fulfilled by everyone concerned, and after Kruglov left, all the measures which he had ordered were introduced, were actually used.

Mr. Kersten. At this time—it is now approximately 12:15—but I would like to state before we adjourn that nobody here should leave the room until after the witness has left, and the witness is excused until

2 o'clock, and the witness and the party with him may leave the room at this time and be back at 2 o'clock. Everybody else remain seated, please

We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.

(The committee reconvened at 2:15 p.m.)

Mr. Kersten. Hearings will come to order. I think we left off at the point the witness was speaking of the orders that came from General Kruglov about the stern measures that were to be applied against the Lithuanian partisans. Will you continue, Colonel Burlitski, now, and tell us of the events in Lithuania following these orders or just where you left off in your statement this morning.

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. After the meeting at which Kruglov presented his demands and his orders, the Lithuanian Government, that is the Soviet Lithuanian Government, military units which were located at that time in the territory of Lithuania and territorial units of the NVD which were at that time in Lithuania began fulfilling the orders of Kruglov. Besides these measures the Soviet Government undertook some other measures. For instance, at the central committee for the Lithuanian Communist Party the Soviet Government had created a bureau, ORG Bureau, organizational bureau. This ORG Bureau which was established by the Soviet Government was headed at that time by a member of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and now one of the secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Suslov. This ORG Bureau in actuality was the supreme party, exercised party leadership, and was superior in its functions and in its rights to the central committee of the Communist Party of the Lithuanian Republic. The aim of this organizational bureau, or ORG Bureau, was to exercise actual and factual power in the entire territory of the Lithuanian Social Soviet Republic. The chief aim of this organizational bureau was to strengthen and to resurrect the party and the administrative apparatus in the entire territory of the Soviet Social Republic of Lithuania.

This ORG Bureau as its principal aim had the liquidation, the securing of the power of liquidation of the so-called bandit movement in the territory of Lithuania. This ORG Bureau in actuality took over the entire political administrative, and economic life of the Republic. Any kind of orders or directives which were issued by this Suslov were a must for the government of Soviet Lithuania. Besides that the Soviet Government undertook another measure. The central committee of the Communist Party in Lithuania together with the Soviet Government of Lithuania issued a joint appeal to the so-called bandits in Lithuania. This appeal contained a statement which said that the so-called Lithuanian bandits should leave their underground lairs and their forests and should report to the territorial organs of the NKVD of Lithuania, with a statement that they repent their sins. Those people who obeyed this appeal were promised a guaranty that they will be independent; that they will have freedom, and that they will receive Soviet documents. These people were told that they were supposed to give up their arms and to indicate to the territorial organs of the NKVD where the headquarters of the underground movement is located; where depots for arms are located; who leads these underground formations of Lithuanian guerrillas, and so on. Those were the measures, the steps which were undertaken by the Soviet Government.

After this the party apparatus from all the way up, from the central committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania which is top echelon, all the way down, and the administrative Soviet agencies have started practically to carry out the orders given to them by Kruglov. A wave of executions and torture started. The people who formed the base of this bandit movement were deported to far-away regions of the Soviet Union, the setting on fire of various villages.

The leadership of this so-called bandit movement seeing what is happening, these people seeing how the Lithuanian people were being exterminated, how villages were burned, how cattle was destroyed, made a decision to go and leave the underground; to abandon and to give up some of their units, to let them go and temporarily abandon any kind of active operations. All this in order to preserve the people the leadership and the population for a future fight. The Soviet Government utilizing this decision of the leadership of the underground, used this opportunity in order to resurrect the party and administrative apparatus all over Lithuania, and this so-called bandit movement was weakened, but never completely liquidated, and as far as I know up to 1953 it still existed. That is all.

Mr. McTigue. Colonel, did your men, who were highly disciplined soldiers, ever get sickened by the things that they had to do in connection with the reign of terror in Lithuania?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. At that time, that was 1944 and 1945, I had not seen any open signs of revulsion on the part of my soldiers.

Mr. McTigue. Did you see any later?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. In April of 1945 my unit and I were transferred to east Prussia on the border of Poland, and in April of 1949 I was again returned to Lithuania, to the region bordering on Poland. During 1950-51 the entire fight against the so-called bandit movement of Lithuania was entrusted to two NVD divisions, so called divisions for special tasks—the 2d and 4th Special Tasks Divisions. The headquarters of the 2d Special Task Division was located at Wilnus, and the commander was General Vetrov, and the 4th Division for Special Tasks is located in the city of Shauliai and the commander of this division is General Piashov. These 2 divisions, under the command of these 2 generals I just mentioned, are actually doing all the work and all the fighting against the so-called bandit movement in the territory of the Social Soviet Republic of Lithuania, of course, in connection and cooperation with the local units of the NVD. In 1949-51 from the members of these two divisions which I have just mentioned, there were many occasions when soldiers, sergeants and even officers, in fulfilling these horrible tasks which were given them by the Government deserted as a sign of protest. And the orders to comb through the various forests in order to search for these so-called soldiers in doing it were holding into an old soldier's proverb which reads "One day passed by," which means it is one day nearer to the time when I become a civilian again.

Mr. McTigue. Who was the most famous and troublesome Lithuanian, Colonel, in your experience among the partisans?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. The most troublesome and the acknowledged leader of the entire so-called Lithuanian bandit movement was a Lithuanian

by the name of Mishkeniz. The Lithuanian people considered this Mishkeniz to be a national hero, and he had a tremendous authority among the Lithuanian people.

Mr. McTigue. What happened to him, Colonel, do you know?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. As far as the fight against the Mishkeniz group is concerned, I know something which happened during the years 1946-50. From 1948 to 1949 and 1950 during these years, according to the information which was supplied by the territorial organs of the NVD, it was said that Mishkeniz has finished a 2-year intelligence course in an American school, and in 1950 came back to Lithuania, was dragged back to Lithuania, and was at that time in the neighborhood of the Prenskey forests. In order to liquidate his group and himself a lot of troops were concentrated, brought together. The operations for the capture and liquidation of Mishkeniz were all led by Kruglov himself. He was in charge of the entire operation. Having been surrounded and having found himself in an absolutely hopeless situation, in accordance with information from territorial organs of the NVD, Mishkeniz committed suicide.

Mr. McTigue. Was his body ever identified, Colonel?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. I do not know that. At that time I was in charge of guarding the border and did not participate in that operation. There are two legends which I heard from the organs of the NVD. One of the stories or legends was that when he was caught in a hopeless situation in the Prenskey forests, in a clearing of the forest, and having been completely surrounded, he committed suicide. The other legend was that he was surrounded in a res-

taurant in the city of Kalun where he was eating with some friends, and having found himself completely surrounded by the enemy and in order not to fall into the hands of his enemies he committed suicide. Which of the two versions is correct I do not know. The fact is that he disappeared.

Mr. Kersten. Was it not the custom of Lithuanian partisans before they were captured sometimes to put a hand grenade to their heads or face so that they could not be identified so that their relatives would not suffer by virtue of their partisan activity?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. I do not know of any occasion when they blew up grenades in front of their faces, I know something else though. I know another thing, that the Lithuanian guerrillas when surrounded, even if they were found, never surrendered themselves alive but always committed suicide. Those who could not offer any resistance at the time of their capture and who were actually taken by the Soviet troops, managed to commit suicide even after they were in the NVD prisons, they used to commit suicide by hanging onto their own underwear, they used to jump out of windows, and so forth, but never gave that information to the Soviets, to the NVD organs, which they demanded.

Mr. Kersten. So that they always made sure that they would never give information by these acts; is that correct?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. Absolutely correct.

Mr. McTigue. Do you believe that even today the partisans such as the Lithuanian partisans which you have just described, are fighting the battles for a free world in the forests and swamps of East Europe?

Lieutenant Colonel Burlitski. I think so. I am convinced that it is so especially in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, western Bialovesze, and western Ukraine.

13. Resistance Report on the 1946 Elections in Lithuania.

Suvalkija, February 14, 1947.

I, Budrys, the prosecutor of the Tauras district, assigned to investigate and prosecute the crimes which the Bolsheviks have committed and are continuing to commit in Lithuania, on the evidence of the testimony of witnesses, of my own observations, and of other sources, draw this document about the violation of the Lithuanian nation's freedom of will by the Bolshevik government, Bolshevik party and Bolshevik activists in conducting the forced and illicit elections to the highest council of the LSSR.

1. The armed forces and local Red Army troops, consisting of approximately 50,000 MVD (formerly NKVD), already present in Lithuania were not sufficient to conduct these elections in Lithuania. About 60,000 soldiers of the regular army, therefore, were called in for this purpose. The army arrived a few days before the elections. Part of the army, in groups of 25-50 men, was distributed among the buildings of the districts in which the elections were being held. Besides this, motorized forces stood by in the centers of the counties and districts. The army was armed with submachine guns, semi-automatic rifles, and automatic pistols. It was learned from the soldiers that they came to Lithuania from Poland, where they had participated in the elections and had

taken part in open and fairly severe clashes with the local underground forces. A small part of the army had been brought in from East Prussia, having to come by foot all of the way. The army guarded those districts in particular which had large forest areas, while the MVD patrolled the districts which in their opinion were less susceptible to attack.

2. A few days before the elections, Bolshevik agents spread the rumor that those who did not vote would be deported to Siberia.

3. During the last week before the elections the entire Bolshevik apparatus, the clerks and officials of the central agencies, the cooperatives, and other employees were sent into the villages for purposes of mobilized agitation and other work connected with the elections. It was noticed that, in comparison with previous elections, in preparing for these elections Bolshevik activity and scrupulousness had increased greatly. Meetings were organized in the villages, but the villagers did not attend. There are known instances where there were more agitators at these meetings than listeners in the audience. News have been received to the effect that in one district, the chief prosecutor arrived and called together village representatives for investigation and questioning. He explained the electoral procedure to them and made

them responsible for persuading the villagers to vote. The representatives were told to march all of their villagers to the polls early on election day. If they did not comply, they were threatened with severe punishment.

4. Written invitations to vote were sent out to everyone eligible.

5. Fifteen to twenty farm wagons were herded into the election areas in the villages. Lists of the sick and disabled, unable to come to the polls, were drawn up. Especially appointed Bolshevik officials were to come to their homes and collect their votes.

6. An MVD or MGB (Secret Police) officer was appointed to each of the election districts, of which there were 2277 in Lithuania. This officer was responsible for conducting the election and was in reality and fact the president of the election committee. Moreover, according to the secret instructions pertaining to the elections and to the method by which they were to be conducted, the militia in addition to other officials, was to keep close watch on the "anti-soviet" and "lawless" attitudes of the people.

7. Companies, factories, and all other agencies were ordered to come to the elections with all of their employees. The administration was made responsible for carrying out this order. Thus, the employees felt a double pressure, not only from the government organs but also from their bosses, and were forced to vote in order not to harm their management.

8. Those who were to arrive first at the polls were promised two bottles of pure alcohol and a piece of sausage.

9. The elections were to be held on February 9, 1947, from 6:00 to 24:00 (Moscow time). At 6 A.M. the bolsheviks and all of their servants and guards began to vote. The workers and employees of the various agencies and factories also came, compelled by force. However, the situation was different in the farms and villages. Here, apart from the Bolsheviks themselves, only one or two of the more easily frightened citizens came to vote. There were areas in which only 0.40% of the 500 registered voters had voted by noon.

10. In spite of the arrival of the Bolsheviks and the threatening danger, the Lithuanians ignored these elections much more than they had ignored previous ones. On that day, the inhabitants did not leave their homes for any reason at all; they did not even go, as ordinarily, to Church. I observed the elections in the Suvalkija villages. These villages seemed like ghost towns except for the bolshevik agents on foot or on horseback. Confirmed reports from villages having 30-50 families indicate that only 2-3 people went to the election districts.

11. When the Bolsheviks saw how few people came to vote, they tried a new line of attack. Around 12:00 (Moscow time) groups of 10-15 armed men were sent out from the polls with portable urns to collect votes from the villagers. But they found stubborn resistance among the people. In some cases the people locked themselves in their rooms and refused to let the vote collectors come in. In other cases, adults were hiding while the children told the collectors that their parents had gone to vote. The Bolsheviks searched some homes looking for voters. Lithuanians found at home refused to vote, finding all sorts of excuses. Some explained that they were satisfied with the present government and did not

want a better one. Others said that they had never participated in any election and did not wish to do so now. There were also individuals who categorically refused to vote. These were threatened by the militia in various ways. They were accused of banditism, their names were taken down, and they were told to come to the militia offices for questioning. Some, frightened by this, did vote. But there were also others, who told the militia that they realized that they could be shot or deported for this, but that they still would not vote. When threats failed, the Bolsheviks placed as many votes into the urn as there were adults in that home. A case has been registered, where a Bolshevik forced a ballot into a woman's hand and then forced her hand into the urn. The farmers who were forced to drive the Bolsheviks around reported that in some instances the Bolsheviks did not even bother to enter the homes, but counted the number of voters, placed an equal number of votes into the urn, and returned to their office. It is also known that in some cases an individual came to the polls to vote and found that someone had already voted for him. He was often forced to vote again, even though he explained that he already had voted.

It was noticed in one district that weeping women came to vote at the polls. Upon questioning, they explained that they had refused to vote despite the threats. At this, the Bolsheviks had forced them to kneel, half-naked, in the snow at 25-degree temperatures until they consented to vote. The kom-sorgas of the Pilviškiai district, Juozas Petrauskas, especially distinguished himself in this type of work. He not only forced the women to kneel, but beat them as well.

12. Some Lithuanians, fearing Bolshevik terrorization, came to vote but tried to get a certificate of voting without placing their ballot in the urn.

13. The official newspaper *Tiesa*, No. 35, February 10, 1947, prints the report of the central election commission: "The elections took place with unusual enthusiasm among the voters. Great activity and organization on the part of the voters was noticed in all the election districts. On February 9, at 12 A.M., the elections officially ended throughout the land... no less than 96% of the voters participated..."

As is evident from the above facts, the elections took place under conditions of extremely great resistance; terrorization of unheard of proportions was employed, but the majority of the nation did not succumb.

It is also not true that the election ended on February 9th at 12 o'clock midnight. Many cases are known in which the Bolsheviks collected votes among the villagers until noon of the following day. The final report from the Vilkaviškis district, the electoral district of Oželiai, states that the collection of votes continued until noon of February 10th, since on election day, despite threats and surveillance, only 10 people had voted out of 500 registered. The election commission sent for help. A truck filled with soldiers, MVD officials, and a representative of the central committee of the Communist party was sent to Oželiai. This representative formed groups for collecting votes and sent them out again to collect votes in the villages at 6 A.M. of February 10th. The groups were told not to return without 100% of the votes. However, it was impossible to collect 100% of the votes

anyway. The missing votes therefore, were cast by the Bolsheviks themselves upon return to the polls.

In that same Oželiai district early in the morning of February 10th, six armed strebėteliai went with the urn to see every inhabitant and forced him to vote. They did not visit those who lived near the forest, since they feared guerrilla reprisal. Having finished this free voting in one farm, they left and disappeared. The farmer, fearing that they would steal something, hurried outside. There in back of the outhouse, he found the armed men stuffing the ballot urn with the votes supposedly gathered from those living closer to the forest. The farmer had to laugh out loud at this sight. The men, however, ignored him and went on with their task.

Reliable evidence shows that even before the elections each electoral district had received a pre-set plan indicating how many votes each district was to collect. Each commission was bluntly told that if they did not execute this plan, they would be severely punished. For example, in the Paežeriy electoral district, 114 votes were still missing after all the threats and collections. The commission itself placed these 114 ballots into the urn on February 10th before the eyes of many outsiders.

14. Act number 3 contained a description of the fraud perpetrated during preparation for the election. It was shown that in the 180 electoral districts in Lithuania, 180 candidates were presented for election, one for each district. Thus there was one "block", one candidate, one ballot with the one name of the sole candidate from that district, and the Lithuanian had to place this ballot into the urn so that by this act the Bolshevik fraud would be masked. But the Lithuanian nation refused to participate in this hoax and the Bolsheviks themselves had to place 85% of the ballots into the urns. Only 5% voted freely, while 10% were made to vote by force. The remaining votes were cast by the Bolsheviks themselves. Tiesa, No. 38, February 13, 1947 published the names of 180 "newly-elected" deputies — names which had been known long before the elections. This same issue reports that 97.91% of the electorate voted. "24,138 voters cast votes against the candidates... 4,699 ballots were found invalid." It is obvious that there could have been invalid ballots and that there were many more than the reported number. Yet how could it be possible to vote against the candidates if there was only one ballot? This is incomprehensible to everyone and even the rules for the election did not foresee such a possibility. This is an obvious Bolshevik trick.

Tiesa, Nr. 36, February 11, 1947, writes: "This is the victory of the Communist and non-party block

— a new glorious triumph of the Bolshevik party." History will one day evaluate this triumph against a small, enslaved nation through deception and terrorization.

15. The army, having helped in conducting the elections in Lithuania, immediately left the country. It is suspected that it went to conduct elections in other republics.

16. A full report of the murders committed by the Bolsheviks during the elections has not yet been received. The latest word reveals that on February 9, 1947 in the district of Vilkaviškis, the laborer Jonas Jašinskas was killed by MVD officials. Jašinskas, being deaf, was unable to answer the questions of the MVD. His skull was cracked open with guns and his brain was seen splattered. His corpse was desecrated by being thrown on the dung heap in the militia yard and left there for three days following the murder.

17. In this manner were the elections conducted in Lithuania — elections which the Bolsheviks crown as the most democratic in the world. And in the opinion of the American friend of the Bolsheviks, Wallace, this Bolshevik democracy is of a better quality.

18. According to news received today, an order has been given to make up lists of those who did not vote.

These rigged elections, from the initial organization of the election commissions until the conduction of elections with the help of armed forces and terror, were held in Lithuania by the Lithuanian party and non-party Bolsheviks, by the officials of the local administrative apparatus, by the members of the Bolshevik activists, by the members of all the electoral commissions, by the "deputies", MVD and MGB officials according to government and Politbureau in Moscow. All of the party officials, officials of the above-named institutions, and all others who actively participated in the execution of this hoax are hereby accused of this crime and will be prosecuted by the court of independent Lithuania. Their individual responsibility will be set after questioning.

One copy of Election rules, LTSR constitution, other election literature, and the issues of the official newspaper Tiesa pertaining to the election are incorporated into this document as corpus delicti.

We, the undersigned, witnesses, have read this document and testify that the facts contained herein are true.

Signed by witnesses:

Zvejys, Grafas and District prosecutor Budrys — I certify that this is a correct copy of this act:
The Adjutant of the district of Tauras (signature)

14. Excerpts from a Letter to His Holiness Pope Pius XII by the Roman Catholics of Lithuania.

O Holy Father, Shepherd and Leader of all Catholics, we, the Catholics of the Lithuanian Republic, ask for Your Holiness' intercession. Through the word and order of Our Lord Jesus Christ, you are our Leader and Shepherd. We, who are being persecuted, destroyed, terrorized; hungry, naked, drowning in our own blood, left without even the natural rights of men, isolated completely from the

rest of the world — we beseech Your help and care. We are now living through the eighth year of this occupation of terror and oppression. At the expense of our lives, we send to You this document of our country's sufferings, showing the shame of the twentieth century's atheism-communism, unmasking in the eyes of the world the base lie about freedom of religion in the USSR. While the horrid oppression

of the occupants has not yet destroyed and devoured us, we are writing the real truth, the harsh tragedy of our nation. This document represents the testament of the death of our Fatherland.

Eighty-five percent of the Lithuanian nation is Roman Catholic. The influence of religion was, and still is, very strong. Our nation has a very special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and honors her greatly. Pius XI called Lithuania the Land of Mary. There are countless shrines and crosses on the roads and byways of our land. These crosses are symbols of our nation's suffering. Bolshevism knows well that until it destroys the influence of religion, the nation will resist, and will be immune. Its heaviest blow, therefore, is aimed at religion. According to the bolshevik leaders, religion is as opposed to Bolshevism as water is to fire. Thus, all religions and religious traditions were destroyed in the USSR before the war. In 1943, under different circumstances and in order to improve opinion and sentiment abroad, freedom was officially granted for the practice of religion, especially to the Russian Orthodox Church. The main motive in this was the desire to unite the Orthodox churches of various nations (Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania etc., to strengthen the Orthodox Church, and then to use it to spread communistic influence in those countries. Allowing religion to exist temporarily, they made certain that religion would only serve to strengthen Communism, the influence of Bolshevik imperialism abroad. The newly appointed priests of the Russian Orthodox Church scarcely differ from NKVD espionage agents. Their role and function is to express and enforce the ideas of the State from the pulpit and to reveal likely suspects. Listening to the sermons of these priests, one cannot find even a trace of Christian teachings. One merely finds hate for other denominations, revenge, lies and Bolshevik propaganda. God is Russian in character, similar to Lenin. The Russian Orthodox Church is only an espionage agency cloaked in the robes of religion.

Stalin's constitution grants freedom only for the external religious ceremonies, leaving the road open and clear for all anti-religious propaganda. The State continuously blasts anti-religious propaganda with all the force of the methods and media that is commands. Publicly religions can only practice their rites and ceremonies, but propagation of religious propaganda and ideas is completely forbidden and banned. That is why even today the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR does not have its own press; sermons are virtually nonexistent, except for religious calendars. There are not, and cannot be, any religious and philosophical books, newspapers, or periodicals. Religious literature imported from abroad is also banned. In such a setting, religion cannot live and flourish, exchange new ideas, and the new generation cannot understand and know religion and theology in the light of new findings, research. In both methodology and experience all the secular sciences will surpass the dated methods of religion and theology. According to the Bolshevik rationale, a few years will pass, the older generations will die out, and youth, seeing religion's backwardness and lack of progress will naturally turn its back on it. Experience shows that such reasoning is valid because communication and cooperation with science, art, literature and the press is necessary for the progress of any discipline. The same type of religious freedom

is being planned for Lithuania. The Catholic priests must become espionage agents, must sever all ties with Rome, must aid the State in every way — in other words, they must become tools of the State. The Lithuanian Catholics did not agree to this. Then began the reprehensible terrorization and destruction. This terrorization is furtive and concealed. Officially everything is all right, but in reality, things are different. It is pleasant and reassuring to hear the powerful politicians of Moscow speak. But behind the scenes, other directives and orders are given. The harsher an official is towards religion, the more he is valued. No law restricts him. The orders are to put on pressure, victimize, do whatever one wants, only avoid public scandal. The following are examples of this terrorization:

1. The national church

Great pressure for the formation of a national church, as in the formerly Polish part of Ukraine, already began in 1944. With promises, intrigues at first, and finally terrible censures and deportations, the government tried to force the clergy, especially the more active priests, into spreading propaganda directed against the hierarchy of the Church, seemingly because of its lack of activity. Inoculating the idea of closer cooperation between the Church and the State and thus forming a group of activists which would become the nucleus of the national church. At the same time, the official press unceasingly denounced the Pope, writing of His frauds, deceptions and betrayal: Rome is the nest of abnormals, of hang men. The Pope was and still is the betrayer of the Lithuanian nation. The Pope is the "Enemy Number One" of all nations and of Lithuania, and so forth. The Lithuanian Roman Catholics listen because they are forced to, but they hear nothing. The government finds no assistants or stool pigeons.

4. Trailing of priests

Each priest is under constant surveillance by several persons. The neighboring houses report who visits the priest, with whom he meets. Wherever the priest is a more frequent visitor, someone is engaged to find out what is discussed there. Several agents are present at every sermon. Unaware of each other's identity, they must give resumes of these sermons. If there are variations and any trace of mildness and laxity, the spies are punished. Even a person to whom the priest merely speaks on the street is immediately suspect.

5. Taxation of priests

A priest must pay an income tax to the government. Pastors are taxed approximately up to 100,000 rubles, vicars up to 50,000 rubles per year. A pastor's tax equals the yearly wages of ten government officials of high rank. If the tax is not paid, the individual is sought out by force. It is not possible to pay this tax because the congregation, although willing, is unable to meet such an exorbitant price. Parishioners normally earn only a tenth of the wages necessary to keep them from dying of hunger; they live by selling off their belongings. Inability to pay the tax results in the seizure and sale of the priest's personal and even liturgical articles. Sale of such articles at government prices does not even pay a small part of the tax. The law allows the government



V. K. Jonynas

Christ of the refugees

to force the priests to pay off the rest through working on road construction and other public works. Fearful of the people's indignation and revenge, however, the government has not as yet put this law into effect.

10. Tax on churches

Every church is taxed up to 50,000 rubles per year. It is a superhuman effort to collect such a sum from a congregation which can barely keep body and soul together as it is. It would be hard on the priest to announce this from the pulpit. This, as everything in the USSR, is a half-secret. If the tax is not paid, the Church property is appraised and often seized. The Church is even closed. Some churches of other religions have already been closed.

14. Seminaries

In 1944 there were three seminaries. Although even up to this day all facilities taken over for military use have not yet been vacated, in 1946 two of these seminaries were closed and the seminarians were allowed to move to the seminary in Kaunas. In that same year, the government decreed that Lithuania was to have a maximum quota of 150 seminarians — the rest, about 200, were dismissed. There are hundreds of testimonies that the number of seminarians will be reduced to 60. In such a way, Lithuania would obtain eight new priests per year,

while each year 25-30 priests die, not counting those arrested and deported. There are parishes even now where three or four pastors have been arrested one after another. Often a single priest serves two or three parishes. Old, invalid priests have returned to their priestly duties and sometimes serve two parishes. The seminaries are financed solely through the offerings of the congregation.

18. The situation of the congregation

A worker or clerk who is a known Catholic is tormented in every possible way. He never attains a higher position or gets a better job. He is tolerated only because of the shortage of labor. The Lithuanian farmer is especially religious. Working on his plot of land, he is fairly inaccessible to government agents. There were very few rich farmers in Lithuania. Most were poor, working from morning to night to earn their living. But the Bolshevik land reform affected even this hard-working farmer. The government accused him of cooperating with the Germans or of something similar and seized his land, even though it often was already seeded. Because of minor offenses, often fabricated, he is called "buožė". The "buožės" are protected by no law. "Buožė" is every true Lithuanian, regardless of whether he is a farmer or a laborer or an old invalid. The farmer is patient, enduring much just to be able to work on his own plot of land. No matter how much he is pressured and abused by the government, he can manage to hide one thing or another and can therefore live better than people of other professions. That is why in 1947 the government plans to force all farmers into collective farms, so that each would earn a meager living and would not concern himself with anything else. In this way the farmer would be more easily controllable and malleable and the government would profit even more. In the USSR, all belongs to the State; there is no such thing as private property. Everyone — farmer, laborer, or clerk must "steal" from the government if they do not want to die from hunger. Wages are small, enough for only a few days. The people therefore steal whenever they have a chance. Under the circumstances, this is no disgrace.

21. The results of persecution

The results of this three-year Lithuanian religious-national resistance are grave and terrifying. Oppression, fear, blood, and suffering exist everywhere. More than 100,000 have died from torture or from the cold and hunger in Siberia. New victims are found every day. There is no home in which tears have not been shed. Forty percent of the priests, that is more than 400, are in hiding in the underground or are in Siberia. Only one free bishop remains in all of Lithuania. Two bishops died (Karevičius and Karosas) and four were arrested and imprisoned. Borisevičius, Matulionis, Ramanauskas and Reinys). The curia is suppressed, the seminary barely functioning, the convents and monasteries destroyed or scattered. No one knows when the police may come. So that no word would leak abroad, everything is done very quietly.

Thus Stalin's constitutions grandly guarantee freedom of religion in practice. Everything is done only for propaganda purposes abroad. In reality, there is no freedom of religion, just as there is no

freedom for any individual in the USSR. Even if the government gives some ray of hope, a slight indication of more freedom, this is done only to strengthen communism and to improve foreign opinion. In practice, the harshest strictures are not as terrifying as the daily fear of provocation, the constant spying and the frightening uncertainty.

Three years have passed since this deadly battle began. We fight and resist in every possible way. If we had not resisted, we would not exist today. Thousands of our youth, men, young women and even old people are already hiding in the forests. The occupants fear the forests. There alone can we find freedom. Only one who has lived through this suffering can understand our plight. The occupant is Asiatic, an animal and not a man. Whenever an Asiatic feels that he is strong, he becomes cruel and inhuman. His cruelty, thirst for blood, rage, mania for destruction are limitless. When the world speaks sternly to him, when he senses danger, then only does he quiet down for a moment, out of fear, like a wild animal surrounded by hunters. Often, when it is harshly spoken about the deeds of Communism, some think the matter is exaggerated. We, who now are living under the terror of Communism, are amazed and surprised that so little is known abroad about Communism. Its threat is not realized. Let people speak as they wish, the fantasies of the wildest imagination cannot equal or approach reality in a land enslaved by Communism. Corpses are dragged through the fields, tied to trucks, laid in church squares to frighten and warn others. The naked disfigured bodies of young men and women lie for days until mothers and children cannot bear seeing this desecration of their loved ones. Then the cruel persecution begins, often striking several generations. Some people think that it would be better if the occupant were not annoyed by action from abroad. That is not true. Things cannot be made more difficult for us. Already everything is destroyed, burned and the people are deported or scattered. We have already lost everything and we will know how to lose our lives at a high cost.

Holy Father, we know that in these troubled times you are burdened by many cares. Yet, in the name of the suffering that we have endured, we dare to ask You, as our Leader, for intercession and aid. We no longer have neighbors whom we could trust with our own and our nation's future. The occupant surrounds us from all sides. Led by Your Holiness, we, the children of Catholic Lithuania, are the only remaining Catholics in the North — an island surrounded by other denominations. We will not be able to endure such pressure for long. We will all perish. Our faith, our traditions, our customs, even our language will be destroyed. We often remember about the invasions of the Turk and Arab hordes during the Middle Ages, when such great Roman leaders as Urban II and Innocent III arose. The hordes from the East today do not fear diplomatic words and fine speeches. We often ask ourselves, where have the nations of our Western culture disappeared, where are the millions of Catholics? Are there no more lovers and champions of truth in the world, no more great men? Do they not know how their fellow Catholics are being persecuted? Have the world's Catholics fallen asleep with the deceptive slumber of tranquilization and assuagement? Do they believe that these hordes will stop once they have destroyed

us? No. In the USSR, two hundred million people of every national background, such as we, are making weapons day and night for the conquest of the entire world. Even today the weapons we have made aid the rebels in Greece and the strikers throughout the world. Even today this Asiatic conqueror has enslaved half of the world and is reshaping it to suit his tastes. The time for the final struggle between East and West — the time of woe for the hypnotized and sleeping — will soon come. Bolshevism is prepared to annihilate the civilizations of the world, its culture and its Christianity. Let us not be deceived: Bolshevism only awaits a suitable moment. Let us not mislead ourselves: Bolshevism is stronger than many think. Atomic power soothes the fears of the West, but Bolshevism will soon have weapons equally potent and powerful.

Holy Father,

1) We ask You to declare a Lithuanian Day for the world's Catholics, as your revered predecessor Benedict XV did in 1917. Let the world see the sufferings of the Lithuanian Catholics, their woes and persecutions at the hands of twentieth century atheism.

2) We beg from Your Holiness a public word of sympathy and hope to the Lithuanian nation. We endure immense suffering for union with You, Your Holiness. Holy Father, say a word of comfort as did once the first Pope, St. Peter, in Rome's Coliseum. Holy Father, we are not suffering less for our Holy Mother the Roman Catholic Church.

3) We ask you to place our plea in some manner and appeal before the United Nations. Perhaps the nations of the world will end our suffering.

4) We ask you to increase the broadcasts of the Lithuanian radio hour. Let it give more news of our persecution. Are we, who are dying for our holy faith not worthy of this? Indeed, 100,000 of our nation were tortured to death or await death in Siberia mostly because they refused to give up the faith of their forefathers and their nation, and did not betray their fellow Lithuanians.

Holy Father, we hope and trust that you will hear our plea. We have endured and suffered much, very much, for our faith, for our loyalty to the Apostles' throne. That is why we have hope that You will intercede and aid us. We are dying, but dying we would like to hear a word of comfort from You and from the world's Catholics — that our children will no longer have to endure this slavery of their souls. We hope that Your influential and powerful word will shake from their sleep the leaders of the nations that love freedom and truth. Holy Father, our letter is not up to our standards. We are writing it in the underground, by flickering lamp-light, awaiting the police at any moment. We are purposely not mentioning the time and the place, because we are unwilling to give the police any data. When this letter reaches you, perhaps we will no longer be alive. Many of those who bear this letter will be felled by the shots of the NKVD.

Holy Father, give Your blessing to us who are dying for the freedom of our religion and our nation.

May Jesus Christ, the Lord of the Living and the Dead, reign forever.

The Roman Catholics of the Republic of Lithuania
Vilnius, Occupied Lithuania, September 20, 1947.

15. Memorandum to the United Nations by the Lithuanian Resistance.

I. Seizure of the State of Lithuania

Disregarding the Peace Treaty of 12 July 1920, the Nonaggression Treaty of 1926 renewed in 1936, and pending its entry into the war, — the U.S.S.R. in the fall of 1939 compelled Lithuania and the other Baltic States to accept mutual assistance pacts and its military garrisons and bases.

It was clear that this meant the induction of a Trojan Horse into the Baltic States. Nevertheless failing to obtain support from other States, Lithuania was forced to bow to this demand.

Eight months later, taking advantage of the temporary defeat of the Western Powers at the hands of Germany on the eve of the fall of Paris, the U.S.S.R. occupied Lithuania with huge forces (15 June 1940). This occupation was prepared in advance by loud and false propaganda charges to the effect that Lithuania allegedly was not complying with the pact made in 1939 and was preparing acts of violence against the Red Army.

Immediately after the occupation, Molotov solemnly declared that the U.S.S.R. did not intend to change either the political or social system of the State of Lithuania, and demanded that the Government, administration and armed forces of Lithuania refrain from any action and remain at their posts. This was a temporary maneuver intended to pacify external and internal public opinion; it was designed to retouch the brutal aggression during the first days of its operation. Nevertheless, events following immediately after the occupation flagrantly disclosed the deceit of those maneuvers.

Even though today the Soviet Union proclaims that the Lithuanian State had voluntarily joined the U.S.S.R., the comedy of the merger was not well rehearsed during the first weeks in 1940, although some justification of the military Soviet occupation had to be shown. Therefore, Soviet Russia's leaders and agents in their speeches justified the occupation by motives of a "realistic policy."

In the summer of 1940, a representative of the Foreign Office of Lithuania inquired why Russia, disregarding the nonaggression treaty, occupied Lithuania. Mr. Ivanov, the then Charge d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R. in Paris, frankly declared: "If we had left Lithuania on the other side of the fence, Germany would have seized her; therefore, we moved the fence to the Lithuanian-German frontier."

Later, Russia fabricated her justification of the aggression by broadcasting the fable of the alleged voluntary merger of Lithuania in the U.S.S.R.

In this connection we may cite the speech made in the so-called "People's Diet" on 21 July 1940 by Justas Paleckis, at the time a Moscow-imposed Prime Minister and presently Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet (of Lithuania). He said, without any evasion:

"The struggle of Lithuania's common people is tied to the struggle of liberation of the international proletariat whose vanguard was always represented by the proletariat of the Soviet Union. These struggles and sacrifices had been fruitless for a long time, and would long remain

fruitless had it not been for the fraternal aid provided us by the ever fraternal and friendly peoples of the great Soviet Union and brought to us by the liberating Red Army." (Liaudies Seimo Stenogramos—The Verbatim Record of the People's Diet—1940, page 34.)

That is why Paleckis, in the name of expansion of the communism and of the Red imperialism of Russia, declared:

"In the People's Republic of Lithuania, the Soviet soldier is greeted as the good and sincere comrade liberator and carrier of culture."

He continued:

"I emphasize once more the gratitude to the Soviet Union and to the Red Army, thanks to whom our common folk's ultimatum to the old plutocratic order was, at last, accepted and executed." (Liaudies Seimo Stenogramos, supra, p. 80.)

Realizing that the communists could not win and hold out in Lithuania without the support of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, Moscow's agents and among them Sniečkus, secretary of the Communist Party, proposed to incorporate Lithuania in the U.S.S.R. In proposing, he stated in the People's Diet:

"Introduction of the Soviets or Councils in Lithuania could not of itself provide a firm guarantee of survival of a socialistic Lithuania. The common folk in Lithuania realize that such guarantee of survival can be provided only by their entrance into the family of the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union. Having liberated our country, the glorious and invincible Red Army will guarantee the integrity of our frontiers." (Liaudies Seimo Stenogramos, supra, p. 25.)

The legal Government of Lithuania (whose majority was deported to Siberia) was forced to resign and was supplanted by a provisional People's Government with Paleckis, an agent of Moscow, at its head. This "government" was ordered to effect the political and social changes which the government of Moscow deemed timely and ripe.

Oddly enough, the "people's government" initially utilized the former Constitution of an independent Lithuania, even though the latter's spirit was diametrically opposed to a communistic regime. But the end justified the means. According to Paleckis:

"We are applying the selfsame instrument (the Constitution) in behalf of the working people, against the people's enemies. The common people picked up the same stick, only turned the other end." (Ibid., p. 9.)

"The vanguard of the proletariat," in whose name Moscow and the army of occupation operated in Lithuania, was in reality composed of 400 political and criminal prisoners, convicted for subversive activities against the Republic of Lithuania. The "people's government" discharged these prisoners, as communists, immediately after the Russian army of occupation entered. Most of those "at once enthusiastically united for the task of realizing the people's liberation and to guarantee it" (Liaudies Seimo Stenogramos, p. 13). These selfsame political prisoners com-

posed the majority of the "people's diet" where, by Moscow's orders, they hastened to bury the independence of Lithuania and to incorporate her in the U.S.S.R.

According to Sniečkus, at that time Director of the Security Department and Chairman of the Credentials Committee of the People's Diet, who later became secretary of the CK of the LKP b (Central Committee of the Communist Party-bolshevik of Lithuania), out of a total of 78 deputies of the People's Diet, 49 persons, or 62.2 per cent of the entire membership thereof, were formerly imprisoned in penitentiaries and detention places (for subversive communist activities — Liaudies Seimo Stenogramos, p. 105). Nevertheless, it is of interest to note that such candidates were named and, moreover, elected in a country where, it may be said, there were no communists.

Disregarding the opposition of the entire nation to the occupation and the boycott of elections, the Communist Party alone drafted the slates of deputies and forced the people, by moral and physical coercion, to vote for such slates. One of the coercive threats was the stamping of the passports with "VOTED" or "DID NOT VOTE." Repressions were applied against those lacking the voting stamp—they were either driven to the polls or were discharged from work. When the majority refrained from voting, forgery was employed: election boards themselves stuffed the urns with ballots.

It is well known that these methods, first tested in the Baltic States, were later employed in Central European states. Present events in Greece, China and other countries show how a political minority, supported by external armed might, manages to terrorize the majority. Fortunately, in those countries one external force faces another force which does not allow the violence to establish itself. But Lithuania at that time, in 1940, and now could not avail itself of such a privilege and of moral and material aid, as in the case of Greece or Turkey, in order to successfully resist the Soviet violence and restore its most sacred rights.

The above mentioned "People's Diet," pressed by the occupational organs of Moscow, against the Lithuanian People's will adopted "the Stalin Constitution of the best model" (Liaudies Seimo Stenogramos, p. 10) which authorized an ultimate destruction of the political and social order of Lithuania by allegedly legal means. This was done in the sad days of 21-23 July 1940.

Consequently, within one month and one week of the Soviet occupation, a series of declarations were enacted pertaining to the state system, Lithuania's incorporation in the U.S.S.R., the nationalization of lands, industries, banks, private realty holdings. In consequence of these cumulative measures, the inhabitants were impoverished—even their savings were confiscated.

Bearing in mind that about 80 per cent of the inhabitants of Lithuania earn a livelihood by farming, the nationalization of lands affected the largest class of the population. Even though the Agrarian Reform enacted by independent Lithuania in 1922 left only 82 hectares of land as the largest norm of landholdings, which was small indeed,—the Soviet government left but up to 30 hectares to an individual farmer. Since the second occupation in 1944, this norm is being decreased by degrees. In preparation for the col-

lectivization of land, propaganda and terror are directed against the so-called "kulaks." The property of the farmers who had formerly owned in excess of 30 hectares of land (presently—in excess of 20 hectares) is confiscated and their families are evicted.

This Soviet type of "agrarian reform" is difficult for a civilized man to comprehend. This is not a simple statutory nationalization. It is an attempt to destroy the farmer and his family morally and physically, by taking away from them the right to any sort of existence. Namely, he can obtain no employment, no living quarters, no food, no ration cards, his children are barred from secondary and upper schools. His road leads to the concentration camps in Siberia.

Privately owned homes of the city dwellers in excess of the 180 square meters in space, were nationalized. The socialistic housing administration is notorious for its negligence. Many homes became untenable for lack of repairs. For this reason, there is a great housing shortage in the cities, as there is no incentive to build new homes.

Nevertheless, all these measures of socialization are nothing in comparison with the terror employed against practically all the Lithuanian population.

In order to break down the morale and resistance of the Lithuanian People, the occupants soon conducted arrests and, on 14-15 June 1941, mass deportations to Siberian labor and concentration camps began. More than 40,000 people were deported in the period of 1940-41. Families were split up, husbands were separated from their wives and children. It was verified later that nearly all of the deported male exiles have died because of the unbearable treatment. To mask this crime before the public opinion of the world, the organs of the NKVD compelled the exiles, during the war years, to sign statements that they had of their own will evacuated themselves for labor.

If the German atrocities are being prosecuted by the Allied Powers,—the atrocities being committed on a greater scope at this time by a member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union, should not be forgotten.

II. Soviet Occupation of July 1944

After more than three years of the severe German occupation (1941-1944), the exhausted Lithuanian people, together with the entire world, believed in an Allied victory and expected a reconstitution of its independent state after the victory. However, our People was slated to fall under a second, a harsher and more cruel Soviet occupation.

Having experienced the cruelties of the first Soviet occupation, masses of the Lithuanian population fled from their country before the approaching Red Army and repressions, hoping to be able to return soon to their own homes. However, more than three years have elapsed—and they are still unable to return to a free homeland.

Meanwhile, the people who remained in Lithuania are suffering a vengeance by the Soviet occupant and repressions, which could only be invented by the experienced NKVD executioners.

Invading the territory of Lithuania for the second time in the summer of 1944, the Soviet occupant did not deem Lithuania an independent coun-

try and treated her as Soviet territory legalized by the first occupation. Furthermore, encouraged by their victory over the Germans, the Soviets began to rule without entertaining any international responsibility for their actions. The Soviet counter-espionage, the NKVD and the NKGB, began to probe in a most cruel manner every Lithuanian inhabitant's behavior with respect to the Soviet rule and their behavior during the German occupation. The pretext for all sorts of charges were found under the banal yet convenient labels of a "people's enemy" or "war criminal."

Included among such war criminals were township employees and farmers who under coercion by the occupant, had delivered the requisitioned grain. The terror struck the entire country and all strata of the inhabitants with full force. During the first Soviet occupation, the Soviets eliminated and exiled to Siberia mainly the people formerly active in the independent state, the state employees and people known in political life. Presently, these measures are applied against all "people's enemies and war criminals." It is now convenient to apply the chapter on "Counter-revolution" of the Penal Code and to mete out sentences of from 10 to 25 years at hard labor in Siberia.

In this manner, the mass deportations of 1940-1941 were replaced during the present occupation by the procedure of Military Tribunals. This procedure gradually fills the prisons and cellars of private homes with prisoners. These are deported in groups to Siberia, always making room for new parties of prisoners. This means of destroying a people is no less effective than mass deportations.

Is the United Nations Trusteeship Council intended for the protection of only the colonial areas and can give no relief to an occupied country entitled to membership in the United Nations?

The war which raged in Lithuania cost her about one-third of her inhabitants, and the alleged "vacuum" is deliberately filled in with Russian soldiers, civilian employees and agriculturists. Diverse experts, instructors and propagandists swarmed in. The Poles evacuated from the Vilnius district are supplanted by Russians. Especially the counties of Vilnius, Traikai and Svencionys become objects of a serious Russian colonization.

The capital city of Vilnius became the center of "Russian culture and progressive democracy" (communism). Here resides the Soviet Council of Ministers, two-thirds of whom are Russians from Moscow. Of the present 29 "Ministers," 15 are Russians; their deputies and counsels are nearly all Russians. It is of no importance ultimately that no Lithuanians are included in this Council of Ministers, inasmuch as all of them receive the same orders from Moscow. Ministries of the Union republics are mere agencies of the U.S.S.R. ministries, and they cannot function without an order from Moscow. The ministries of foreign affairs provided for in the Constitution of 1944 for the Union republics are merely fictional, intended to provide more voting delegates to the United Nations organization.

The world is probably convinced by now that not only Union republics but the allegedly independent countries of Eastern Europe can have no "foreign policies": only satellites of the Soviet Union are represented in the United Nations.

The situation prevailing in the Council of Ministers is duplicated in Lithuania's Supreme Soviet. Distribution by nationality of the deputies of this Supreme Council, "elected" on 10 February 1947, is to be noted.

In 1947, of the total number of 180 deputies of the Supreme Council, about 30 are Russians from Moscow. There is nothing surprising in the fact that Stalin, Molotov, Shcherbakov and assorted Red Army and NKGB garrison commanders and representatives of the Russian administration are deputies to the Supreme Council of Lithuania.

The world would have been astounded to hear that Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goebbels had become Parliamentary Deputies of, for instance, France. But under the "democratic" Soviet regime similar facts are called "fraternal peoples' friendship." What a farce is made of the democracy of the Western World!

One might inquire why, after all, should these Russians of the Supreme Council outweigh the majority.

The Supreme Council is made up almost exclusively of Communists who receive instructions from Moscow. The All-Union Communist Party's Central Committee is represented with the Communist Party of Lithuania by Shcherbakov who directs the entire political apparatus in Lithuania. Several non-Party deputies are included merely to impress public opinion that, besides the Communist Party, there is another party of "nonpartisans." Nevertheless, it is known that, with the aid of the NKGB, six million communists of Russia rule over 160 millions of the non-Party or anti-Soviet inhabitants of Russia. They even manage to cause trouble in other countries. Well trained and well paid agencies of the communists are operating everywhere, aiming to create a world revolution with the Soviet Union's assistance.

After World War II, the Soviet Union founded fertile field for communist expansion. This aim is served not only by the purely communistic ideas but by the ideas of Pan Slavism and even by the Orthodox Church. The Slav world counterposing against the Western Christian world, finds excellent executors in the Balkan and Central European states.

The gains of the Soviet Union in Europe represent but a "marking-time" period for a more distant jump. Her propagandists without the least reticence are focusing their attention on disrupting the unity of America and England. It is proclaimed everywhere in the Soviet Union's possessions that, after the destruction of the British empire through liberation struggles, America alone would remain capable to resist. But there, too, the Soviets expect to rear a fifth communist column to aid them at the proper moment. Strikes are organized in foreign countries and forces are massed for the decisive blow. The Soviet Union propagandists brush aside the forthcoming war by stating that the Western Powers would not attack her, as they do not want war; the war will be initiated only at a time chosen by the U.S.S.R. itself. The Soviet propagandists boast of the Soviet might in the occupied countries, hoping that the occupied peoples would resign their hopes of liberation and assist in the destruction of the rest of the civilized world.

Time and terror, of course, slowly accomplish their task.

III. The Resilience of the Lithuanian People

Since the very start of the second Soviet occupation and disregarding all the measures of terror and propaganda, the Lithuanian People morally and physically resist the Soviet influence and expansion, and remain faithful to the principles of the Western Democracies. Even though during the late war Lithuania expected and aided the Allied victory, nevertheless, she understood then the dangers threatening her and the rest of the world from the direction of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, after Germany was defeated, Lithuania—unable to defend her rights by legitimate means—engaged in an underground struggle. Inasmuch as the leaders of the underground organization which had struggled against the Germans were dispersed and activities were disrupted, a new organization was born spontaneously for the struggle against the Soviet occupation and for the reconstitution of a democratic, free state of Lithuania.

This organization, uniting an absolute majority of the population, all freedom-loving Lithuanians of all social strata and convictions (except the communists), is—**Bendras Demokratinio Pasipriešinimo Sąjūdis** (B.D.P.S.)—the United Democratic Resistance Movement, directed by its Praesidium. This is the only legitimate voice of the will of the entire Lithuanian People. It also commands the underground armed forces which operate throughout the entire country. Lithuanian representatives, authorized by this Praesidium, are acting abroad.

The Praesidium of the United Democratic Resistance Movement hereby appeals to the United Nations and the Four Power Foreign Ministers Council to raise openly in an international forum the question of the reconstitution of an independent and democratic Lithuania.

It requests the delegates of the organized and democratic world to answer the plea of the suffering

three million Lithuanian People and to demand from the Soviet Union:

1. To withdraw the armed forces and the administration of the Soviet Union from Lithuania.

2. To stop the terror directed against the population of Lithuania.

3. To return the Lithuanian exiles from Siberia.

4. To recompense the damages inflicted through illegal occupation.

5. To conform to the Peace Treaty of 1920 and other treaties concluded between Lithuania and the U.S.S.R.

In order to assure the implementation of these measures, the United Democratic Resistance Movement requests establishment of an international control.

The Lithuanian People will then be enabled to elect its Government freely and without external pressure, as was assured in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter.

The Lithuanian People request the Foreign Ministers Council that, when the final settlement of Germany and Europe will be under consideration and the frontiers of Germany shall be defined,—due consideration be given to the eternal and historic title and interests of the Lithuanians in that part of East Prussia which had been seized from the State of Lithuania by the Teutonic Order.

THE SEAL: BDPS PREZIDIUMAS

(Praesidium of the UDRM)

Coat of Arms of Lithuania

Signatures:

Gintautas

Algimantas

Jonas (surname illegible)

Petras Vytyš

Vincas Kalvaitis

Žvejys

Kazys (surname illegible)

V. Recent Reports of Anti-Soviet Activity in Lithuania

16. An Extract from a Student's Letter Describing Student Demonstrations in Vilnius During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

The students of our school began to organize, two days in advance, a joint demonstration at the cemetery of Rasai. They had been speaking almost publicly of their intention. The night was cold, but pleasant and fair, so almost all of us arrived on time at the cemetery. There we found, already gathered, crowds of people with lighted candles in their hands. Most amazing was the fact that the entire student bodies of the University and the Institute of Vilnius were present. While standing over the graves of the fallen Lithuanian soldiers, the students started to sing the following songs:

"Beautiful is my Fatherland, Country of Sufferings, "Holy, Almighty," and others. We approached the tomb of Dr. Basanavičius, the Lithuanian national patriarch. The tomb was flooded by candle light. In the Chapel of Our Lady of Vilnius there have never been so many candles as here on the

tomb of Basanavičius. Whoever approached the tomb lit a candle; they melted later into a mass of wax which covered the tomb. The echo of our songs could be heard kilometers away from the cemetery. Our national anthem was sung several times. Although previously no one dared even to mention the national anthem, it now sounded over the city and gave the impression that Vilnius was free, again. When the University students brought their wreath, tied it with black ribbon, and deposited it upon the tomb of Basanavičius, the crowds began to sing the national anthem even louder. Thus they sang late into the night, until more people arrived. The huge crowds started moving towards the center of the city. But here they were met by police who were sitting in armed cars, waiting for them. The police demanded the streets cleared. Disregarding the orders, the crowds broke through the ranks of police and went shouting along the streets.

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